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SUMMARY
Both Plato's theory of virtue and his attitude towards
democracy -the two being correspondent- change significantly as we
move from the middle to the late dialogues. The Republic 1S a
substant ially author i tarian work which expresses an unmi t igated
rejection of democracy. Its authoritarianism is deeply rooted in
the fact that its ethical and political assertions are justified
on a metaphysical basis. Plato suggests that virtue and
metaphysical knowledge legitimize political power t but both virtue
and knowledge are so defined as to be attainable only by a tiny
minority. In the Po l i t i cu s Plato reasserts the superiority of a
complete virtue grounded on philosophical knowledge t but seriously
questions the attainability of this ideal. In the closing part of
this dialogue Plato demonstrates an interest in history and in
this respect the Politicus anticipates the Laws t where political
theory 1S not justified by metaphysics t but is informed by
historical experience. More specificallYt Plato attempts to
reproduce on a theoretical level a legislation similar to the
actual historical legislation of Solon and he underlin~s the need
for a moderate state involving elements from different
consti tutions. Because Plato adopts a historical perspective in
the Laws t his earlier authoritarianism is severely curtailed
(though not completely abandoned). SOt despite still holding a low
opinion of democracYt Plato does use some democratic elements in
his Magnesian constitution and the predominant conception of moral
virtue put forward in the Laws is not the highly exclusive virtue
of the Republic t but a virtue falling within the capacities of the
ordinary citizen. In comparison to the state of the Republic the
city of the Laws is for Plato only a "second best". Even SOt
however t the latter dialogue with its moderation t its rejection of
absolutism and its surprisingly modern emphasis on the
accountability of all officials constitutes a contribution of
lasting inte~est to Western political thinking..
INTRODUCTION
The present thesis is primarily concerned wi th Plato's
theory of virtue and his position on democracy in the late
dialogues and in particular in the Politicus and the Laws.
Because Plato throughout his philosophical career
consistently adheres to the principle that moral virtue is a
prerequisite for the legitimate holding of political power,
the two subjects are inextricably linked.
In comparison with the Republic, Plato's most heavily
studied dialogue, the Laws is a relatively neglected work.
In contrast to an almost inexhaustible literature on the
Republic, contemporary English-speaking books specifically
on the Laws can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and
articles on the two dialogues are equally disproportionate.
One reason for this neglect is probably the poor literary
quality of the Laws which has made the work unattractive to
scholars. But this cannot be the whole story, for Plato 1S
not simply a skilful author of Greek prose; he is also a
great philosopher, and it is only reasonable to expect each
of his works to be judged on its philosophical merits. This
brings us to the second, and more important reason for the
lack of scholarly interest in the Laws. Scholars have often
approached the work wi th the preconcept ion tha t the "t rue"
Platonic political doctrines are to be found 1n the
Republic, and then treated the Laws as some sort of epilogue
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to this dialogue t as a work which has little t if anything,
to add to the "essential" Platonic dogmas of the middle
dialogues. This attitude is exemplified even by scholars who
have taken a specific interest in the Laws. It is partially
demonstrated by StaIley, who writes that "[i]t would indeed
be remarkable, if not inconceivable, that a man oft say,
seventy-nine should suddenly develop new and original ideas
of lasting significance"; 1 and it is typified by Saunders'
claim that "Plato could perfectly well have written the Laws
when he wrote the Republ i c and the Republ ic when he wrote
the Laws, for they are the opposite sides of the same
coin" 2 This appears to remain to a great extent the
predominant attitude towards the Laws.
In the following pages it will be argued that this type
of reasoning fails to do justice to the philosophical
gravity of Plato's last dialogue. Far from being a dull
elaboration of themes already aired In previous dialogues t
the Laws contains a moral and political philosophy which is
both original and significant. There are substantial
differences between the Republic and the Laws. In the former
dialogue Plato expounds an ethico-political doctrine which
is finally justified by a complex metaphysical theory. The
political ideal of the work is personified in the notion of
the philosopher-ruler, a perfectly virtuous state autocrat
whose power remains absolute and unchallenged. In the Laws,
on the other hand, although Plato's metaphysical theory IS
still there, it is silently dissociated from questions of
2
power. Plato turns to history for political elucidation, and
the fundamental informing principle of the work becomes
historical experience. The main reason for this change of
attitude is Plato's realization, attested in Politicus
301c-d and emphatically repeated three times In the Laws
(691c, 713c, 875b-c), that there is no such thing as an
incorruptible human ruler, or at least that the possibility
of the appearence of such a ruler is too remote for a whole
political system to be constructed on it. Under the light of
this idea, Plato recommends strict adherence to a written
constitution as .the best political prescription. Moreover,
the virtue theory of the Republic, where complete virtue was
the prerogative of a tiny minority, is now compromised, with
Plato promoting a type of virtue less exalted, but
consequently less exclusive. This change in Plato's ethical
doctrine is accompanied by a shift in his epistemology. In
the Republic Plato underlines the difference between
knowledge and opinion and insists on the vast superiority of
the former. But in later dialogues, without abandoning his
belief that episteme is superior to doxa, Plato acknowledges
the potential usefulness of the latter as far as practical
matters are concerned. In the Po I i t i cu s eXAT}eDS is
o
exal ted as a e£ Cos o£CJI.l0S (309c) and in the Laws it is
treated as an acceptable alternative to (653a,
688b, 689a). It is obvious that this implies a change in
Plato's stance on democracy. From a fundamentally deficient
.
nOALL£La In a state of moral anarchy in the Republic,
3
democracy becomes a constitution which has some things to
offer to the creation of the best practical policy. This is
not to say that Plato comes anywhere near becoming a
democrat. But the completely unreserved animosity to
democracy which dominates the Republic is seriously
qualified in the Laws.
In underlining the importance of history in the Laws I
follow to some extent Morrow, who in his meticulous Plato's
Cretan City3 has done more than anybody else to demonstrate
the extent to which Plato's practical proposals are grounded
on Greek (and mainly on Athenian) historical experience. But
I attempt to go beyond Morrow in two respects. First, I try
to make more explicit than Morrow the political and
philosophical rationale behind Plato's specific
constitutional proposals and then incorporate this analysis
in the framework of Plat.o's political theory as a whole.
Second, I argue that Plato did not simply draw from
historical experience in general, but he specifically tried
t.o produce the philosophical equivalent of the Solonian
Reformation of 594 B.C.
This is a point which, to my knowledge, has never been
made explicitly in the relevant literature, but there IS
considerable textual justification for taking Plato as
trying philosophically to reproduce in his imaginary colony
the measures which Solon took in order to save the civic
peace in Athens. Solon was credited in antiquity with
creating (possibly the first) "mixed constitution"; and even
4
if Plato had not adopted any of his practical proposals (in
fact quite the opposite is true), he would still be
following the Athenian legislator in this respect, for he
repeatedly exal ts in the Laws the value of a balanced and
mixed constitution. There is a problem with this line of
argument, though, and this is that Solon was by the
mid-fourth century B.C. already a legendary political
figure, with almost all the Athenian political factions
arguing for his theoretical
whether he intended to benef it
inheritence.
:> 'the OA/')'O/"
The question
the OfllJOS or
neither party was debated then as it is still debated. It IS
therefore difficult to assess what exactly Plato knew about
Solon. However, some help is available on this issue, and it
comes from Aristotle's The Athenian Constitution. This work
was probably written between 328 and 325 B.C.,4 that is some
twenty years after Plato's death. But Aristotle must have
been amassing the material for it for many years, and until
Plato's death he was a member of the Academy. It is
therefore highly probable, even if it cannot be proved, that
his historical knowledge about Solon would not be too
dissimilar to that of Plato's. Thus I think it is reasonable
to compare some of Plato's major constitutional proposals in
the Laws to Solon's measures, taking the information for the
latter mainly from the Athenian Constitution.
One word of warning has to be issued on this point. By
arguing that in the Laws Plato adopts a different
philosophical principle from the one he utilizes in the
5
Republic, I do not want to suggest that there IS a radical
break between the two dialogues. In the Laws Plato
explicitly characterizes his Magnesian city as a "second
best", and occas ionally conf irms the super ior i ty of the
Republic's doctrine. Moreover, the last pages of the
Politicus clearly show how Plato envisages the relationship
between the rule of the philosopher-king and the sovereignty
of law. The former remains the best political arrangement in
absolute terms, but in the absence of a perfect ruler one's
best bet is unqualified obedience to the law. Both the
difference between the two concepts and their continuity are
therefore forcefully brought out in the Politicus.
Because of this clear relationship between the political
theses of the middle and the late dialogues, one has to take
the Republic into account before proceeding to the Politicus
and the Laws. And because the Republic's theory of virtue
and its political authoritarianism are grounded on Socrates'
moral inquiries, one has to take a further step back and
look briefly at the early Socratic dialogues. It is in the
early dialogues, then, that the quest for an understanding
of Plato's theory of virtue and his position on democracy
necessarily begins.
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CHAPTER 1: THE REPUBLIC
I THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF SOCRATES
IN THE EARLY DIALOGUES
A comprehensive exposi tion of Plato I s theory of virtue
and of his attitude towards democracy in the late dialogues
inescapably involves the examination of the corresponding
features of earlier dialogues. Given that Socrates'
influence on Plato's thought seems to have lasted until the
end of the latter's philosophical career (it can be
attested, for instance, in the last Book of the Lews i , a
brief outline of Socrates' attitude towards democracy is a
useful starting point for the present inquiry.
The first crucial question one comes against when
addressing the early dialogues is how close the Socrates
depicted in them is to the historical man. Although this is
a matter which, by its very nature, precludes absolute
precision, some assumptions can be made on the issue with a
reasonable degree of probability.
There are certain features shared by all the early
dialogues. They are concerned primarily with moral
questions. Socrates uses the "elenctic" method to prove the
knowledge of his interlocutors inadequate without claiming
to possess positive knowledge himself. In many of the
dialogues a definition of a particular virtue is sought, but
7
these attempts at a successful definition fail and the
dialogues end in aporia. In the process of these dialogues
Socrates declares two convictions of his that he is not
able, strictly speaking, to prove, but which he uses as
useful instruments - in the discuss ion: the first is that
virtue is one, i . e. particular virtues are parts of virtue
as a whole; the second is that knowledge is a sufficient and
necessary condition for virtue.
In an illuminating essay, Vlastos claims that on the
basis of the information included in the Platonic corpus we
can distinguish the Socrates of the early dialogues from the
Socrates of the middle ones and then identifies the former
with the "historical Socrates -recreated by Plato in invented
conversations".1
Even if Vlastos' claim that in the early dialogues we
have the historical Socrates is too strong, there are
reasons to assume that we have something f a i r l y close to
him. First, Plato came to philosophy under the influence of
Socrates, starting composing his works soon after his
master's death, if not earlier. Second, Plato's works were
read by a number of people who knew Socrates personally; it
is therefore unlikely that he would present in them, at
, . 1 2least in the years immediately following Socrates t r i a I ,
an unfaithful picture of him and this suggestion IS not
cancelled because he did so later on. Third, as Vlastos
convincingly argues, both Aristotle and Xenophon offer
significant evidence that the views of the Socrates of the
8
early dialogues are close to the views of the historical
man, whereas the doctrines Socrates exposes in the middle
3dialogues are Plato's own.
The attitude of the Socrates of the early dialogues
towards democracy is without doubt an inimical one. Some of
the most prominent passages which demonstrate this point are
the following:
a) in the Crito 48a, Socrates tells Crito that "we must
,
not consider at all what the many (ot nOAAOt) will say of
us, but what he who knows (0 tnatwv) about right and wrong,
the one man (0 cts), and truth herself will say. And so you
introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when
you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of
.
the multitude (LnS L~V nOAA~V 8o~ns) about the right and the
*noble and the good and their opposites".
b) in the Meno 93a-94d, Socrates suggests that the great
leaders of the Athenian democracy, Themistocles, Aristeides,
Pericles (and the leader of the oligarchic party,
Thucydides) were unable to pass on their to their
sons. These remarks are coupled by his insistence in the
Gorgias that these men were no real poli ticians, because
they did not make their fellow citizens better in terms of
the virtue appropriate for citizens (515d-519d). The four
men mentioned in the Gorgias are Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades
------------------------------------------------------------
*All translations of ancient Greek texts (unless otherwise
stated) are given in section B of the Bibliography.
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and Themistocles, all of them leaders of the democracy4 and
the men who built the Athenian strength during and after the
Persian Wars. Socrates accuses them of having "glutted the
state with harbours and dockyards and walls and rubbish of
,
that sort (TOlOVTWV <PAUa p l G) v- 519a ) " instead of caring for
the moral improvement of the citizens. Furthermore, Socrates
claims to be probably the only practician of the real
political art: "[o]lpal P£T' ;) .OAL1WV CI )Ilva PTI £l1IW
povos, ;) ~ ;)£1IlX£Lp£tV Tn ws aAnBG)S nOAlTlXn T£XVTI xaL npaTT£lv
\ \ \
. .
Ta rro x r r t x« uovo s TG)V urn>" (521 d).
c) in the same context in the Gorgias Socrates fiercely
criticizes Pericles. for making the Athenians "lazy and
cowardly and garrulous and covetous by his introduction of
the system of payment for services to the state" (515e). The
measure criticized, the introduction of payment for
participation in the Assembly and in the courts was of the
utmost importance for the practical extension of democracy,
because it provided a very substantial material backing to
the poorer citizens so that they could participate in common
affairs. How much this measure was despised by the oligarchs
is plainly revealed by Callicles' response that Socrates
heard such things from "pro-Spartans with cauliflower ears",
the expression referring to the most extremist
philo-Lacedaimonian elements in the Athenian citizen-body.
Because of the immense importance of the measure attacked by
Socrates here, and also its irrefutable class focus, this is
one of the most uncompromising Socratic attacks against the
10
very essence of democratic practice.
d) in the Laches 184e, when invited to solve a difference
Socrates
.
Xpl.V£Ueal., 1:0
that
moreonce
:I
ou
declares
aAA'
Socrates
Here
Laches,and
olllal.
,
Xpl.enU£ueat".
lap
Nicias
XaACi)S
between
,
Il£AAOV
repudiates the principle of the majority, the fundamental
operating principle of democracy.
e) in the Apology 24d-25b, when Meletus suggests that all
Athenians make the young better, except for Socrates, the
latter is quick to resort to the example of a 1:£xv Tl , here
horse-training. Only one ("£[s") or very few ("nC:Xvu OA~lot")
can make horses better, and the same is true for "all
animal s". Therefore only very few , at bes t , can give the
young the right education. The remark is important because,
first, it clarifies the Socratic conception of 1:£xVn as
,
something requiring expertise and excluding OL nOAAOl. and
second because the education of the young is by it se I f a
political procedure.
f) again in the Apology 31c-32a, Socrates explains how
,
his oatllOVtOV consistently prevented him from engaging in
political activities, and that this was really a very good
,
thing ("nalxaAws"), because "the fact is that no man will
save his I if e who nobly opposes you or any other populace
(nAQe£t: the word is roughly synonymous with Ot nOAAo~) and
prevents many unjust things from happening in the state. A
man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve
his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen,
11
not a public man". Here Socrates goes as far as to declare
that participation in democratic politics is incompatible
I 0
with LO OLX<XLOV.
One thing emerges most clearly from these passages5 and
this is Socrates' deep disrespect for all aspects of
democracy, its theory, its practice and its leaders. In
fact, this disrespect is so uncompromising that Socrates
does not hesitate to make anti-democratic statements even in
the Apology,where he is trying to win his acqui ttal 6 and
where he is conscious that such a tactic might alienate the
jury, a jury that Socrates himself twice identifies as
democratic 7(21a and 32b). Kraut finds here evidence that
the Apology is not "a sanitized version of what Socrates
said", because "Plato makes no attempt to downplay Socrates'
hostility to democracy".8
In addition to this fragmentary but still substantial
evidence of Socrates' ·hostility to democracy, the Protagoras
demonstrates how Socrates' ethical theory, and more
specifically his theory of virtue, leads In a strongly
anti-democratic direction. This is especially important
because the Socrates of the early dialogues does not produce
a consistent political doctrine and therefore his political
leanings have to be extracted from his ethical theory.
Socrates presents his theory of virtue in response to a
Protagorean doctrine which provides an excellent theoretical
basis for the justification of ancient democracy; this
doctrine is presented in the form of a myth on the origins
12
of human civilization (320c-322d) and of a subsequent
rational explanation (322d-328d). The political essence of
the myth is revealed at its end (322d), where Protagoras has
Zeus ordering Hermes to arrange for all men to acquire a~o~s
.
and oLXry, the two crucial qualities which make communal life
'bl 9PoSS! e.
The suggestion that political virtue is a common property
of all human beings is obviously an argument for democracy.
Protagoras explicitly justifies the Athenian practice of all
citizens being permitted to speak and vote in the Assembly,
on the basis of the assumpt ion that pol it ical virtue is
shared by all and is not confined to just a few members of
the community. He takes the Athenian practice to be founded
on the conception that "it is incumbent on everyone to share
in that sort of excellence [political virtue], or else there
can be no city at all" and he explicitly justifies the
Athenian practice of accepting all men ("lhcav'ros &vop~s")
into the Assembly (323a). This does not entail that
political virtue cannot be taught, as Socrates claimed
(319b). On the contrary, the main objective of the whole
educational system is to teach the young children the right
conception of what is morally right and wrong, and at a
later stage "the city itself makes them learn the laws and
live according to them" (326c-d). So, the acquisition of
moral and political virtue is for Protagoras a long
procedure in which the whole communi t y part icipa tes. The
result of this procedure is to allow the young members of
13
the communi ty to transform their innate potent ial i ty for
virtue (Zeus' universal gift of aLo~s and O~XD) into actual
nOAt-rtxD ap£-rD.
One fundamental consistent of democracy that Protagoras
does not refer to explicitly in the dialogue is the
principle of the majority. However, given that he both
attributes the political art to everybody (apart from
exceptional cases which have to be eliminated from the
citizen-body-322d) -and accepts Athenian political practice
in general, it follows naturally that he would have endorsed
it, had it come into question. Since political virtue
consists for him in certain qualities applicable to most
human beings and not in some form of expert knowledge, the
most sensible route for making a decision would obviously be
to accept the opinion that wins the greatest assent.
It is on the strength of this rationale that Protagoras
has been proclaimed not simply a devoted democrat,10 but the
man who "has produced for the first time in human history a
theoretical basis for participatory democracy". 11 This view
is absolutely right, but it has to be defended against two
possible objections.
The first has been raised by Untersteiner who questions
Protagoras' pro-democratic attitude on the grounds that the
sophist does not uphold an unqualified egalitarianism. 1 2 It
is true that Protagoras nowhere suggests that all human
d 13 H·beings have pol it ical excell ence to the same egree. 1 s
point is rather that they all share the minimum amount of it
14
required for a civil ized communal I ife to be maintained.
Insofar as political virtue is teachable, there is always
room for individual improvement and a competent teacher does
exactly this, to help his students advance a little more.
Here the sophist uses the analogy of language to support his
claim (327e-328a). All Greeks are able to speak their
language, but an expert on the subject can always offer some
advancement in his field. This is how Protagoras justifies
his profession, his claim to be a teacher of virtue: he does
not take students who have no political virtue at all and
implant it in them. What he does is to help his pupils, who
already possess political virtue up to a certain point, to
improve further in this field. But this by no means
repudiates the sophist's pro-democratic stance, because
Pr o t ago r a s does not provide a bluepr int for some form of
extreme egalitarianism, but consciously defends the
political practice of Athens. In the framework of this
practice, every citizen could participate in politics, but
,
the most important offices, like the one of the o~pa~Dyas,
were filled on merit. The underlying assumption was not that
all men had equal political capabilities, but that they all
had the minimum political virtue required for participation
in common affairs; this is exactly Protagoras' position.
One instance in the dialogue could cast more significant
doubt on Protagoras' democratic attitude. It occurs in 353a
where the sophist asks:
.
"[~]t,
,
8£,
,
Lwxpa~£s,
15
,
CI CI ~I
at, or t av ~vxwot,
,A£vOUaLV·". ,. Prima facie, this statement seems
incompatible with the thesis that all people are wise enough
to participate in politics. But one should notice that this
question of Protagoras comes in the context~ set by
Socrates, of the examination of the many's assertion of
akrasia. In this context, the sophist finds himself
discussing a highly specialized ethical issue at a level
which most common people would not be able even to follow.
Throughout the dialogue Protagoras is so self-conscious of
his own merits (even arrogant at times), that he is ready to
express serious doubts regarding the ability of common
people to solve complex philosophical problems like the one
In question here. However, Protagoras never based his
political assumption that the many are entitled to
participate in state affairs on the claim that they have
expert ethical knowledge. As we saw, he made the much weaker
claim that they possess the minimum of the political art
which is required for this purpose. So, there is no
incompatibility between his position that the many are no
philosophical or moral experts and his assertion that they
are wise enough to speak and vote in the Assembly. His
doubts concerning the philosophical abilities of the many
would undermine his political theory only if he had asked
for expert knowledge in politics. Since nothing is more
remote from this conception than the views expressed in the
myth and its I . 14exp anatlon, Protagoras' pro-democratic
position is not invalidated by the remark in 353a.
16
The ethical doctrine that Protagoras upholds is both
conventional and relativistic. The sophist regards the
community as the agent utterly responsible for the moral
formation of its younger members. His moral theory is
therefore conventional, since it relies upon the collective
moral wisdom of the community and relativistic, since
Protagoras does not question the moral concepts on which the
educa t ion of the young is based t but accepts tha t every
communi ty has the right to impose its moral code on its
younger generation.
Socrates rejects the Protagorean conception of morality,
based on what could be described as common moral sense t in
favour of a morality relying on scientific knowledge.
"[W]hat should we [judge] to be the thing that saves our
,
lives ((TCJ)'LTlPL<X
,
'LOV ~LOV)? The art of measurement or the
power of appearances? (n P£'LpTl'LLXn 'L~XVTl Dn 'L00 $<XLVOP~vov
,
8VV<XpLS;)" Socrates asks rhetorically in 356d. The
, .
$<XlVOP£vov bVV<XPlS corresponds of course to the traditional,
unexamined ethical theor ies of the Protagorean type which
draw their legitimacy from experience. Socrates wants to
replace such theories with a p£'LPTl'LLXTl 'L£XVTl founded on
objective, universal principles. This 't:£XVT} cant and
actually must be taught, but because of its specialized
character it is no longer accessible to the many. Indeed t it
j s generated by the need to replace what, in the Socratic
perspective, is a fundamentally deficient guide for moral
judgement. But the replacement Socrates offers comes in the
17
form of an ethical science the obvious prerequisites of
which are cu I tural cu l t i vat ion and intense contempla t ion.
Attributes such as these t far from being universal
possessions of humanity, are more readily available to the
upper strata of society, to men that have the cultural
background and leisure which allows them to be devoted to
the practice of the . 15new s c i enc e . For this reason t the
science in question is sui tably designed for labour-free
aristocrats t but not for the mass of craftsmen t manual
workers and merchants who constituted the big majority of
the Athenian on~os and were the most faithful supporters of
democracy.
Socrates does not deny all usefulness to ordinary
morality; he underlines its imperfect character. As Kraut
puts it: "[e]vidently, Socrates has no quarrel with the
Protagorean view that a valuable training in virtue begins
at the earliest stages of life, and that a young adult who
has received a conventional moral education is far better
off than he was 16before". Socrates conceives his theory
rather as an advancement on the usual ethical education.
This advancement, however, changes its character
drastically. From an essentially simple and universal
pedagogical procedure in ethics, we move to a science of
human deliberation constructed appropriately for
philosophers but excluding the ordinary the
majority of the participants in Athenian democracy.
As far as Socrates is concerned, it is the many's custom
18
of deciding on moral issues by their unreliable opinions
that generates the need for measurement In ethics in the
first place. The possibility of cOL
I
nOAAOL being elevated
from this status of confusion to the infallible Socratic
science is undercut by the fact that measurement itself is
defined as an art. An obvious characteristic of an art is
that it is mastered by a limited number of persons and that
it presupposes exercize and effort for its acquisition. In
the myth Protagoras pin-pointed political virtue as the only
art that is attributable to everybody. When Hermes asked if
he should distribute alo~s and 8~xn in the same way as the
.
other r£xva L Zeus replied that these should be given to all
(322c). From this brief discussion of the two gods it
becomes obvious that the normal notion of an art entails
that there are certain (and not too many) experts in itt and
that Protagoras t in claiming his conception of political art
to be a common possession of mankind is fully conscious of
the fact that this represents an exception to the rule that
connects r£xvn with expert knowledge. Socrates t for his
part t returns to the accepted pattern of taking art as
something that entails expertise. Already in the Laches
(184e-185e) he had asked for an expert in moral training. It
is this emphasis on the need for expert knowledge t this
insistence on an exclusive r£xvn of human deliberation t
which blocks a possible acquisition of the art of
measurement by the many and gives to Socrates' argument its
essentially anti-democratic character.
19
Socrates' contempt for the many becomes plain In his
argumentation from 352a onwards. We should remember that the
virtue that he and Protagoras set forward to define IS
essentially political in character. The sophist declared
that he teaches the political art (319a) and went on to
clarify this art in such a way that its political
significance was obvious at every stage of the myth and its
explanation. In this way he set the framework of the
discussion in such·a manner that Socrates, despite his shift
from politics to.ethics, was always bound to respond to the
political force of Protagoras' proposal. Socrates does that,
but not in a straightforward way_ By arguing that the many
are unable to grasp the sovereignty of knowledge and by
showing them incapable of forming in their minds the right
conception of virtue, he not only reveals his contempt for
the average citizen, but also effectively rejects the
latter's claim to participation in common affairs. The very
,
expression "oox£t o£ -rots nOAAots" (literally, it appears to
the many-352b) purports to show exactly the inadequacy of
their intellectual facul ties when it comes to the crucial
,
ethical questions on which nothing less than our £voatpovta
,
and aw-rDpta -ron ~tOU depend; and the whole argument against
the many's conception of akrasia serves the purpose of
underlining their attachment to ever-changing opinions and
to the "power of appearances" -ron
,
<patvop£vou
,
ouvapts-356d). It is noticeable that even if certain
individuals of low origin were able to learn the Socratic
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art of measurement and consequently become virtuous In the
Socratic sense, this would not at all undermine the
anti-democratic thrust of Socrates' argument because the
vast majority of the many would still be excluded. In fact,
Socrates nowhere suggests that such a thing is impossible.
But a democratic constitution does not depend on the
possible elevation of poor or low-born individuals to the
higher positions of the state. It depends on the
participation of the mass of citizens as such. By showing,
then, the intellectual and moral deficiency of the many,
Socrates attacks the most fundamental principle of
democracy, not any of its derivative and secondary
chara~teristics. So, politically, there is more to Socrates'
proof that the many are inconsistent with themselves In
their explanation of akrasia than the simple pin-pointing of
an incompatibility of two of their beliefs (hedonism and the
possibility of akrasia-352a-357e). For Socrates this is not
a simple logical error, but a powerful indication that the
many lack the knowledge that would allow them to put their
lives right from the ethical point of view.
The natural corollary of this view is that not only are
the many unable to be self-governed, but that they are in
need of moral guidance and, insofar as their inability to
reach the right moral behaviour is innate rather than
accidental (Socrates takes this point for granted by
attributing intellectual inability and moral inadequacy to
the many unconditionally), they stand in need of political
21
17
control as well. In the Protagoras, Socrates does not give
any specific indications of how this political control might
be realized. But, still, the seeds of the authoritarianism
that finds its way in the Republic are present in this
dialogue in a manner that clearly anticipates the elaborate
anti-democratic dogmas of the Republic .. In the context of a
debate where, from the very beginning, moral and political
virtue are interwoven, the demand for expert political
leadership follows naturally from the request for expertise
in ethics and the animosity to democracy enclosed in this
.
idea is only reinforced by Socrates' contempt for o~ noAAoL.
This picture IS strongly supported by some historical
considerations. Socrates' pro-aristocratic inclinations have
been questioned, notably by Kraut, on the grounds that
Socrates "was no active opponent of democracy, nor was he a
partisan of the aristocratic political faction that existed
in Athens". 18 This claim, however, is contradicted by two
historical facts. First, there is no doubt that in Socrates'
time the fundamental political divide lay between a
democratic and an aristocratic/oligarchic faction. To
suggest that Socrates' constant criticisms of the former
betray no bias of any kind favourable to the latter is
completely to disregard the historical context in which
Socrates' thought was shaped. Second, it is absolutely true
that Socrates never willingly became involved in practical
politics; but, far from being a proof of Socrates' lack of
interest on the subject, this type of withdrawal appears to
22
conform with a pattern followed by many aristocrats, Plato
included, and their political friends in the period after
Pericles' death. Connor, who gives a penetrating account of
the phenomenon, writes that "one result of the flamboyance
of the new style [developed by Cleon and others] was
animosi ty and annoyance among the Athenian chrestoi". 19 For
some of them, Connor continues, "the best course seemed to
be to withdraw from politics into private circles of
like-minded friends, small informal gatherings".2o
There is no doubt that Socrates did move in aristocratic
circles21 and that he enjoyed such "informal gatherings". On
this point Plato and Xenophon are in essential agreement.
There is also little doubt that his contempt for the many
was not an incidental feature of his ethical thought, but a
basic principle to which Socrates was deeply commited.
Vlastos aptly points out that whereas Socrates was a
revolutionary thinker In his rejection of retaliation
against personal enemies, he did not extend this notion to
cover social inferiors, but was utterly conformist on this
22
score. And if Plato's Socrates never exhorted anybody to
take up a political career as a member of the aristocratic
party, Xenophon' s Socrates twice does exactly this in the
M m i : 23emor e 1 i e . Now Xenophon might lack the philosophical
genius of Plato, but to suppose that he put into Socrates'
mouth views that had nothing to do with the political
affiliations of the actual man without anything in Socrates'
overall intellectual outlook justifying this move, IS to
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attribute to Xenophon an exceptional degree of intellectual
dishonesty. If, however, the interpretation of the political
stance of the Socrates of the early dialogues hitherto
proposed is accepted, it is obvious that the difference
between Xenophon and Plato is not unbridgeable. It is in the
degree of openness with which Socrates puts forward his
aristocratic ideas that the two authors differ, not in these
ideas themselves.
In conclusion, both the historical evidence available and
a substantial number of Socratic remarks in the early
dialogues point distinctly towards the direction of a
commitedly anti-democratic Socrates, and, moreover, the
argument of the Protagoras shows how this Socratic political
attitude paves the way for the Republic's authoritarianism.
Whatever other sources Plato's totali tarianism might have
had, Socrates' virtue ethics was one of them.
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II THE VIRTUES OF THE nOAI~
In the following sections three theses concerning the
Republic will be argued for. First, that Plato's moral
theory, and in particular his theory of virtue, is plainly
anti-democratic. The Republic's unqualified rejection of
democracy is one aspect of the' work which is often debated
in the literature. However, Plato's anti-democratic attitude
will here be approached from a perspective different from
the one usually adopted by Plato's liberal critics.
Second, it will be underlined that the ultimate
justification of Plato's Callipolis IS transcendent, i.e.
that the whole political construction of the Republic is
justified by the Theory of Forms. This has important ethical
and political implications.
Third, it will be claimed that in this dialogue Plato
pays very little attention to history. This is not to deny
that the Republic itself is "written in reaction against
contemporary political conditions,,24 and therefore represents
Plato's response to the historical setting of his time. It
is to make the distinct claim that Plato does not use
historical knowledge as a source that could contribute to
the solution of
confronts. This
established, some
the moral
cannot be
decades
and political problems he
accidental: Thucydides had
earlier, the inextricable
connection of history and politics, and, as it will be
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argued in the third chapter, Plato did base politics on
history in his last work, the Laws. What has therefore been
described as Plato's disregard for "historical truth",25 lack
of concern for "historical reality, [for] "what happened in
history",,26 is the product of a deliberate Platonic decision:
the decision to justify ethical and political claims on
metaphysical grounds and to do this in such a way that
history remains irrelevant to the whole process (in the
metaphysical scheme of the Republic history belongs to the
world of particulars: according to Plato it therefore it has
only partial existence, it comes between being and
not-being. The iYn"i)~lto,t10V) of this is that no lesson of
\
lasting value can come from history).
The challenge to which Socrates responds in the Republic
is set in Book One by Thrasymachus who argues that the
unjust individual is happier than the just. Socrates begins
his endeavour to disprove this thesis by proposing justice
to be sought first in the city because there it exists on a
,
"larger" scale (368e). He suggests that the first rcox t s is
created because everyone is "OUX :tau-rapxTJs,
,
a'A'Aa no'A'AG)v
(369b). Division of labour produces better
efficiency (36ge-370a) and conforms to the fact that each
individual is by nature suited to do a certain job (370a-b).
As more production needs arise, more people are required to
do different jobs and the city grows (370dff.). Its people,
in Socrates' description, have only the bare essentials for
a simple life, and this invites Glaucon to complain that
26
Socrates is talking of a pig-city (372d). Socrates responds
that the city so far described is c '"VYl-T}S" , whereas the
"T; PVepG)CT<x" one tha t G1aucon wants will be ."<PA£YJ1<Xl-VOVCT<X"
(372e). As even more people are required to provide for the
new, luxurious needs of its inhabitants, the city reaches a
point where its own land is not enough to sustain its people
and it ends up going to war with its neighbours (373d). At
this point the necessity of an army presents itself.
There are two points which are worth making about the
.
"l>G)v noAl-v". First, Plato realizes with remarkable acuteness
that a city starts as an economic association destined to
provide for the needs of its members. In order for this to
happen more efficiently, Plato claims, distribution of
labour has to come into effect, and this is actually a good
thing not only in economic terms (giving more
efficiency-36ge-370a), but also in terms of human
self-fulfilment (it is obviously best for every individual
to do the job he or she was destined to do by
nature-370a-b). This economic insight, r v e . Plato's clear
understanding of the significance of the division of labour,
and his conception that an individual is by nature best
suited to do one job, playa crucial role in the formation
of the social structure of Callipolis.
Second, as certain commentators have pointed out, it IS
this germinal " . 27 d tcity which is Plato's "ideal CIty an no
Callipolis which is often described as such. Strictly
speaking, the remark is true. The pr imi t i ve communi t y IS
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indeed "ideal" in that it does not Lnc Luda , in its initial
stages~ the features of Plato's contemporary societies which
,
lead to divisons between individuals~ factions and cities.
But· Plato understands that such a non-conflict· situation
bears no resemblance to the political realities of his time.
In a community which is a priori peaceful~ politics does not
apply~ because politics is primarily concerned with the
restriction or elimination of conflict (both the political
and the psychological definitions of
,
awcPpoauvT} and
o
oLx<XLoauVT} explicitly address the question of the
elimination of conflict-see also 422e-423b and 551d. This IS
important because these two are the virtues which have to do
with the relationships between classes and therefore they
have an immediatel~ discernible political character). So the
proto-community might be "ideal"~ but unlike the city of the
Republic~ it is ideal on a non-political level.
The desire for luxury brings about the need for an army~
and given the principle of specialization introduced earlier
by Socrates~. this army has to be professional. The Platonic
"just city" eventually stems from the discussion of the
character required for the soldiers and the education which
they receive.
The city is divided into three classes: the Guardians~
who come out of the soldierly class as its older and most
competent members and are given the job of ruling the city;
the Auxil iaries, who are the rest of the soldierly class
.(the term cPUA<X~ IS introduced in 374d and IS used to
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designate the ex professio soldiers up to 414b where the
distinction between rulers and soldiers, the latter now
,
called £RLXOVpOL, is introduced. From then on the two terms
are used in a specific technical sense); the third class IS
not ascribed a specific name by Plato. He refers to them by
diff erent names
,
like 0TJIlLOVP10L (421d), <XAAOL (the
rest of the citizens, Guardians and Auxiliaries
excluded-423d) or 'to XPTlIl<X't/'O't/'XOI) (434c). This Platonic
failure to name this class consistently is an indication of
Plato's lack of interest in 28them, which IS further
demonstrated by the fact that he devotes much attention to
the education of the Auxiliaries (376d-412b) and the
Guardians (502d-541b), but never spells out a word about the
education of the Producers.
.
The city is wise, for Plato, not because of the £nLo't11J111
of its craftsmen, but because of the which is
concerned wi th the benef it of the city as a whole; the
latter belongs to the Guardians,
,
a "epvo e /,
) ,
OA/,l/,O'tOI)
,
1£1)05" (428e-429a. See also 431c-d, 491a-b and 503d). Plato
applies here by implication the principle that a city has a
moral quality when the class in it for which it is
appropriate to have this quality has it and is in a position
to exercize it. This principle becomes explicit in the
discussion of bravery which follows. The city is brave not
by virtue of the bravery of all its citizens, but only of
those who have to perform military duty (429b), i.e. the
Auxi liar ies. Their bravery consists in having an unmovable
29
opeD 8~~a as to what is to be feared and what not (430a-b)
and is imparted into their souls by the education that was
prescribed for them in 376dff.
,
~weppoavvT}, unlike the former two virtues, is not "owned"
by one class, but is rather a
,
"avpepwvLa" and c •"apPovLa"
(430e). This "concord" and "harmony" consists in an
agreement that the best should rule over the worse (431b).
The three other virtues having been identified, Socrates
suggests, the one which remains is justice (432b). Justice
is declared to be "in a certain sense" • , 29('t"ponov 't"Lva) for
each "to mind hi s own bus iness ,,30
,
( 't"°
, c
r o «u r on npa't"'t" £ LV-
433b). It is also what "makes it possible for them [the
other virtues] to come into being and preserves them"
(433b) and what makes the city "1l~'ALa't"a eXlaeDv" (433d).
, , c
Finally, one short argument 1S added to show why 't"0 't"a av't"oO
npa't"'t"£LV is a good definition of justice. The role of the
courts, which in the" Ideal City are to be manned by the
rulers, is to give to everybody what belongs to him or her
and this is just (433e-434a). The definitions of the four
virtues of the city hereby summarized have to be regarded
as, in a sense, provisional (a full account of wisdom can be
produced only after the introduction of the philosopher and
the full meaning of justice is not expounded until the end
of Book Nine). They are however important because they
provide the first explicit formulation of Plato's theory of
virtue and, from a political point of view, because they are
.
specifically definitions of the virtues of the no'ALS.
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There are a number of problems involved in this part of
Plato's argument. First of alIt in his conception of wisdom
Plato insists that only very few will be able to achieve
this virtue. This doctrine springs of course directly from
Socrates' insistence on the importance of expertise in
politics t which very few can achieve t 31 but the question is
how well Plato defends this position here. His argument is
that only the Guardians will care for the whole city and not
merely for their own interests. But is there something in
the moral argument of the Republic as a whole that
necessitates this exclusiveness? The answer is no. Even
allowing for the significant role of the Guardians'
education t Plato has nowhere proved that the practical
ability to protect the interests of the state as a whole
mus t necessar i ly res t only wi th the Guardians. Annas t who
draws attention to this fact t concludes that Plato "commits
himself without argument to the anti-democratic thesis that
the citizens with the wisdom that will make [the state]
well-governed will be the smallest class in the city".32
A more fundamental logical problem appears in Plato's
somewhat mystifying belief that virtues cannot be more or
less than four. When wi s dom , bravery and temperance have
been defined t Socrates asserts that "what remains" is
justice (432b). Cross and Woozley characterize this as a
33 h
"worthless procedure", Plato having nowhere as muc as
indicated why virtues should be only four. This criticism is
certainly correct and pinpoints a serious gap r n Plato's
31
argument. It has to be noted J however J that as the scholars
themselves agree J this does not necessarily invalidate
Plato's conclusions about the nature of justice. 3 4
As regards Plato's judicial argument J an obvious fallacy
is involved if it .i s taken in its stated form. The first
premiss is that what the judges should do is to make sure
everybody gets what is his or her own. Given that the judges
aim for justice J it follows that it is just that everybody
should have his or her own. So far Plato's reasoning IS
faul tless. But Plato claims that his p r em i s s e s prove not
only that it is just that one should have one's own but also
that one should do one's own. However J the premisses state
nothing about one doing one's own and the argument cannot be
accepted in this form.
Vlastos has argued that this fallacy is too gross to have
gone unnoticed by Plato and that the argument is in fact
11 . . I 35e IptIca. There is an unstated premiss which is that
"each shall have one's own iff each does his 36own".
According to Vlastos, this argument represents a Platonic
attempt to connect the particular notion of justice proposed
in the Republic (which can be called Platonic justice) with
the common conception of justice (ordinary justice). Vlastos
asserts that the argument includes a specific attempt to
show that Platonic justice, exactly like ordinary justice,
,
involves refraining from nA£ov£~La (having more than one is
due) and that Plato can expect a general agreement on this
point. Treated this waYJ Vlastos suggests J the argument is
32
both valid and does establish the correspondence between
Platonic and ordinary morality that the philosopher aims
for: Plato is counting on his readers "to understand his
definition to imply that in any community in which everyone
c
aU1:G)v
is plausible:
IJTJ'T:£
~ .
TaAAoTpla
.
IJTJT'
Cl£XCXO'TOl~Iav"01CWS
-lived up to the maxim "do your own" there would be no
pleonexia".37 Vlastos' point about pleonexia
O'1:~pWV1:al" (433e) to which he draws attention3 8 does read as
expressing what an ordinary Greek would understand by
.
1CA£ov£l;la.
Read as elliptical in this way, Plato's argument is
actually formally correct. There IS, however, one question
which has to be asked: does the hidden premiss that each
shall have one's own if and only if one does one's own
establish a connection between Platonic and ordinary
justice? In other words, would such a correspondence be
immediately recognizable in any Greek society? If not, Plato
cannot claim to have succeeded in connecting the Republic's
morality to common morality, because even if there was
general agreement that justice consists in refraining from
.
1CA£ov£l;la, there would be no similar agreement that to have
one's own is equivalent to doing one's own.
one's own,
The biconditional relation between "having" and "doing"
39
which Vlastos asserts, means in socio-political
terms that one's property should be related to one's social
status and/or one's function in the state. In Plato's city,
which is rigidly stratified, this condition is indeed
33
satisfied. (It is satisfied not in the sense that the
highest classes have more possessions, but in the sense
that, as we will see in section 4, they control economic
power by commanding the labour of others). But iri the real
world, though this principle might have applied in some
strict oligarchies like Sparta, it hardly applied in
societies where economic power was not concentrated in the
hands of the classes traditionally regarded as the higher
ones. In Athens, for example, a metic could be extremely
rich, but still was excluded from participation In common
affairs. But we have no evidence that the Greeks considered
this asymmetry between one's property and one's
socio-political status as unjust. Therefore, Plato's
equi valence between having and doing one's own cannot be
accepted as a point on which he could justifiably expect
general agreement and this invalidates the claim that he
does establish a full rapport between his own and the common
concept ion of jus t ice by his judic ial ar gument. I t is fai r
enough to say that he uses a commonly accepted notion of
justice (as entailing rejection of pleonexia), but that he
can achieve universal agreement for his equivocation of
having one's own with doing one's own is far from clear.
This fact does not entail that Vlastos' addition of a
suppressed premiss In order formally to save Plato's
argument is incorrect: this move remains both tenable and
p I aus i bI e . ltd0 esind i cate, howev e r , a s e rious unres 0 I ved
. 40
problem in Plato's account of justice in the cIty.
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III THE VIRTUES OF THE THREE CLASSES
One cardinal characteristic of Plato's theory of the
I
virtues of the 1£OAl.5 IS that he refuses to attribute any
specific virtue to the third class. The city derives its
wisdom from the wisdom of its Guardians and its bravery from
.
the bravery of its Auxiliaries. In this sense ao<lHa and
&vcSp£ ~cx are "properties" of Ithe <PVACXX£S and the 2£1£l.XOUpOl.
I
respectively. The <puAax£s are also brave, and this on a
higher plane than the 2£1£l.XOVpOl., since they start their
careers as Auxiliaries and become Guardians by virtue of
being distinguished in their soldierly duties as well as by
eventually coming to possess 2£1£l.a1:11JlTJ as opposed to the
Auxiliaries'
I
cSol;cx. But temperance and justice Plato
defines not as properties of particular classes (in which
case they would "belong" to the individuals of all the
classes), but as relations between classes. In this way he
can include the Producers in the political framework without
necessarily allowing them any claim to virtue and
.
consequently to political authority. The case of aw<ppoauvTJ
is particularly interesting in this context, because Plato's
presentation of it involves a deep-running ambiguity. On the
one hand, if temperance, whose essence is that rulers and
ruled agree about who must govern, is a kind of "concord"
(430e), this implies that the Producers will have at least
35
some degree of freedom and rationality. Of freedom because
their consent would become a substantial part of the
justification of the Guardians' r u l e , and of rationality
because this is required for them to recognize the "natural"
(431c t 432a) superiority of the Guardians. Plato also writes
that "'to CJQ<Ppov£tv £1J£t1JexL ,••• &~<PO't£POLS['tOtS apxovCJL XexL
'tots &Pxoll~VOLs]" (431e). :lEV£t1JexL literally means to exist
in them; it appears then that Plato comes close here to
,
attributing CJw<PpoCJvvD to the Producers in a way that implies
they "possess" this virtue (along with the other two
classes).
Nevertheless t as Irwin remarks t Plato's language here can
be misleading: "[i]n a temperate state (a) the same belief
about who should rule enestin in rulers and ruled, [431d9];
(b) this concord about who should rule is temperance,
[432a7]; (c) the state's temperance, unlike its wisdom and
courage is not en mer e i t i n i of the state, [431e10], but is
spread through the whole citYt 432a2. These uses of en might
mislead us into thinking all the individuals are temperate
... But Plato says only that all the classes in the state
contribute to the state's temperance, which implies nothing
about the temperance of individuals".41
This interpretation is actually supported by the fact
that there is a decisively darker side in Plato's
psychological treatment of the Producers: "the greatest
numberand va r i e t y 0 f desir esand p l eas ures and pa ins is
generally to be found in children and women and slaves, and
36
in the less respectable majority of free men ,(XCXL -rG)V
,
'A£YOIl£VWV :J£v -rots lIo'A'Aots
-r£ XCXL
$<x~'AOLs-431b-c)".42 The passage foreshadows the psychological
model which Plato will soon be explaining, but it is
particularly important even in the limited context of the
,
political discussion of aW$poauvn, because it underlines the
difficulty of bringing the Producers to the recognition of
the superiority of the Guardians. In order to achieve this,
they have to overcome their deeply rooted tendency to be
dominated by their desires and pleasures. This being so, the
rationality which they can demonstrate by their temperance
t b 1 Limi d 43 d he imus e severe y 1 1 te; an t i r freedom IS not the
substantial freedom of checking the Guardians' power, with
the latter depending on their continuous consent, but rather
the nominal freedom of accepting the Guardians' authority in
an acquiescent way which, as Cross and Woozley demonstrate,
does not neccessarily involve real freedom. 44 The expression
"-rG)V ~A£Ue~pWv 'A£yoll~vwv" is crucial in this respect: common
people are free only by name (in the framework of Plato's
subsequent psychological analysis it will become clear that
this is so because they are "enslaved" to their instinctive
desires). They cannot therefore be invested with the virtue
of temperance or with political freedom as the "optimistic"
,
interpretation of aw$poauvn appeared to indicate and,
consequently, their freedom cannot be regarded as going
beyond a passive acceptance of their betters' rule.
The essence of Plato's problem is the following: concord
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between the citizens and consent about who is to rule are
crucial for the harmony of his s t a t e , which he rates most
highly. But all these presuppose a certain amount of
rationality on the part of the producing class. Plato
t
however, operates philosophically with a very low opinion of
this class. And he is fully aware that given the moral
inferiority of the Producers, it is not very plausible to
expect them to achieve even the 1 imi ted amount of
self-restraint which is vital for a harmonious state. On the
other hand, if he adopted a different course and placed too
much faith In the rationality and the moral qualities of the
Producers t he would undermine his political argument. Given
that rationality and virtue (the two being inextricably
linked) are the attributes which legitimize political
authority in the Republic t the greater the extent to which
the Producers "possess" those attributes t the greater the
potentiality of their having a claim to power. Plato's
presenta t ion of jus t ice is a good example of this. Like
temperance, justice is a relationship between c l a s s e s , but
not a property of all three classes. If the latter was the
c a s e , and given that justice is the central virtue which
br ings into being and preserves the other virtues (433b) t
the Producers would be put on an ethical stance high enough
to enable them to make a claim to power. They would have no
technical c l a i m, SInce politics demands expertise and they
lack wisdom, but they would have a moral claim in that they
would "own" the principal virtue, justice. So, on the one
38
hand, Plato blocks this moral claim by refusing to call them
just. But on the other, if the state is to be based on
consent and not on sheer force, the Producers have to be
somehow part of the justice of the state. By putting forward
justice and temperance as relationships between classes
Plato attempts to achieve both objectives.
The assertion that Plato does not attribute any sort of
virtue to the Producers is decisively supported by two
subsequent passages in the Republic. The first, and most
crucial one, is 495b-e. Here Plato declares that when
,
philosophy is abandoned by its true lovers, [o t s l1aALoLu
,
npooT]X£L] it is taken over by "a whole crowd of squatters
[who] sally out from the meaner trades", because philosophy
"still retains a far higher reputation than other
occupations, a reputation that these stunted natures [[ot]
, I I I I I
aL£A£ts p£v Las ~VO£LS] covet, their minds [Las ~vxas] being
as cramped and crushed
,
[Ov)'X£XAaop£vOL L£ XaL
&noL£epVpp~VOL] by their mechanical lives as their bodies
•• • 45
are deformed by manual trades [OLa Las ~avaVOLas]".
The philosopher states here, in absolutely unequivocal
terms, that philosophy (i.e. the intellectual activity on
which the full virtue of the Guardians is absolutely
dependent) does not npOOT]x£ L to anybody involved in manual
labour because such people have by nature a fundamental
moral deficiency. But the passage does not only deny to
manual workers the full virtue of the Guardians. I t goes
further in refusing to allow them even the partial virtue
39
that a superf icial reading of 431 aff. might suggest.' The
definition of temperance in both the state (432a) and the
individual (442c-d) involves a harmonious agreement between
their respective three elements. It is obviou~ that a
deformed and amputated soul cannot be expected to achieve
this type of agreement. Given that the typical social
property of the Producers is that they engage in manual
activities, it becomes clear that the deformity of their
souls precludes the possibility that they might "possess"
even an individual virtue like temperance. Moreover, if one
accepted that Plato attributes temperance to the Producers,
one would probably .have to allow for the Producers to
"possess" justice as well, since this virtue 1S defined in
terms remarkably similar to temperance and it is the second
virtue which depends on the relationship between the
classes. But it is absurd to suggest that a deformed soul
can achieve justice, the highest virtue of the Republic.
Consequently, 495b-e has to be accepted as actually ruling
out the possibility of the Producers individually possessing
I ,
either aw~poavvD or oLxaLoavvD on the basis of their natural
moral deficiency.
The second passage which fortifies the conclusion that
the Producers are credited with no virtue in the Republic is
590c, where Socrates asks "and why do we despise manual work
, .
[[~]avavaLa xal. X£LP01:£xvLa] as vulgar?" and goes on to
answer his own question: "isn't it because it indicates a
certain weakness in our higher nature, which is unable to
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control the animal part of us, and can only serve and learn
how to pander it?". This passage has striking similarities
wi th 495b-e: it connects virtue ( or rather the lack of it)
with manual labour and it asserts that the incompatibility
of the two is by nature. The difference between them is that
.
in 590c Plato makes an explicit reference to the A01LOTLXOV
and to the £nLeV~DTLXOV, and therefore this passage is
incorporated in his psychological scheme as a whole. The
typical psychological characteristic of the Producers, Plato
assumes, IS tha t they are domina ted by the lowest part of
,
their VJvXD, that they are incapable of controlling their
appetite. In the framework of a dialogue where virtue is a
question of the domination of the better elements of oneself
over the worse, domination by one's desires and virtue can
only be mutually exclusive. It is therefore obvious that the
characterization of the Producers by the domination of the
£nLeV~DTLXOV in their souls irrevocably rules out any
suggestion that they might have any form of virtue.
Furthermore, it is the Producers' lack of virtue which
sanctifies the possible use of repressive measures against
them. It is not true that Plato "never clearly decides,,46 on
the question of whether the Producers are to be ruled by
,
consent or coercion. His account of ow~poovvn represents his
attempt to achieve the former. Despite the incompatibility
of the use of force and the ideal character of his state,
however, Plato is explicit on the question of force. When he
,
discusses the relationship between the £TCLeV~nLLXOV which
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. .
corresponds exactly with the ODPtovP1 0 t, the evpO£to£s which
does so with the and the
.
A01 i o r t xov which
,
corresponds exactly with the ~vAax£s (this principle is
established in 435b), Plato's language leaves little doubt
about what means will be employed to control the desiring
part of the soul: it is full of military analogies
o
suggesting force: nOA£p£tv (440a), oTaOtaCOVToLV (440b),
o
ovppaxov (440b), OTaa£L (440e), TLe£aeaL Ta <3TCAa (440e),
. .
avppaxw (441e), xaTaoovAwaaaeat
\
47 0(442b) , TCOA£ptOVS (442b),
,
npoTCoA£ponv (442b), aTaataCWaLv (442d). The accumulation of
such an extraordinary number of mi 1 i tary analogies in the
space of less than three Stephanus pages leaves little doubt
about Plato's recommendations. Provided the Producers accept
their social role through their limited rationality, the use
of force is unnecessary. If they do not, however (and
Plato's insistence on force in the aforementioned passages
demonstrates how seriously he was taking this possibility),
it is unresevedly sanctioned by Plato. And any remaining
doubts on the issue are dissolved by Plato himself in 590d:
"wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within;
failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that,
being under the same guidance, we may all be fr iends and
equals". The passage is indeed exceptional in that it refers
to a friendship created by force. Occuring towards the end
of Book Nine, and given that the last Book is some kind of
e xcu r s us , this final acceptance of force as a legitimate
o
means of controlling the ODPLovP10t clearly demonstrates
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Plato's failure ever properly to reconcile his wish for
c' ,
social O~OLO~nS and ~LALU with his low opinion of the moral
qualities of the Producers. 48
Unl ike the Producers who have no virtue, the Guardians
possess all four virtues and therefore virtue as a whole.
The virtue which typifies them is wisdom and the whole city
is wise because of the wisdom of its Guardians (428d). The
Guardians also possess bravery, and despite the fact that it
is the Auxiliaries' bravery which makes the city brave
(429bff.), the bravery of the Guardians is superior to that
of the Auxiliaries because it is grounded on reason, not
merely on opinion. The Guardians are temperate because they
are par excellence the class In whose souls the right
relationship between the three elements of the soul exists;
this relationship consists in the domination of reason over
the other two elements, and the Guardians have the right to
rule the city exactly because this part, which is concerned
,
with "the whole [soul]" (441e) is in command in their tlJVXUL.
The Guardians are the class with which Plato is
particularly preoccupied in the Republic as a whole;
according to Annas "[a]s the Republic proceeds, Plato in
fact loses interest in anyone but the Guardians, and there
is some truth in the charge, often made, that he identifies
the just person with the Guardian type and does not care if
the other citizens in his city are not strictly speaking
just".49 But this fact does not appear paradoxical if Plato's
overall conception of the Producers and their inability to
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reach virtue is taken into account. Plato has some strong
ethical reasons for being especially interested in the
Guardians, in the sense that they are the only class to have
full virtue. The individual virtue which is most important
in terms of Plato's exposition of the overall virtue of the
~~lax£s is their typical ap£LD, wisdom; and the reason for
this is that their wisdom does not consist in knowledge of
sensible things, but it is knowledge of Forms. From 502e
onwards Plato develops the content of the Guardians'
, ,
education, which. culminates with 8Lal£xLLxD. 6Lal£xLLxD is
the greatest science, for it is concerned with the highest
ontological entity, the Form of the Good (532a-c, 534b-c)
, ,
and it aims at "n cp t, 1t:aV1:OS lap{3av£Lv" (533b). Plato had
,
claimed that the ~vlax£s should govern because they are the
class which is concerned with the whole city in 428c-d and
had suggested that justice is concern for the whole soul in
441e; but in the context of Book Four these statements had
no immediate ontological overtones. By suggesting that the
Guardians' ultimate aim is the comprehension of metaphysical
reality as a whole, Plato provides a link between the
aforementioned passages of the Fourth Book and the Sixth and
Seventh Books which explains (and fortifies) the Guardians'
right to power.
The underlying assumptions of this theory of virtue
(though not its metaphysical justification) are clearly
Socratic. Plato presents knowledge as the crucial quali ty
which brings out virtue and insists that the Guardians have
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all the individual virtues and ap£~D as a whole. In this he
adheres to the Socratic assumption that knowledge is
necessary and sufficient for virtue (because of the moral
content of the Forms, their comprehension leads by necessity
to virtue. Plato of course goes beyond Socrates on this
point, since the latter did not introduce Forms In his
ethical argument, but Plato's metaphysical theory IS
designed In such a way as to support the Socratic assertion
that virtue presupposes knowledge). Plato also adheres to
the Socratic belief in the unity of virtue. The idea that
o •
the ~vAax£s have.perfect virtue and the oD~LOVP10L no virtue
at all conforms with the Socratic ethical axiom that virtue
is one and that one cannot have one individual virtue
without having all the others. As for the Auxiliaries, their
case does oblige Plato to modify the strict form of the
doctrine of the unity of the virtues, but not to repudiate
it in essence.
The Auxiliaries are credited with a kind of virtue by
Plato, but not with full virtue. They positively have
&j)op£~a, but only an &j)op£~a based on doxa: "[t]his kind of
ability to retain safely in all circumstances a judgement
[o~~DS opens] about what is to be feared, which is correct
and with accord with law, is what I propose to call
courage", Socrates says in 430b and in 430c he adds that
this constitutes "political" virtue as well. The reason this
type of virtue signifies merely a modest modification of the
doctrine of the unity of the virtue and not an abandonment
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of it is that the virtue of the Auxiliaries constitutes a
first stage in the moral development which eventually leads
the most talented of them to acquire full virtue. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the Guardians start their
careers as Auxiliaries and they are initially given an
education which is based on doxa (386aff.). This entails
that the Guardians start from correct opinion and proceed to
acquire knowledge. Because, however, these two
epistemological states are continuous (as I shall argue in
section 7), the virtue of the Auxiliaries, its Immense
difference from full virtue notwithstanding, is not
completely different from the perfect virtue of the ~v~ax£s;
it is a first stage in the process which ends in the latter.
There is therefore one virtue In the Republic, but two
stages In the acquisition of it. The first stage IS the
political virtue of the Auxiliaries, the second stage the
;) ,
fully developed ap£LD of the Guardians.
The fact that the virtue of the ;)£1CLXOVpOL is an
;)1 hundeveloped version of its counterpart in the apXOVL£S as a
crucial consequence for the political argument of the
Republic. Because the education of the former involves the
,
abi 1 i tyto recognize reason (AO)'OV -402a), the Auxiliaries
are in a position to comprehend the orders of the Guardians
before they execute them. This is politically significant,
because given the fact that the rationality of the Producers
cannot be trusted and given that the apxovL£S have no other
physical means at their disposal for controlling the
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.0DPLOUP10 L except for the armed force of the £n~xoupot, this
force is crucial for the ability of the Guardians to
implement their political decisions. Therefore the
rationality of the Auxiliaries, though substantially
inferior to that of the Guardians, is necessary for the
political stability of Callipolis. It is for the same reason
that, in his psychological scheme, Plato presents the
thymoeides as the "natural ally" of reason (441a).
One is now in a position to assess certain arguments that
have been put forward to defend Plato from the charge of
unhesitatingly prescribing the psychological and political
suppression of the Producers. Such arguments can be roughly
divided into two categories: those which use primarily
psychological premisses and those which use political ones.
Here we will examine some of the former, leaving the latter
until Plato's concept ion of democracy is more fully
explored.
One scholar who attempted a defense of Plato on moral and
psychological grounds was Demos, who argued that the
cardinal virtues can be dichotomized, one part involving
virtues with regard to institutions (one could say political
virtues) and one concerning the inner life of the individual
(one could say private . ) 50vIrtues . On the basis of this
distinction, Demos argued that whereas as citizens the
people of Callipolis will perform one specific function, as
d . ,,51 W' dpersons they will "remain whole and self-or e r i ng: . IS om
is not only a prerogative of the philosoper-kings, because
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in the private realm everybody is a "completely developed
52[person]".
There are certain objections to this type of
is open to the same major
interpretation. For example, the suggestion that somebody
might have an orderly, well-balanced personality in his or
her private life but be characterized by the force of his or
her irrational desires in public activities is obviously a
psychological implausibility. On a more formal level, the
problem with Demos' thesis is that there is no evidence for
two sets of values in the Republic. On the contrary, as we
saw, Plato upholds the essent ial uni ty of virtue. 53 This
objection induced Skemp to modify Demos' thesis. He accepted
that all classes share justice and temperance and conceded
that "there is one set of &p£'taL, but their civic effect
varies as between the classes". 54 However, this is only a
transformation of Demos' position and amounts essentially to
the same thing. Skemp'did not explain how one set of virtues
can produce different civic effects, and without this
explanation his argument
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objections as Demos'.
A more recent attempt to show how Plato makes moral
56
"salvation" possible for all classes was made by Kraut.
Kraut draws attention to 590c, where Plato claims that
manual workers are characterized by the domination of the
desiring part in their souls. This is a surprising textual
choice for someone who wants to defend Plato from the charge
of sanctioning the oppression of the lower class, for it
48
case
expresses most clearly his contempt for manual work and his
conception of working people as fundamentally morally
deficient beings. Kraut challenges this interpretation by
arguing that "craftsmen can be trained to prefer the goals
of reason to those of appetite",57 obviously forgetting that
there is not in the whole Republic one word about the
education of the third class. 58 He points out that the
citizens of Callipolis "are tied to each other by feelings
of affection", ignoring that this affection might be imposed
from without (590d which is cited by Kraut),59 in which
it is a self-defeating notion. He also refers to the fact
that the Producers will benefit from the rule of the
philosophers and interprets this as follows: because the
Producers are not "intellectually gifted" and are therefore
likely to "develop appetitive values,,6o "it is ... better for
the artisan if the ruler of an ideal state interferes with
his natural moral growth and inculcates values other than
the ones the artisan would adopt on his own".61 Kraut finds
this intervention to be beneficial for the Producers,
ignoring the fact that it is imposed from without and it
involves a very strong element of psychological suppression.
His final argument is that since an artisan can show some
intell igence in learning his craft, he is not completely
devoid of reason. The phi losopher-king takes advantage of
this fact and installs in the artisan's soul a rule similar
(though on a lower plane) h ' 62 Th'to IS own. IS thesis is no
more tenable than the previous ones. It depends on the
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obvious paradox of the Producers benefiting by giving away
any claim to self-determination and is completely
incompatible with what Plato says elsewhere In the Republic
t
for example with the text in 495e which we discussed
earlier. On this interpretation, none of Kraut's arguments
can stand independently. But the main inadequacy of his
position is that he fails to realize that the need for the
Producers to be morally "saved" from without would not arise
in the first placet' if Plato did not hold such a low opinion
of them. If the Producers were not the morally and
intellectually helpless beings that Plato takes them to bet
there would be no need for them to .be a s s i s t e d , or rather
controlled, In their moral development by the philosophers.
From the moment such a need exists t they cannot be as
rational as Kraut presents them.
Klosko has offered a milder defense of a Producers'
. 63 Hv i r t ue , e made a distinction between instrumental and
normative reason and argued that all men are rational
because they all have the 64former. Given the right
d . 65e ucatlon t even those people in whose souls appetite IS
dominant can come under a holistic (i. e. caring for the
whole soul) rule of reason and this leads to a more
harmonious and happier life. 6 6
But Klosko's interpretation is as unsuccessful as
Kraut'st because a number of his premisses are
demonstratively wrong. First of all, like Kraut t he ignores
the fact that the Producers are not to be given any kind of
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formal education. Secondly, having set up the distinction
between instrumental and normative reason and having made
the claim that the Producers are to some extent virtuous
because they "possess" the former, Klosko disregards the
essential difference between the two. Instrumental reason,
like the Humean one, is concerned only with means. It is the
kind of reason that can be employed by appetite in order to
calculate whether it is prudent to satisfy a particular
desire at a given time or not. It is the sort of reason that
a robber uses In planning his next attack. In attributing
this type of calculating ability to all people Plato does
not credi t them wi th a virtue. He s imply acknowledges an
empirical psychological fact. Platonic reason proper, the
highest element of the soul, involves this type of
reasoning, but is not typified by it. It is characterized by
reason's self-motivation in setting its own standards. Only
when controlled by the alms of normative reason is
ins t rumen t a Ireas 0 n vir t u 0 us. Gi venthat therei s lit t l e
doubt that Plato categorically denies the possibility that
the Producers can ever achieve the highest type of reason,
Klosko's argument does not prove that the ordinary citizens
of Callipolis have even the second-rate kind of virtue that
Klosko attributes to them. 6 7
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IV PLATO'S POLITICAL PRINCIPLES
Plato's position on democracy cannot of course be in any
way dissociated from his more general political doctrine.
For this reason, one has to start the examination of the
Republic's attitude towards democracy by a characterization
of the underlying political principles of the work.
In this section some fundamental political and economic
principles of the Republic are examined. On the basis of
these principles the question to which class in the actual
historical world Plato's ruling class most closely
corresponds is then answered. And this in turn sheds some
light on the relationship between Plato's sociological and
ethical doctrines.
One key passage wi th regard to these pr inciples is the
famous Phoenician myth of 414cff. The myth is a l£vvatov
W£voos, yet Socrates introduces and narrates it with extreme
seriousness. According to the myth, all the citizens are
born from the earth and therefore they are all &O£l$O~ and
avyy£v£ts (415a). Nevertheless, some of them have in their
souls gold, some silver, and the rest iron and brass. The
golden ones are those able to rule, the silver ones are the
Auxiliaries and iron belongs to the "l£wPyots xaL 'tots
<XAAOLS 0TJPLOUpyots" (415a). "Now since you are all of the
same stock", Socrates continues, "children will commonly
• I I I ~ C ,
resemble their parents" (Lo p£v nolu OPOLOUS av uptv aU'tots
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1£VV~~£-415a). Occasionally, however, a child might be born
wi th a metal diff erent from that of its parents. In this
case, the primary duty to the god is that the rulers make
sure this child is relegated or promoted to the proper
class, for "there is a prophecy that the State will be
ruined when it has Guardians of silver or bronze" (415c).
The political significance of the myth can hardly be
overstated. It declares, in no ambiguous terms, two of the
pivotal principles of the Republic: the natural inequality
of human beings and the correlating principle that social
and political status is determined basically by birth. The
first of these principles· is so explicit that not even
Plato's modern defenders have attempted to cast doubt on it,
despite its obvious incompatibility with any type of modern
democratic theory. But the second has been seriously
questioned. The tone was set in the nineteen twenties by A.
E. Taylor who took the provision of social degradation and
ascent according to natural worth to be "absolutely
destructive of 68caste". He is followed by Guthrie, who
writes that the "moral of the metal allegory is not that it
is necessary to keep the classes apart as classes based
1 1 b i rth,,69so e y on and Klosko, who asserts that "class
membership is based on merit, not birth; ... there can be no
doubt that considerations of merit are intended to outweigh
considerations of birth".7o
This argument is formally correct, but, if pressed too
far, it can be seriously misleading. It is true that Plato's
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statements, taken literally, make Callipolis ameritocratic
s tat e . But PI at 0 c I ear I y pre s urnestha t mer i t res idesin a
particular class (the Guardians) and he strongly believes
that moral and intellectual qualities are, with very few
except ions, heredi tary wi thin each class. His mer i tocracy,
therefore, has nothing to do with an egalitarian notion of
meritocracy which would entail that equal opportunities are
given to all individuals irrespective of their class
background. This latter type of meritocracy clearly defies
the principle that heredity should be the basic factor
determining one's social status. Plato's meritocratic
spirit, on the other hand, covers only exceptional cases and
there are a number of features in the Republic which prove
that Plato's society will be in practice divided along class
lines mainly defined by a hereditary principle.
First of all, 415aff. is quite clear about the fact that
social mobility will be restricted to a very limited number
" ,
of cases. The norm (liTO f.1£V 7ToA u l! ) is that children will
belong to the class of their parents. The exceptions to this
rule are formulated with an hypothetical syntactical form
(£~V l£vVT}'CaL :IIWaOVaLI) , &v~~ouaL-415b-c),
signifying that they are to be regarded as cases that might
occur, but their occunence is by no means certain.
Second, Plato does not provide any specific provisions
about how promotion and relegation are to be regulated,
despite the fact that he gives considerable emphasis to
sound breeding. . I 71This is a criticism as old as Arlstot e,
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but the lack of an institutionalized system controlling this
type of social mobility is important in that it demonstrates
that Plato's provision is intended to cover exceptional
cases, not to substantially modify the hereditary principle.
Third, Plato could hardly take the strong interest he
does in the mating and breeding procedure, if his state was
not primarily based on mental characteristics inherited
within each class. Both 458dff. and 546aff. assert Plato's
strong interest in the Guardians' correct mating and
childbearing. But a close interest in such procedures is
definitely incompatible with the suggestion of Callipolis
being a mer i tocracy in the egal i tar ian sense of the term.
Furthermore, it is exactly the inaccuracy of the timing of
the mating procedure which leads to inferior offspring and
the degeneration of the ideal city (546dff. ).72 This is where
the assumption that the Republic's meritocracy might be
incompatible with (or destructive of) a hereditary class
system is irrevocably refuted. A state where merit is
independent of class and IS not transmitted by heredity
cannot come to its downfall by the decline of its eugenic
procedures, and this is exactly what Plato unequivocally
states here. The fact that the ideal state breaks down when
its hereditary principle is compromised clearly demonstrates
that Plato regards this principle, and not merit independent
of class, as the cornerstone of his ideal state.
Far from defeating Plato's belief in the hereditary
principle, the occasional transfer of children from one
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class to another is designed to reinforce its political aim.
As far as relegation from the higher classes is concerned ,
Plato intends to use it to check the degeneration of the
classes considered as higher at his time, a degeneration
which he undoubtedly was in a position to observe during his
lifetime. By removing unworthy individuals from the Rulers'
class Plato hopes to achieve the preservation of the high
moral and intellectual standard which he sets for this
class. Even more' ingenious is the provision for the
promotion of some individuals from the Producers to the
Auxiliaries and the Rulers. As noted in the last section,
Plato is fully conscious of the danger of this class
protesting against the rule of the Guardians, something
which would destroy the much desired unity of the state. By
allowing the social ascent of the most talented Producers,
Plato deprives this class of the members most likely to
question the unchecked authority of the Guardians and
possibly lead this class into revolt. Read under this light,
his provision for limited social mobility is not designed to
invalidate class-distinction, but rather to foster it by
perpetuating the submission of a leaderless third class. And
it IS a measure of Plato's ingenui ty that he is able to
incorporate in the same myth the conception of fundamental
human inequality and the conception that all men are
relatives. The philosophical objective is here the same as
it was in the distribution of the virtues of the state. All
men share a common origin7 3 and this functions as an argument
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for the essential unity of the state. But instead of
inferring from this some sort of egalitarian doctrine, as
Protagoras did, Plato uses the common origin of humans to
consolidate the class distinction implied in the myth.
The state of the Republic is also characterized by the
prohibition on private property for the Auxiliaries and the
Guardians. In economic terms these two classes can be
treated as one, since the fundamental economic distinction
Plato draws is between the Producers, on the one hand, and
the two higher classes on the other. 7 4 As was noted In the
discussion of the primitive city in Book Two, Plato
demonstrates a remarkable economic insight in realizing that
it is the pressure of economic needs that obliges men to
come together and form communities and that it is division
of labour which marks the first steps towards an organized
society and in this sense constitutes its basis.
Economically, Plato's Republic IS an oligarchy. It is
oligarchic not in the sense that property is a qualification
for power, which is how Greeks sometimes applied the term,
but in the etymological sense that economic power is
.
exercized by the DALyoL. What Plato fully realizes is that
economic power is determined not by property, but by the
abil i ty to command and control the labour of others. It is
exactly this power that he bestows on his ruling classes by
the suggestion, introduced somewhat casually in 416e, that
.
the Auxiliaries and Guardians are to be given ~LaeOV by the
Producers, i. e. to be physically sustained by them. How
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exceptional his insight is on this point, IS proven by the
fact that this is the economic principle not only of
Callipolis, but of any oligarchy: the higher classes live
off the labour of the rest of the community which sustains
them, and, in the case of the Republic, allows them a
labour-free existence. Although, historically, either money
or ag r i cu l tural products were always concentrated in the
hands of the higher classes, it was not this concentration
per se which guaranteed their social and political
supremacy, but rather the ability to control the labour of
the economically and socially inferior classes. Therefore
Plato is absolutely justified, in terms of political
economy, to envisage a propertyless ruling class.
In recent scholarship, Plato IS very rarely, if ever,
given full credit for the exceptional clarity with which he
is able to distinguish property ownership and real economic
power. More often he is simply misunderstood. Klosko, for
example, completely failing to realize that Plato's economic
planning fully consolidates his political system, suggests
that "partial communism works to satisfy the economic
longings of the lower class", 75 but is puzzled by the fact
Plato did not extend it to the Producers. Guthrie talks
about Plato's "dream of a complete divorce of political and
economic power" 76 But this is the last thing Plato has in
mind. He divorces political domination from monetary, not
from economic power; and he has a very good reason to do so.
The economic structure of Callipolis offers a crucial
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advantage to the higher classes. It eliminates internal
divisions of interest in t hem , and secures the unity that
Plato craves for. (Although his overall argument depends on
the consent of the Producers to guarantee the unity of the
state t Plato is painfully aware of the' problem of the unity
of the ruling class. Twice he declares that the unity of the
state is a question of the unity of the Guar d i ans-e s oSb ,
545d-e). As Winspear r ema r ks , "[v]iewed in its historical
context t there can be little mystery about the much debated
Platonic communism. It represents part of the constant
debate among Greek conservatives as to how their power could
best be maintained".77 Power of course depends very much on
unity. And , as far as unity is c onc e r ne d , Plato comes up
here with the perfect answer t since he completely eliminates
the most probable cause of conflict within the higher class t
diversity of economic interest. To what extent this is a
practical proposition is another . 78questIon. It hardly
matters t however t since the Republic is supposed to be a
pattern to aspire tOt not a political proposal to be
literally put into effect. 79
Both the hereditary principle and the model of division
of labour that Plato adheres to are principles strongly
associated with the landed aristocracy of Athens at his
time. The hereditary principle is of course crucial because
no aristocracy can be maintained without it. It does not
involve simply inheritance of property (in Plato's case
inheritance of the right to command labour)t but also
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inheritance of social status. Plato does make social status
dependent on moral and intellectual qualities. But given his
belief that these will by and large be genetically
transmitted within each class, it is not something
decisively different from the inheritance of social
positioning. As for the exceptions, they do violate the
hereditary principle as such, but they confer the
considerable advantage of reinforcing the vIgour of the
higher classes at the expense of the lower ones. Individuals
moving across the class bo rders do not invalidate the
social system itself. In the Republic's case in particular,
this movement is designed to fortify class~distinction, not
to defy it.
As for Plato's division of labour, it exactly corresponds
with the division of labour which the rule of a landed
aristocracy requires. (It needs to be made clear again that
in economic terms aristocracy is a form of oligarchy, 1. e.
rule by the few, but not the specific form of oligarchy
distributing political rights on the basis of property
qualifications). This suggestion is fortified by the fact
that Plato's aversion to certain other types of property,
those which are not based on land and are alienable, is made
plain In the Republic. Commercial activities are never
expl ic i t l y ment ioned in the framework of Call ipol is, but
.
they probably fall into the same category as ~avauoLa,
manual work. In 547d Plato remarks that one of the features
of the ideal city that timocracy preserves is abstinence
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from X£LPO~£XVLQV xaL ~On aAAov Xpn~a~La~OOt the latter
obviously involving commerce.
Contempt for manual work t another intrinsic part of
aristocratic ideologYt is a recurrent motif in the Republic
(e.g. 397e t 434a t 443c t 495e t 522b). This subject will be
examined in the next section t because it is immediately
relevant to the issue of the philosopher's attitude to
democracy.
To the extent that Plato has a real-life model for his
ideal citYt it is Sparta that performs this role. so Sparta is
of course sharply distinguished from the ideal state t but it
is explicitly declared the best of the existing states
(545a) and it iS t together with Crete, the degenerate state
in which appetite has not yet come to rule. Its constitution
was indeed a proper landed aristocracy and Plato praises it
for the abstinence of its citizens from manual occupations
(547d). Lycurgus had forbidden Spartans to get involved in
money-making activities (in which Plato follows him) and its
political stability was admired throughout the Greek world.
Nevertheless t one should exercize caution as regards the
extent of the analogy. Plato is describing the declining
Sparta of the fourth century and he does have some serious
misgivings about Spartan manners. He attributes to the
Lacedaimonians extreme and unbalanced preoccupation with war
and greediness (547e-548a). But the deeper reason Plato
could never unqualifiedly accept Sparta's model is its
complete lack of artistic or intellectual achievement t the
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monolithic militarism which essentially isolated it from the
cultural achievements of the rest of the Greek world. B1
Despi te Plato's doubts concerning the ethical character
of its ci tizens, however, his admiration for Sparta as an
economic model can -hardly be doubted. Aristotle notices the
parallel betwe~n Plato's economic structure and the Spartan
system and comments that according to Plato "the guardians
are not to farm the land; and even that is a rule which the
Spartans already attempt to follow-. B2 Barker has criticized
this statement by pointing out that the Guardians do not own
the land as in Sparta (in other words they have the use of
the products of the land, not its "legal" possession)B3 and
that the farmers are not helots. Both points are formally
correct; neither, however, diminishes the value of
Aristotle's remark, if the latter is viewed from a purely
economic point of view. The fact that the Guardians have
only the use of the agricul tural products does not affect
the division of labour that Plato prescribes for his city
and despite the fact that the Producers are free citizens by
name, economically their position is not all that different
from that of the helots. Plato's remark in 547b-c that those
who in the ideal state were £A£~e£pOL,
I
C/>LAOL and 't poC/>£ r s
become in timocracy n£p~oLxOL and oLx£'taL would be valid
only if he had been able to establish beyond dispute that
the Producers will accept their role willingly. His failure
to do that, which we discussed in section 2, decisively
weakens this assumption.
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Both Plato's adherence to the hereditary principle as a
means for enforcing class-distinction (exceptions to this
rule being designed to fortify this distinction) and his
endorsement of an economic model dividing labour along the
Spartan lines constitute proof of Plato's own particular
class preferences; and as we will now see, the division of
labour he envisages in the Republic is inextricably
interwoven with his moral argument.
One of the major features of Plato's economic system is
that it secures for its higher classes freedom from manual
labour, historically an essential prerogative of a landed
aristocracy. On this point the interdependence between
Plato's economic structure and his ethical theory is
revealed. Given his own concession that manual work 1S
morally destructive, that it deforms the soul (495e), it
becomes clear that a fundamental presupposition for virtue
is a leisured existence. Plato in fact declares this
emphatically in 395b: "[s]o we argued originally that our
G d i 84 b f d f 11uar i ans must e ree rom a forms of manual work".
This passage, occuring in the context of the exposition of
the Guardians' education (before their division into
Guardians proper and Auxiliaries), clearly demonstrates that
virtue, far from being the universally attainable property
that a mer i tocra tic reading of the Republ i c i mp I .i e s , is
essentially grounded on social conditions, i.e. freedom from
the need to work. This interdependence of social condi t ion
and moral status has to be taken into account if a full
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understanding of Plato t s ethico-political theory IS to be
achieved. Bernard Williams, for example, working purely from
premisses of moral psychology, is baffled by the following
puzzle: "logistic supremacy and fitness to be a guardian are
of course for Plato necessarily connected. But how about
epithymetic motivation and fitness to be a ODPLOUP1~s? Not
even Plato at his loftiest can have believed that what
actually qualified somebody to be a cobbler was the strength
of his £1(LeUIJ~exL.,,85 But this might look less improbable once
one realizes that for Plato manual work is an occupation
which deforms the soul and makes virtue unattainable, or, to
put it the other way, virtue requires abstenance from
"vulgar" activities. In this sense, moral weakness and
.
manual work, (3exvexU"C1LeX, go together; the former, manifested
psychologically by the force of one's desires, does
"qualify", or rather does restrict one to be a demiourgos.
Platonic justice, the requirement that everyone does the
job he or she is best fitted to do by nature, is justified
by Plato on the grounds that one's moral qualities should
decide one's social position. But this is not a one way
road. Given that someone already involved in manual
occupations has a deformed and cramped soul, Plato's moral
argument excludes, from the very beginning, the large
majority of citizens from any claim to virtue, and,
consequently, to any form of pol it ical power. In this way,
Plato's sociology supplements his ethical theory in blocking
any active political role for the democratic masses.
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V THE REPUBLIC ON DEMOCRACY
As a political work. the Republic represents a sustained
and devastating onslaught on all aspects of democracy as
Plato knew it. He relentlessly attacks the fundamental
theoretical principles of this type of constitution. its
practices and the moral and intellectual qualities of the
social groups which supported the Athenian democracy and
politically benefited from it .
. The Platonic repudiation of democracy is by no means
restricted to his formal discussion of democracy as a
degenerate consti tution In Book Eight. It is a recurrent
motif in the work. and. in a
argument of the Republic is
inefflciency and disregard for
certain sense,
an attempt to
na ture to which
the whole
prove the
democratic
theory and practice give expression.
bl . f P 86 th G kWith the possi e exc ep t i on 0 r o t a go r a s , e ree s
did not develop a consistent and systematic democratic
theory. According to Finley it was the "philosophers [who]
attacked democracy; the committed democrats responded by
ignoring them. by going about the business of government and
politics in a democratic way. without writing treatises on
the sUbject".87
But although there was not a systematic democratic
theory. there def ini tely were certain not ions which were
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absolutely crucial in the development of what can be
described as democratic ideology. The two most crucial ones 8 8
~ '89
were taovO~La (initially equality before the law but later
also "equality through the law,,)9o and ~LaT1l0pLa (the
prerogative of a citizen to speak before the Assembly) and a
word used sometimes as synonym for democra~y.91
The common denominator of the two notions is that they
imply political equality between citizens in a way that
excludes discrimination on the basis of wealth or birth.
They both underpin the principle of the majority which can
only operate on the theoretical basis that the opinion of
one ci t izen is as good as that of any other. And they
functioned in democratic practice as guarantees for the
prerogative of any citizen, irrespective of class, to
participate in the Assembly, the ultimate decision-making
authority of the state.
,
Plato uses taOVo~La twice In his discussion of democracy:
in 561e, In the framework of the description of the
psychological character of the democratic man he talks of
, ,
"['rov] f3Lov
,
LaovollLxOO 'rLVOS &vopos". Here the word is
cl ear ly a synonym f or "oT1~oxpa'rL xo ti!". In 563b Plato talks
, '
about the "LaovollLa xo t, £A£Ve£pLa" that prevail in the
relationship between men and women in democracy. The
statement does not make sense historically, given the
exclusion of women from social and political life. What it
does declare is that isonomy is a cause of democratic
licentiousness, which for Plato is one of the most prominent
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defects of democracy. Here the close connection between
isonomy and democracy is again easily discernible, with
Plato treating isonomy not as a theoretical notion In
itself, but only as a typical feature of democracy.
The fact that Plato does not discuss ~LaovollLa (or
:JLaryyopLa which is nowhere mentioned in the work) as a
theoretical notion in the Republic is symptomatic of his
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refusal to take on a specific democratic argument. What he
does is first to refute both by his overall argument, by
employing the maxim of the fundamental inequality of human
beings, and second to repudiate the principle of democratic
equality by substituting for it the notion of a geometric or
proportional equality. As far as the first strategy is
concerned, the Phoenician myth of 415a-c is immediately
relevant. What Plato in essence does is to declare human
inequality as an axiomatic proposition; having done that, he
has no need to argue explicitly against a specific
democratic doctrine. As for democratic ideology, the
fundamental principles of Plato and his democratic opponents
are so far apart that there is hardly any common ground for
discussion. Which argument one sides with becomes simply a
question of where one stands on the subject of equality
among citizens. Plato consolidates his anti-egalitarian
doctr ine by the ethical and pol it ical arguments of Book
Four, the anti-democratic character of which was discussed
in section 2. Plato's second response to . 1
9 3
unlversa
democratic equality is admittedly sketchy, but still clearly
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discernible. In 558c he comp l a i ns of democracy that it IS
c . • ~I • :t ' I
"0J10LWS LO'OLS 1::£ XCXL CXVLO'OLS OLcxV£J10vO'cx". What Plato employs
here is the notion of geometrical equality, an undoubtedly
aristocratic concept of Pythagorean origin. 9 4 According to
Dodds "it may well be the Pythagorean answer to the
democratic slogan of "equality".95
,,[CH] lO'~1::Tlsry l£WJ1£1::PLX~" is introduced in the Platonic
corpus in Gorgias 508a, without being explained or supported
by argument. In that context it is intended to refute
Callicles' defense of pleonexia, "without thereby conceding
Callicles' assumption that if justice . ,IS LO'01::TlS, it would
justify equality between the masses and their betters
Thus "geometrical" would be used to break the democratic
stranglehold on , 96LO'01::TlS". Vlastos, who offers the above
penetrating comment, is baffled by the fact that "Plato is
so uncommuni ca t i ve about it" and supposes that "P la to has
not yet detached this doctrine from the metaphysical
framework In which he received . t" 971 • Vlastos then
ass urnesthat " ( a ) [ PI at 0 is] unsur e 0 f the ext en t 0 f his
agreement with it and/or (b) such a discussion is
thematically precluded by the exclusively moral interests of
the Gorgias". 98 Wha t is diff icul t to grasp about (a) is how
Plato could use geometrical equality in such a brilliant way
as to refute both Callicles and the democrats in one
masterly move (Vlastos' first argument clearly brings out
the anti-democratic tendencies of the Gorgias) without being
"sure" of its political implications. I believe Vlastos'
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second explana t ion makes more sense, and can equally be
applied to the Republic, where again geometrical equality 1S
left undeveloped. In the political scheme of the latter work
Plato does apply geometrical equality· in the sense that
everyone receives from the state what is appropriate for his
social position. From this point of view geometrical
equality exists at the very core of the Republic. Why Plato
does not make more of it on a formal level remains an open
question. Thematic considerations could be part of the
explanation. Another reason, though this can only be a
speculation, is .tha t his disciples in the Academy, where
Pythagoreanism was studied in depth, might have been
familiar with the concept and therefore not much exposition
would be necessary. Aristotle explicitly endorses
proportionate equality99 and if we accept that the Laws was
directed to a wider audience, this explains the fact that
Plato discusses this type of equality at greater length in
that work (756e-758a). Fd na Ll.y , none of the characters of
the Republic expounds a democratic argument, which would
have given Socrates
proportionate equality.
the opportunity to elaborate on
Another aspect of democratic theory which definitely came
under Plato's notice was the democrats' claim that their
~ e' .bl 100constitution aimed at the greatest £A£V £pt<x POSS! e.
~EA£Ve£p~<x was for the Greeks primarily a question of birth
(one had to be born to free parents to be oneself free) and
on the level of the city, the term designated a self-ruling
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community. But in democratic theory the notion ,took
overtones of what we might call self-expression or the right
of every citizen to live the way he chose. 1 0 1 No ancient
author takes the democrats' claim on virtue more seriously
than Plato. 1 0 2 who responds to it in two ways. The first is to
present the democratic notion of freedom as the equivalent
of unlimited and morally destructive licentiousness. Plato
does not dispute the democrats' assertion that their
constitution aims at freedom. His first remark on democracy
is that its citizens become "n:pGH;OIJ J1~1J on £A£~e£pOL. x<X~
. , '. 103£A£v8£PL<XS D n:OAlS J1£a~n xal n:appnal<XS .lLYIJ£~<XL" (557b).
But he attempts to defame this concept of freedom by
equating it with anarchy: everybody in democracy can choose
their own constitution (557d). Nobody is obliged to obey any
authority. and even if the law precludes somebody from
becoming ruler or judge. one can do it if it comes one's way
(557e-558a). Convicted criminals go around unpunished
(558a). The high principles of Callipolis are met with
,
x<x~a~pOlJnaLS (558b). As regards the politicians' moral
status. nothing counts "provided they profess themselves the
people's friends". "llnJ1oxpa~~a". Plato concludes. is "Do£t<X
n:oAL~£~a xa~ avapxos xa~ n:OLX~An" (558c).
Plato uses the notion of freedom which was associated
wi th democracy in a de r oga t o r y sense in a number of other
passages. In 561d it is one of the names which the
democratic man uses to describe his morally anarchic life.
In 562cff. the desire for freedom entails disobedience to
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the rulers and opens the way to tyranny. Similarly, in 564a,
in the beginning of his description of the constitutional
transition from democracy to tyranny, freedom is described
• ~ " I
as Le a d i ng to its extreme opposite, "c Ls ectcxv OOUA.£LCXV". In
572e it is the name used as a euphemism for "complete
licence", ncxpcxvolllCX. But Plato's deepest objection to
democrat ic freedom comes in 563b: "[-r]~ ••• ~o"x.cx-rov r n s
.
nATleOVS" comes when "ot :J£CUVTlIl£VCXl XCXl cCXl
,
GlO"l -ruW nplcxll£vcuv". What is
absolutely unacceptable for Plato is that £A.£Ue£p~cx 1S, in
his opinion, destructive of all social hierarchy. It not
oniy defies the social stratification within the
citizen~body, but it even goes as far as blurring the most
fundamental of social distinctions, that of freemen and
slaves. It 1S the de facto association of freedom and
equality that Plato objects to, going to absurd lengths in
suggesting that even domestic animals enjoy unprecedented
freedom in democracy (562e, 563b-c).
In attacking freedom, however, Plato paints a completely
inaccurate historical portrai t of Athenian society. It is
impossible to see how such an amorphous state as the one he
depicts could come close to ruling the whole Greek world and
be the major power 1n the Eastern Mediterannean for almost a
century. The issue of Plato's gross distortions of
historical facts will be more fully examined in section 8.
Plato distinguishes this type of freedom from what we
might call Platonically "true" freedom. Because he never
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discusses the notion specifically, his conception of it has
to be extracted from the way he uses the term in contexts
where it is not associated with democracy. So in 576a it IS
stressed that the tyrant can "never taste true friendship of
freedom". In 577c the city governed by the tyrant is not
:I •
"£A EVe eoca:' but
. .
"J1aALeJ'(a OOVAT]V". In 577d-e the best
.
elements in the tyrant's soul are "enslaved (OOVA£V£LV) and
completely controlled by a minority of the lowest and most
lunatic impulses". For this reason "0 r o OV'tL 't~pavvos r c
\ \
OV'tL (01)AOS :I •[£O"(L]" (579d). For Plato, then, "true" freedom
consists in the best elements in both soul and city having
control over the worse. This notion of freedom is further
developed in 589c-590d. Here Plato emphasizes that
&V£A£Ve£p~a is the result of the subordination of the
eVJ10£LO~S to the £nLeVJ1T]'ttX~V (590b); and in 590d he
declares that epithymetic people should be subjected
("00 1)AOV o£tv £LVat") "to the same rule with those who
are governed by their rational part", and that this is not
:I •
"£nt
. ,
~Aa~T] 'tn '(01) OOVAOV". The profound authoritarianism of
\ \
this assumption has already been discussed. It IS indeed
remarkable that Plato, in responding to the democrats' claim
on £A£Ve£p~a, creates a notion of freedom which explicitly
denies self-determination to the Producers.
Plato's attack on democratic practices is another
recurrent theme of the Republic. One cardinal feature of
democratic practice was popular participation in juries
which were considered as representative of "the demos itself
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. t . ,,104 Ad' .r n ac 10n . ccor a ng to Ar i s t o t l a , one of the Solonian
measures which gave rise to democracy was the right of
~CP£(JLS which was conceded to the 7IA1'}eOS, because "X~PLOS lap
l}v 0 81'}110S r n s tpDCPOU X~PLOS l~lv£'[aL r n s TCOAL'r£~as". 105 Based
on his assumption that justice consists in everyone doing
his own, Plato emphasizes that the farmer should never be a
judge (397e); and in a hardly concealed assault on popular
juries, he insists that there is no greater shame for
somebody than to take refuge 1n the justice of others
instead of relying on his or her own justice (405a-b). The
passage concludes with an outspoken reference to "a jury
dozing on the bench" (405c).
Plato's most venomous attack on democratic practice is
contained not in Book Eight, where democracy is analyzed in
terms of psychology rather than of political practice, but
in the parable of the ship (488aff.). The parable is
intended to explain how real cities do not employ
philosophers, which, according to Plato's argument, would be
the only way for them to acquire a good government. What is
notable about this parable is, first, that it contains the
only use of the Craft Analogy after Book One, and second,
the particular violence of Plato's onslaught on democratic
practice. The philosopher describes how in one ship
(Athens)106 or in many (Greek democratic cities in general),
the owner (the demos)-Plato writes
.
"vauxADPoS"; he
,
purposefully avoids xu{3£PVD'rDS which implies expertise-is
besieged by the sailors (demagogues) who try to persuade him
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to let them have the helm. None of them has ever studied
navigation and they uphold it cannot be taught. Moreover,
they are ready to put to death whoever says it is
teachable-the reference is clearly to Socrates' trial. They
fight each other virtually to death over control of the
ship. They layout the owner by drugs or drink or in any way
they can. Eventually one group of them wins, after which
they embark on an orgy on board, proclaiming whoever helps
them a great navigator at the same time that the ship
travels virtually on its own. Little wonder, then, that the
real philosopher will not enjoy great respect in such a
situation (488e-489a).
There are a few points about the ship parable which .are
important. First, Plato's choice of language. The demos is
"larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf
and short-sighted, and similarly limited in seamanship"
(488a-b) . The sailors are
,
"a-raataCol)-rcxs npos
(488b) and lethal violence is the name of the game. The
flattering politicians use every means available to them to
,
get the approval of the I)cxvx'AT]pos and the whole situation
results in a ship practically uncontrolled, whereas the real
philosophers stay unused or are even put to death. There is
hardly a political vice absent from democracy.
The parable is a caricature of the Athenian way of going
about politics, and, given the stunning political success of
Athens within the Greek world, it is completely
unjustifiable historically. It also seems to make use of the
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Socratic Craft Analogy, though Plato has now metaphysical
reasons to abandon it (the expertise of the craftsman
belongs to the world of particulars). But there is no
inconsistency in Plato's thought on this point, for two
reasons. First, despite its extraordinary clarity, the
simile of the ship is only a metaphor designed primarily to
expose the inadequacies of democratic government, not an
argument to be taken literally. Second, Plato has already
exposed his metaphysical and epistemological doctrines and
has made clear that the art of ruling presupposes not the
empirical knowledge of the artisan, but the "scientific"
knowledge of the philosopher who knows the difference
. .
between £1CLO"-rT'/l-lTJ and ool;ex and is able to shape his life
according to the pattern of the Forms. Consequently, there
can be no confusion between his own political ideal and the
simpler Socratic one which was void of such ontological
overtones.
In the framework of the same argument, explaining why
real philosophers are left unused in contemporary societies,
Plato describes how the true philosophical natures are
(
corrupted by the sophists and, even more strongly, by OL
.
noAAoL. Every democratic crowd has this destructive effect
for Plato, but most notably £XXATJO"~exL, oLxexO"-rDPLex (the twin
.
pillars of the sovereignit.y of the demos) 8£ex-rpex (another
.
intrinsic part of democratic culture) and O"-rpex-ro1C£oa (492b).
No sound educat.ion can prot.ect a talented young man from the
corrosive influence of such crowds and he inevitably becomes
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"one of them" (492c). As for those who resist the influence
of the mob, they are severely punished with
"disfranchisement, fines or death" (492d), another reference
to Socrates' fate.
This passage connects Plato's conception of the
constitutional apparatus of democracy with his opinion of
the masses. It brings us therefore straight to the third
element of Plato's rejection of democracy, his contempt for
the social categories which provided the mainstream support
of democracy in Athens. To a very considerable extent these
were merchants, sailors, artisans and wage-earners. Such
social categories could differ widely in terms of wealth and
social outlook, but were alike in having no pretensions to
noble birth and being the beneficiaries of the
meta-Cleisthenian democracy which permitted them
collectively an unprecedented degree of political power.
There are a number of passages in the Republic which express
Plato's resentment against these groups. We have already
discussed two of them, 495b-e and 590c. In both the passages
Plato explicitly associates manual labour with moral
deficiency. The same principle is emphatically upheld in
371e, where Plato labels wage-earners, probably the lowest
group of citizens both economically and socially, men "who
. ]" 107 Ihave no great powers to contribute [to society. n
495eff., Plato narrates the story of "some bald-headed
tinker ~ho's just got out of prison and come into money, and
who has a bath and dresses himself up in a new suit, like a
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bridegroom, and sets off to marry his boss's daughter
because her family's fallen on hard times" (495e). "What
sort of children are they likely to produce?" Socrates then
, I
asks. "A mean and misbegotten lot [voea xo t <pa1H.a], I think"
(496a).
This passage is interes t ing in a number of respects: it
declares Plato's endorsement of the existing social
hierarchy (the philosopher explicitly laments the fact that
the tinker marries into a social class higher than his own);
it gives clear expression to Plato's contempt for banausics,
and especially those who use their money to attempt the
amelioration of their social position; and it forcefully
reinstates Plato's conviction that moral qualities are
hereditary: although Plato is speaking metaphorically 1n
this story, his conviction that the children of a <patH.os
will be <paVAa themselves is revealing.
Plato's contempt for manual workers as a social category
is extended to their political role in democratic Athens.
His treatment of 0 Snuo s is crucial in this respect. The
word had pr inc ipally two meanings. Formally it meant the
whole citizen body, which in democracy was sovereign through
its decisions in the Assembly. But it was also used to
designate the common people, the low-born, the poor. It is
in this sense that opponents of democracy, including Plato,
usually used the word. 1 0 8 Plato assimilates the demos to a
,
s ho r t r si gh t e d , almost deaf and ignorant vavxAT1pos in the
ship simile, but, by Platonic standards, this is an almost
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sympathetic description. For in 493a-c the demos is
assimilated to a big, moody, untamed beast, switching from
irrational anger to unjustifiable calm. Although Plato's
venom in both places is primarily directed to the democratic
politicians, his opinion of the many as such could hardly be
lower. In 496c he talks about 1:G1v 1COAA(jjV 1:TJV paVLav and
I ikens the part ic ipants in a democrat ic assembly to wild
I
beasts ("8TJpLa").
If one accepts that Plato is philosophizing not In a
historical vacuum but in response to the social and economic
conditions of his era, then the importance of the
aforementioned passages emerges clearly. As already stated
in the previous two sections, Plato believed that manual
work disqualifies someone from any claim to virtue, wisdom
or political authority. Seen in terms of his contemporary
society, this means that the vast majority of citizens, and
the commi tted democrats in particular, are to be excluded
from social or political recognition. Whether one needs to
work for one's living becomes the decisive factor for one's
socio-political status before considerations of ethical or
,
intellectual ability come into play at all. (~VGLS is
invoked in both 495d and 590c). It is absolutely true that
the Republic is not a plutocracy, since Plato places no
value on wealth. As the tinker's story demonstrates, money,
,
especially when it is produced by {3avaVGLaL, ought to be
irrelevant to social status. But the dialogue is not neutral
with regard to the social groups which existed In the
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philosopher's own time. Having dispensed with wealth t Plato
argues in essence that only a specific training and
abstinence from manual occupations are the social
presuppositions for inclusion in the higher classes. But,
given the historical context of the Republic, these
qualifications can only be found In one class, the landed
aristocracy of which Plato himself was a member. t 0 9
Despite Plato's rejection of every aspect of democracy as
he knew it, modern commentators have often attempted to
acquit him on this score. Even those liberals who recognize
the extreme anti-democratic character of the Republic have,
more often than not, been led astray by reading into ancient
democracy those concepts and institutions which define
modern 1 iberal democracy. In this respect, both camps have
produced serious misreadings of Plato's philosophy. To this
issue we turn next.
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VI THE DEBATE OVER PLATO'S TOTALITARIANISM
The paradigmatic example of a wholesale attack on Plato's
political principles from a liberal point of view 1S the
first volume of Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies.
This book initiated an extended discussion of Plato's
pol i tical phi losophy as a whole and of its relevance to
twentieth century forms of government which Popper regarded
as totalitarian ..
Popper accuses Plato of adopting a strict
class-distinction and of identifying the fate of the state
with the fate of the ruling class. 1 1D He charges Plato with
presenting justice as "a property of the whole state, based
upon a relationship between its . 111classes" while never
d i .. . 112 d . th1scuss1ng 1t as 1sonomy, an temperance as mean1ng at
one is satisfied with one's place in society whatever this
might b 113e. He asserts that Plato bestows unchecked and
11 d h i 1 114 d th t h h dluncontro e power on 1S ru ers an a e unas arne y
uses censorship and deception to consolidate his
sociopolitical system. 1 1S Popper's polemic culminates with the
conclusion that Plato was an arch-enemy of the "open
society", a society which guarantees individual rights and
free expression, and favoured a closed tribal society.
Although Popper's notion of the "open society" 1S
problematic, as we will soon see, the rest of the political
charges cited above are essentially correct. On Plato's
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identification of the fate of the state with its ruling
class,
,
on his use of 8LxaLOaVVT}
,
and awct>poavlJT} , the two
political virtues par excellence, and on his attribution of
absolute power to a tiny minority we commented in previous
sections. As for his adoption of censorship, it IS so
I · . t d . d d116exp 1C1 an WI esprea
questioned.
that it cannot be seriously
Popper's central assertion, i.e. that Plato eliminates in
the Republic individual liberty as we conceive it in the
name of the state, is undoubtedly true. The moral education
of the Guardians·in Books Two and Three purports to install
In them the "right" beliefs, not in any way to develop their
critical capacities,117 as proven by Plato's unhesitating use
of lies in the process (382d, 38gb-c). Plato goes as far as
to suggest that all members of society should have "common
feelings of pleasure and pain" (462b), from a psychological
point of view an obvious absurdity since it presupposes the
assumption that emotions can be so ordered that a whole city
would have the same emotional response to the same events.
In 500d the philosopher is gIven the pr~rogative of "neT} ...
,
'tLe£VaL", a function that goes beyond mere legislation to
the extent that neos entails not simply some sort of
behaviour but a way of life as a whole. These passages leave
no doubt that uniformity of opinion and life-style are
essential characteristics of Callipolis.
Nor is Plato prone to attribute any value to human life
irrespective of the social function of the individual. In a
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passage of notorious anti-humanitarianism he suggests that
anybody who is prevented by chronic illness from performing
his social function should be left to die (406d-407e).
Some commentators. although basically agreeing with
Popper that individual liberty is sacrificed to the state in
h R b l i 118 Li ft e epu i c , attempt to qua 1 y this by suggesting that
the Producers are given a fair deal. Klosko writes that
there is no "terroristic police control,,119 and that "[t]he
Guardians do not use their political power to monopolize
life's goods Though the lowest class is excluded from
1 0 0' 1 11 h ' " 120 I O' 1po 1t1CS, r t contro sat estate s property. n s i.m i ar
vein Annas remarks that "[t]he Guardians are no exploiters;
the Producers have a right to those benefits from the common
working of society which are needed for them to function
best in making their contribution to the common d " 121goo .
Vlastos argues that Plato's treatment of all classes is
impartial: his rule is "that each has a right to those~ and
only those~ socially distributable benefits which will
maximize his [social] contribution".122 He also asserts that
although "Plato's aristocracy" will have the military force
to overexploit the Producers, Plato legislates in the
opposite direction: the rulers will have less "wealth~ sex,
and leisure,,123 than the Producers.
To the extent that any of these arguments purport to
qualify Plato's rejection of individual liberty by
suggesting the Producers are compensated for it, they are
all equally unsuccessful. As we saw in section 4~ Plato's
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economic system is unfair to the Producers In the
fundamental sense that it obliges them to sustain a
I · d 1 2 4 I h i h .elsure c ass w lC In turn controls them politically and,
if need be, physically: Plato obviously does not rule out
force as a means for constraining the Producers, and as for
"po Li c e control". 414b p l . Itt th t f h, aln y s a es a one 0 t e
.
military functions of the ~uAax£s will be to make sure that
"friends at home shall not wish ... to harm the state" and
,
415d-e declares that the ~vAax£s should camp on a spot
,
enabling them "to control any internal disaffection" ('tous
, I
't£ £v6ov paALG't &v xa't£xoL£V). Because Plato's system is so
furidamentally unfair to the· Producers in both economic and
political terms, no amount of impartiality or self-restraint
on the part of the rulers can sufficiently compensate them;
and, as Vlastos himself agrees, Plato does not recognize
human dignity as a value inherent in "man's humanity".125 He
makes it dependent on social productivity and the result IS
that human beings become fundamentally unequal In this
126
respect.
Popper's attack on Plato's political proposals is
therefore neither unjustified nor misplaced. It is in other
areas that Popper's argument is questionable.
Popper asserts two fundamental principles, which in his
opinion are violated by Plato: that ethical doctrine cannot
be based on factual statements 1 2 7 and that "piecemeal [social]
. ." 128
engineering" is always preferable to "Utopian engIneerIng
i.e. to revolutionary change. With regard to the first of
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these principles, Versenyi has persuasively argued that the
fact-value distinction is not valid because notions like
""[e]nd in itself", "good in itself", "absolute norm" are
empty concepts, for the only meaning these words have is a
referential meaning".129 Good, Versenyi rightly contends, can
only be good for someone or something. Thus when it comes to
moral or political issues, it is pointless to speak of the
good absolutely. In these fields, what is good is good for
human beings, and therefore a theory of human nature is
necessary to underpin any political theory. "Nothing but an
"is"", Versenyi concludes, "can justify an "ought"".13o
As far as the preferability of piecemeal social
engineering to social revolution is concerned, Popper's
argument is again unconvincing. Popper explicitly claims
that piecemeal social engineering is rational, while
I · h " . 1 131 H' t f t h irevo utl0nary c ange IS lrratlona. IS argumen or IS
is that because "[a]t present, the sociological knowledge
necessary for large-scale engineering is simply
non-existent",132 wholesale social experimentation has to be
avoided in favour of piecemeal changes. But this conclusion
depends on a number of questionable premisses. First of all,
it assumes that sociology has the apparatus to provide
objective "scientific" knowledge similar to the one produced
by disciplines like, say, physics. But because sociology
inevitably involves questions about the nature of man and
society, on which no common agreement can be reached in the
way that the principles of physics are universally accepted,
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social experimentation can never be ideology-free as Popper
assumes. Furthermore, there is a danger here of making the
social scientists wholly responsible for decisions which
properly belong to politicians (paradoxically, Popper comes
close here to conceding Plato's point that politics is an
art to be conducted by experts). Finally, and most
significantly, both piecemeal and wholesale social
engineering are means to particular ends and therefore their
rationality ultimately depends on the rationality of these
ends. For this reason, there IS nothing that makes
small-scale social change a priori more rational than
large-scale one.
Another problematic Issue is Popper's use of the terms
" open" and "c 1 0 sed" soc i e t y . 133 I n an i 11 urni nat ing c r i t i que of
Popper, StaIley makes two crucial remarks. First, Popper's
distinction between open and closed societies is too
inflexible: Popper talks as if we have a straight choice
between the two, whereas "there is in fact no such thing as
a completely open or completely closed society". 134 Second, it
i s not i mme d i ate 1y c 1ear t hat an 0 pen soc i e t y is to be
preferred: "there are other values which a reasonable man
might seek and these may conflict with the demands of
openness; for example if we set a high value on order we may
. . ,,135
prefer the less open but more orderly of two socIetIes .
Popper IS wide open to both objections, for he fails to
acknowledge that there is a grey area between open and
closed societies and his assumption that an open society is
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always better is nowhere specifically argued for, but
constitutes one of his unstated liberal principles which has
to be taken on faith.
But Popper's most serious drawback IS the way he
understands, or rather misunderstands, the nature of ancient
democracy. Popper takes ancient democracy as a constitution
primarily characterized by the protection and promotion of
individual rights, like freedom of speech and thought. These
were indeed characteristics of ancient democracy to a
certain extent and it is for this reason that some of the
major accusations that Popper launches against Plato are
justified. But they were secondary and in a certain sense
incidental attributes of the Greek democracies. The notions
of human and political rights, with which Popper IS so
concerned, were not familiar to the Greeks, who had neither
a word nor an intellectual concept corresponding to
136
"rights". Because of their dependence on slavery they never
developed anything even remotely close to universally
attributable human rights; and the closest they came to a
concept of political rights was negatively, through the
notion of &'rtll~a, the deprivation of a citizen's political
prerogatives. 1 3 7 The Greeks understood democracy primarily in
socio-economic terms, as a constitution which gave political
expression to the aspirations of the poorer classes, the
cxnopoL or n£vf}'r£s. For Plato himself democracy comes into
, ,
being when the poor defeat the rich: "[&]f}J10Xpa'rLa Of} oLJ1aL
l Ll v £'ra L o'rav OL "£~nT£S VLXDaav'r£S 'rO~S J1~V anox'r£~vwaL 'rQV
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£L£PWV. LOVS O£ £x~~AAOV~t»-Republic 557a). Aristotle writes
that "democracy might be defined as the constitution under
which the poor (oi anopot), being also many in number, are
in 138control" and this definition is repeated like a
leitmotiv throughout his Politics. 1 3 9
What these passages make crystal clear is that democracy,
as conceived by the Greeks themselves, had little to do with
rights, and everything to do with the participation of the
poorer citizens in the affairs of the polis. Operating with
liberal notions which apply to modern representative
democracies, Popper completely misses this point (Popper has
hardly anything to sayan social issues, and he even agrees
that Plato does not sanction the "exploitation" of the
140Producers).
This anachronistic conceptualization of ancient
democracy. in which Popper IS followed by a number of
141
commentators, inevi tably leads to some ser ious f laws In
Popper's overall argument. One of the problems it creates is
that it judges Greek political theory In terms of a
distinction between the individual and the state, whereas
for the Greeks this is an absurd distinction. This point is
excellently formulated by Sinclair: "[t]he antithesis of
rulers and tuled, oi apxavL£s and al &PX~~£vot, and of the
Few and the Many meet us constantly, not our familiar
antithesis of State and Individual. This would have been
tantamount
,
to opposing the nOAtS and
,
the nOA t LTJ S , which
would be slightly absurd, as if one were to make an
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ant i thes is of the hen and the egg". 142 One part icular ·case
where Popper's misunderstanding of ancient democracy leads
him to completely unacceptable results is in his assessment
of the political implications of Socrates' philosophy.
Despite Socrates' continuous and relentless animosity
towards democracy, its leaders, its practices and its basic
principle of deciding according to the opinion of the
majority, Popper unequivocally depicts him as a plain
democrat. Popper holds that Socrates "felt compelled, by his
conscience as well as by his religious beliefs, to question
all authority,,143. He tries to construct a pro-egalitarian
Socrates by arguing that in the Meno he teaches geometry to
a slave-boy "in an attempt to prove that any uneducated
slave has the capac i ty to grasp 144even abstract matters".
But, as Kraut remarks, "nothing of moral significance is
proved by ... [this] 145fact". Clearly, any suggestion that
Socrates holds a universally attributable notion of
intellectual or moral virtue is outweighed by the way he
defines virtue in the Protagoras and by the other passages
where he refers to the limited abilities of ot nOAAo~. It is
the authority of the many, granted and eventually promoted
to a significant degree by the democratic constitution of
Athens, not all authority in general that he is putting into
he says that it would bequestion. In the Apology 28e,
terrible
I("O£LVOV") for him to disobey his military
commanders ("oi apxovL£s"); and he adds that "'t~ 8~ aOLx£tv
xa~ an£Le£tv L~ ~£AL~OVL, xa~ e£~ xaL avep~nw, aLL xaXOV XaL
\ \ \
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aloxp~v £Ol:LI.) otoa"-29b). These passages show that Socrates
is far from questioning all authority, either In moral
,
(/3£'Al:LOVL is here probably meant in a moral sense) or in
non-moral issues, like military obedience.
Popper also rejects the view that Socrates was calling
for expertise in politics, talking about "Socrates' demand
that a responsible politician should be a lover of truth and
of wisdom rather than an expert, and that he was wise only
i f he knew hI'S I' i t t i ,,146own 1m1 a Ions . Were this true, there
would indeed be a lack of continuity between Socratic and
Platonic political thought. But this position is certainly
untenable In the face of the interpretation of the
Protagoras suggested in section one and of what Socrates
says in texts like the Apology 24d-25b (moral education is
like horse-training: only "c t s " or
, :»'
"navv o'ALloL"-25b- can
master it) and the Laches 184e (proper decisions are "made
on the basis of knowledge and not numbers").
This examination of Popper's depiction of Socrates is not
exhaust i ve, but it suff ices, I hope, to show how Popper's
misreading of ancient democracy can lead to the wrong
conclusions. There is nothing democratic in Socrates'
craving for expertise in politics (and the formulation of a
notion of ap£l:l1 in terms of it). Popper takes Socrates'
. I ' 147individualism as a reflection of some sort of 11bera Ism,
and then, thinking of democracy in modern terms, equates his
liberal Socrates with a pro-democratic figure. But this
reasoning is clearly at odds with the way Plato presents
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Socrates' views in the early dialogues if these views are
seen in their historical context.
In conc l us i on , Popper is right in his claim that the
Republic is a totalitarian work. Viewed in terms of the
distinction between individual and state t there is no doubt
that Plato sacrifices the interests of the former to those
of the latter. But this distinction was one that the Greeks
themsel ves would hardly have recognized and t if it is the
main or the only angle from which one judges ancient
political theorYt there is the serious danger of being led
astray t as Popper's complete misunderstanding of Socrates
demonstrates. It is not only or even mainly in its failure
to recognize individual rights as against the state that the
Republic is authoritarian. It is totalitarian on a much
deeper level, because it absolutely re~tcts the aspirations
of the lower citizen classes and because it produces a
complex moral and metaphysical argument which sanctifies the
perpetual social and political subordination of a large
producing class to a tiny minority. It is in this respect
that Plato's argument becomes intelligible in terms of its
own historical context and touches upon the realities of
Greek political struggle. It is here that Plato takes sides
in the ongoing political struggle of the Greek cities and it
IS here that the full scale of the Republic's
authoritarianism reveals itself.
Popper's onslaught on Plato triggered a wave of protest
by a considerable number of scholars who attempted to defend
90
Plato, 148 . . Ilronlca ly confirming the attitude that Popper
characterized as the "idealizing [of] Plato".149 One example
is Versenyi, who conceded Plato's "authoritarianism",15o but
proceeded to claim that Plato's theory of the state,
"supports rather than undermines the establishment of
d . t . . ,,151 h .emocratlc cons ltutlons. T e Repub11c, Versenyi argued,
is not designed as a realizable project. It involves a
circular process in that philosophical wisdom IS necessary
for the recognition of the philosopher-king, and if this
wisdom is lacking initially, there is no way Callipolis can
be set. up. 152 "[H] ow are we to select the philosopher to
select the philosopher to rule?"; if the latter "has not
153
already been found, [he] can never be found".
Given this "logical impossibility", 154 and because Plato
adheres to the principle that power should be proportionate
to knowledge, the absence of the ideal ruler means that the
Republic is, in Versenyi's opinion, a work which repudiates
despotism in practice. Without the philosopher-king no one
IS entitled to absolute power and "[t]herefore the
democratic state, while not the best possible in theory, is
. b" ,,155
stIll the best possi Ie In practIce .
Versenyi suggests that democracy involves equality before
the law, which entails equal opportunities, not equal value
attributed to each individual. This is why democracy's
elected and its educational
Democracy proper
systemofficials are
I . 156se ectlve. is a mer i t oc r acy ,
is
Versenyi
claims, and Plato's Republic is a meritocratic and therefore
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a pro-democratic work.
Versenyi is not unjustified in claiming that the Republic
is not intended to be literally realized. But he goes beyond
what the text allows in claiming that it is not a blueprint
for absolute rule a-t all. The text in 592b clearly shows 157
that the Republic's value is as a pattern to be approximated
as far as possible. Plato does envisage a process according
to which the philosophers-to-be are selected and educated,
but he does not make clear how the initial selection is to
be materialized .(Guthrie rightly remarks that "Plato seems
confused about this,,).158 This is a gap in Plato's exegetical
procedure, but no more than that. By no means does it cancel
out the fact that philosophical rule is the cornerstone of
the Republic's political philosophy (Versenyi himself
concedes this when he writes that "[i]n the ideal state
everything depends on the rule of the philosopher king,,).159
It is particularly interesting that Plato does consider the
question of what ought to happen in the absence of the
philosopher-king, but only in his later political
philosophy, when he proposes strict adherence to law as the
means for covering this eventuality (Politicus 301d-eff.).
But In the Republic Plato does not show any interest
whatever in what might be a prudent caurse in the absence of
the ideal ruler; from the moment this ruler is removed from
the political equation we move straight to the fundamentally
,
defective historical nOALL£tat of Books Eight and Nine.
Therefore, even if the realization of the concept of the
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philosopher-king is doubtful, its paradigmatic value IS
without question the pillar of Plato's political doctrine In
the Republic; and given that the authoritarianism of the
work is deeply embedded in this concept, the dialogue's
totalitarianism is not refuted by Versenyi's argument.
As for the subsequent claim that Plato's proposals are
meritocratic and therefore compatible with modern democratic
practice, the Republic's meritocracy is firmly
anti-egalitarian, as I argued in section 4, and therefore
Versenyi's transformation of the Republic to a democratic
work is untenable on this score as well. In fact, one of the
major defects of Versenyi's thesis is that not only does he
not dispute Plato's belief in natural inequality, on which
the Republ i c ' s au thor i tar iani sm depends, but he seems to
endorse it. For instance he accepts that freedom should be
given on the strength of knowledge,16o ignoring the fact that
a conditional freedom can never be the universal freedom
demanded by democracy. He further claims that Plato's theory
is not incompatible with representative democracy, because
both recognize the factual inequality of human beings. But
representative democracy does not rest so much on the
assumption that the best should rule as on the assumption
that all should be able to participate in voting. Plato
definitely knew the democratic argument that although some
citizens might be fittest to rule, all have the capacity to
par t ic ipa te in common affairs. I t is the pol it ical essence
of the myth he himself put in the mouth of Protagoras. Plato
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disagrees not wi th the assumption of both Protagorean. and
modern representative democracy that some are better
equipped than others when it comes to power t but with the
democratic principle that everybody ought to be able to
participate in politics. He bluntly repudiates this
principle by excluding the Producers from any form of such a
participation and by presenting Athens t who put this
principle into practice t as a state where moral anarchy
reigns. The inescapable conclusion lS that his poli tical
theory lS plainly anti-democratic, no matter whether one
refers to ancient or to modern democracy.
Reeve argues that Plato is innocent of all the charges
attributed to him, even those which other defenders of Plato
d h · bv i lb' 161 HI' h to not touc as too 0 Vl0US Y em arasslng. e calms t a
the Republic is not "a totalitarian hymn to the benefits of
repression and unfreedom, but an attempt to des ign a
pol is whose members enjoy as much real happiness, and as
much real or critical freedom, as possible".162
It might be true that the Republic is not a hymn to
totalitarianism, but only in the very limited sense that
Plato consistently attempts to conceal the repressive
features of the work and present his anti-democratic theses
as the result of a rationality based on nature. But what
Reeve argues in effect is that the work is not totalitarian
at all. This is of course a totally different proposition.
Reeve thinks the Producers can, given the restrictions of
their cognitive ability, be maximally happy in Callipolis,
94
because nothing prevents them from achieving their aim,
which is money-making. Although he agrees that they
definitely do not receive the primary education of the
d i 163 hI·Guar lans, e c alms that they are educated in their craft,
and this "causes [them] to abandon the pleasures of food,
drink, and sex for the more pleasant pleasure of making
164
money". Because the higher classes do not compete with them
for the money the Producers most highly rate,
money-loving desires are not externally frustrated.
their
Reeve also claims that the Producers lack deliberative
freedom, namely the freedom to satisfy maximally the desires
they themselves regard as most important. For this reason,
they might be better off sacrificing these desires for
others which are "sanctioned by the critic-al theory of
. I . ,,165ratlona Ity .
critical freedom.
Reeve calls this latter kind of freedom
With regard to Reeve's first argument, two questions are
relevant: first, whether the separation of the lowest
appetites from money-making is valid and second, whether the
economic interests of the Producers are really compatible
with those of the other two classes.
As regards the first question, Plato makes it abundantly
clear in 580e-581a that the baser desires and money-making
are members of the same class of psychological attributes;
talking of the £nLeVI1T}1;lX~f), he writes: "[w]e accordingly
called it after its most salient characteristics, "desire",
because of the violence of the desires for food and drink
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and sex and the like t or
.
( X<X L ) " ...acquIsItIveness"
.
(C/>L AOXPTJP<X'tOLJ ) t because weal th is the means of satisfying
.
desires of this kind". The conjuction X<XL IS here crucial:
it proves that the more instinctive desires and the wish for
money are t psychologicallYt on a par: the only difference is
that money secures satisfaction of such desires. Reeve
therefore is not justified in suggesting that one's desire
, .
for money is more sublime than the rest of one's £nLeVpL<XL,
and that education in a craft makes a producer somehow more
virtuous by orientating him or her towards money-making.
Moreover, apprenticeship in a craft is not something of
moral value in itself. Plato refers to it only incidentally
in the framework of discussing the Auxiliaries' education
(456d), and then only to contrast it to the superior
education of the Guardians. If he thought there was anything
intrinsically valuable in it, he would definitely have to
pay some attention to the issue. His refusal to do so
clearly renders Reeve's interpretation untenable.
As for the fact that Guardians and Producers do not
compete for money, the economic analysis of the Republic
attempted in section 4 shows that this is a secondary
feature of Callipolis' economy. Given the fact that the
Producers bear the weight of sustaining the other two
classes, their economic condition is one of dependence, and
no amount of fine talk about their willingness to provide
for th~ higher classes can conceal this fact. Thus Reeve is
wrong to assert that the Producers will be happy because the
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Guardians will not deprive them of their valued possession
of money. In the economic structure of the Republic the
value of money as such is minimal. And one could clearly
envisage a situation where the Producers would be better off
keeping the surplus of their production instead of giving it
to the Auxiliaries and Guardians. In an economy like Athens
they would be able to sell it and make a profit. Therefore
there is a sense in which they compete wi th the higher
classes even if one restricts the issue to the question of
money.
One major objection can also be raised to Reeve's thesis
that the Producers can achieve "real freedom" if they
abandon deliberative freedom in favour of "critical"
freedom. As the scholar himself admits, the latter kind of
freedom involves abandonment of the Producers' own values.
Thus there is a deep, and I believe insoluble paradox in a
notion of freedom which demands that the agent surrender his
own conception of freedom, whatever this might be, for an
abstract notion of freedom defined by someone else. Given
that the Producers, due to the restrictions of their
cognitive capacities, are a priori excluded from defining
the rationality on which the critical theory of freedom
depends and given the omnipotency of the philosopher-kings,
there can be little doubt that it is the latter who will
define what is rational and what is not. What we end up
with, then, IS a morally and intellectually impoverished
third class, completely lacking self-determination and
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having its "freedom" tailored for it. But any theory of
freedom, critical or otherwise, which completely ignores the
agents' wishes and which depends on their moral heteronomy,
cannot lead to the "real" freedom Reeve claims.
Consequently, there" IS no justification for attributing such
"real" freedom to the Producers in the framework of
Callipolis.
One final but important remark on the subject. There is a
distinct tendency among those who defend Plato against the
charge of authoritarianism, either on political or on
psychological grounds, to leave unquestioned some of the
fundamental principles which underlie Plato's political
argument. In particular, they seem happy to accept Plato's
belief in the natural inequality of human beings, and to
argue that, given the low cognitive capacities of the
Producers, Plato is justified in depriving them of any
political prerogatives, or, moreover, that he could not
consistently follow any other course. But this line of
argumentation can prove only that Plato is consistent within
his own premisses. It does not absolve Plato from the charge
of authoritarianism, because within its own set of
propositions authoritarianism can be as consistent as any
other political system without becoming either desirable or
morally justified. This. I believe, is one of the major
reasons that the arguments in defence of Plato have been
166
ultimately unsuccessful.
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VII EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
The epistemological doctrine of the Republic and the
corresponding metaphysical doctrine, Plato's famous theory
of the Forms, are introduced at the end of Book Five. The
theory is of great philosophical importance in its own
right, but in this section we will concentrate on those
aspects of it which provide the ultimate justification for
the ethical and political theses which Plato propounds In
the first half of the Republic.
In 473d Socrates declares that "there will be no end to
the troubles of states, or of humanity itself, till
philosophers become kings In this world, or till those we
now call kings and rulers really and truly become
philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come
into the same hands". He then proceeds to define the real
o
~LAoao~oL. As the word signifies, a philosopher is someone
who loves wisdom, and not merely a part of it but wisdom as
a whole (474c).
Socrates adds tha t the phi losopher is the one who "can
reach beauty itself and see it as it is in itself" (476c).
For this reason "we can rightly call his state of mind one
of knowledge; and of the other man, who holds opinions only,
opinion" (477d). It is in this section that Forms are
introduced in the Republic, with the word £loQV in 476a. We
learn that each is "in itself single", but they seem to be a
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multiplicity because they "appear everywhere in combination
with actions and material bodies and with each other"
(476a); that a particular is a resemblance of the Form, the
latter being the reality of which the particular is a
resemblance (476c); and that particulars participate
,
("p£L£xolrrcx") in the Forms (476d).
But this argument presupposes the existence of Forms and
is unlikely to be accepted by the ~LAOe£CXJlOV£S who deny this
existence. For this reason Socrates proceeds to give a
second one, based on premisses that the disbelievers are
I ikely to accept. He suggests that
,
and ool;cx are
,
different OUVCXJl£LS (477b) and therefore they must have
different objects (477d). The object of £TCL<J'rDJlTJ is "what
is", L~ l>v (478a). "[W]hat is not" ('r~ JlD l>v-478c) IS the
,
object of ayvoLcx. The object of ool;cx comes between being and
not being, "between what fully is and what absolutely is
not" (478d). Knowledge is infallible, while opinion is
,
fallible (477e). Now, whereas the ~LAO<JO~OS IS concerned
,
with the eternal and unchangeable Forms, the ~LAOe£CXJlWv
denies that beauty is only one, justice one and so on. But
there is neither a beautiful thing nor a just act that could
not also appear the opposite (479a). Similarly, something
which is double can appear half when compared with a
different thing, and the same holds for other epithets like
large or light. Because of this relativism, the multiplicity
of sensible things belong to an "intermediate realm" between
being and not being, and are apprehended by the intermediate
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. .
ovvaplS, oo~a (478d).
The two arguments from 474b to the end of Book Five are
among the most crucial in the Republic. Their scope is
extremely wide. They purport to justify the main political
assumption of the work, that philosophers ought to rule.
They also introduce Plato's epistemological and ontological
doctrines, and they do that in such a way that the exact
correspondence of the two is immediately discernible, since
Plato distinguishes two realms of reality on the basis of
the different cognitive capacities of which they are the
objects.
Plato virtually repeats the same point in 529b-c where he
states that the sensible world cannot be known because there
can be no £1aa-rDfll1 of the aLael1-r~. :J E1a a -rDfl l1 is therefore
from the outset placed on a position vastly superior to
.
oo~a. This is emphasized by the fact that the former is
infallible while the latter is unreliable, a suggestion made
by Glaucon and accepted without argumentation (477e).
Variations on this theme, the deeply unsatisfactory results
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one gets when one relies on oo~a, run through the Republic:
so, for example, in 367b-d Plato states one of his favourite
political positions, that the doxa of the many about what IS
just and unjust is completely unreliable; In 412a-413a he
writes that we abandon our false opinions voluntarily but
our true opinions involuntarily (the underlying assumption
here IS that doxa is changeable and therefore rests on
precarious grounds); in 444a Plato explains that there is a
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doxa which is connected with ignorance and disaster; in 466b
he talks about an "&v~r}1:~s 1:£ xai I1£LpaxL~oTJs o~l;a" and in
560c he talks about "tp£vo£ts" and "&AaC~v£s o~l;aL".
In 476dff. Plato appears to draw a rigid distinction
between ~£1CL<J1:TJI1TJ
I
and ool;a. He writes that the two are
,
different OVVal1£LS in the sense sight and hearing are
different (477c) and that the cognitive condition of the
, ,
ctn Aoool;os compares to that of the <pLAoao<pos as that of a
human being who is dreaming to one who is awake (476c) . He
then uses this distinction to establish two separate
ontological realms: one is the realm of the sensible world,
which comes between being and not being: its position is
,
"11£1:al;v ~IOV1:WS xo L 1:0'0 OV1:WS"
(477a); everything that belongs to it is "al1a ov 1:£ xaL 1117
OV" and lies 1:0'0 £L.ALXPLVG)S ~IOV1:0 S 1: £ xo L 1:0'0
1CaV1:WS 1117 OV1:0S" (478d); it participates "1:00 £[vaL 1:£ xo t
,
1117 £[vaL" (478e); it -is positioned between "[1:f)s] ~ouataS 1:£
xat
.
1:00 1117 £ l va t " ( 47 9c) and be tween "1:00 1: £ 1117 ~IOU1:0S xat
1:00 OV1:0S £tALxpLVG)S" (479d).
In contradistinction to the intermediate ontological
status of the objects of doxa, the objects of episteme, i.e.
Forms, are fully real: Plato uses here expressions like "ov
1CaV1:£AG)S" (477a) and "£L.AtXptVG)s OV1:0S" (477a, 478d, 479d).
Both adverbs function here as superlatives intended to
designate the fact that the ontological status of Forms is
hugely superior to that of sensibles. Moreover, 1CaV1:£AG)S
(which means fully or perfectly) implies that particulars
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have only imperfect (to use a Greek term, &~£ADs) existence.
What Plato appears to be asserting, then, IS that the
objects of doxa, particulars, belong to a lower degree of
reality than the objects of episteme, Forms, which are fully
real. The tradi tional interpretation of this, and the one
h ld b b t t i 1 .. f h 1 168e y a su s an la majOrIty 0 sc 0 ars, is that when
Plato speaks of the lesser reality of the sensible things,
he means that they exist to a lesser degree than Forms. This
is the "grades" or "degrees of reality" thesis.
This thesis IS strongly supported by another passage in
the Republic. At the beginning of Book Ten Plato declares
that the Form of a bed is
,
, c. ~I
'0 co r t XALVll" (597a and 597c) and
,
he talks of it as "XAI,VllS ... OV'LWS oualls" (597d)t in sharp
contrast to the bed created by a human craftsman who "oux (Xv
~o 0v nOl,ot, &AA~ 'LI, 'LOLOV'LOV orOV ~O 0v, 0v o~ ou" (597a).
,
It IS untrue that the artisan's bed is "'t£A£WS OV" t
obviously because perfect being belongs only to the Form of
the bed.
,
Some interpreters, however, find this position too
scandalous to have been held by a philosopher of Plato's
. dId . . 169 d A f 11 h imagnltu e. V astos argue agaInst It, an nnas a ows 1m
in her reading of 476dff. Annas argues that £[val, and its
derivatives in this section must be taken as predicative,
not existential: ""is" should be read ellipticallYt as "is
F" where ifF" is some predicate". 170 In other words, when Plato
says that something can be large and not large he does not
claim that this thing exists to a lesser degree than the
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relevant Form. He only claims that someone cannot know this
thing to be unqualifiedly large. because at a different
time. or in comparison to different things it might appear
not large. Only the Form of largeness can be known to be.
and therefore is. perfectly large. 1 7 1
Vlastos adds to this another argument. He cites a number
of expressions where Plato uses "real" or "really" In a way
which is not open to an existential reading (e.g. "the
really good and noble man"-Republic 396b. "a really divine
172place"-Phaedrus 2.38c). On the strength of these expressions
he suggests that Plato distinguished. although he never made
explicit the d . . . 173lstlnctl0n. two meanings of "is", one
d 1 " h h . 174 Th f i dec arlng eXlstence, t e ot er genulneness. e lrst oes
not admit degrees, the second does. Vlastos argues then that
when Plato talks of degrees of reality, he means degrees of
authenticity, not degrees of existence. He also cites in
support of this claim Politicus 293e. where Plato contrasts
the ideal constitution with the others which "are not
genuine, nor really real".
The "predicative" reading of 476dff. is both plausible
and In tune with the way modern philosophy rejects the
concept of a gradual ontology. The f act remains, however,
that the predicative use of £lvaL and its derivatives does
not exclude the existential one. and therefore does not
prove by itself that Plato did not believe in degrees of
existence. To the importance of einai for Plato's
metaphysical theory we will return shortly.
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As for Vlastos' other arguments, none of them IS
conclusive. As Vlastos himself admits, expressions like "the
really good and noble man" and "a really divine place" occur
in contexts where they are untechnical, unphilosophical
. 175 d h f .expressIons an t ere ore It is somewhat far-fetched to use
them for deciding fundamental problems concerning Plato's
overall metaphysical theory. Moreover, the best synonym for
really is in both cases "truly", i.e. the primary meaning of
really is here veridical. Vlastos writes that "[t]hat
"really good and noble man" Plato is talking about would be
really good and noble even if he did not exist", 176 but how
can one be a good man without existing in some sense? The
veridical meaning presupposes the existential and Vlastos
cannot claim to have established Plato's awareness of the
difference between predication and existence by this
argument. Politicus 293e, as Guthrie remarks, simply begs
the question: 1 7 7 historical cities surely exist for the
majority of people, but whether they are fully existent from
the point of view of the Ideal Ruler is unclear. It is also
difficult to believe that Plato, having sorted out these two
meanings of being (being genuine and being existent), never
put the solution to this problem in writing. In the Republic
much depends on it, as demonstrated precisely by the
controversy Vlastos adresses, and in the Sophist Plato did
much analytical work in distinguishing the identification
use of £GLL from its other uses (251cff.) without giving, as
Vlastos himself admits, the slightest hint he was aware of a
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distinction between its predicative and existential 178uses.
Finally, the predicative reading of 476dff., IS less
plausible, though still possible, for 597a-d where Plato
does not use his epistemology to support his o n t o Lo g i c a I
claims. But it is not applicable to a later passage, Timaeus
27d-28a where Plato refers to the objects of episteme and
doxa as "what always is and never becomes" and "what becomes
bu t n eve r is" res p e c t i vel y . 179
Whether one accepts that Plato sharply separates only the
,
two cognitive conditions, £Tr:LarTJIlTJ and oo~a, or also the
realms of their respective objects, has an immediate bearing
on the question of the Platonic separation of particulars
and universals. If Vlastos' position is accepted, then Plato
separated these two only in terms of knowabili t y , not In
terms of existence. This is still a form of separation, but
clearly much weaker from what most commentators see as
Plato's separation of vOTJra
;) ,
and a L aBTJra in existential as
well as epistemological terms. In fact, it is questionable
whether in Vlastos' version we should be talking about
separation at all, since the term has come to designate the
two-world view Vlastos rejects. It is true that Plato does
not explicitly mention separation in the Republ i c .
I ,
Nevertheless he does so In the later Parmenides ("XWpLS Il£V
, , '
£LOTJ aura ~rrcx, XWpLS O£ ra rovrwv av ll£r£xovra"-130b), just
when he is about to spell out some devastating criticisms of
his earlier metaphysics. And this is the way Aristotle
understood Plato's ontology as testified by a well known
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passage of his Metaphysics (1078b30-33). In addition to this
historical evidence, there are a number of reasons for
accepting the stronger form of separation.
Indisputably, the key to the whole issue lies with £lvat
and its derivatives: if these are used existentially by
Plato In 476dff., there can be no doubt he meant to separate
Forms and particulars in terms of existence. Kahn provides
strong evidence that the existential and the predicative
meaning of "being" were not sorted out by either Plato or
Aristotle. The logical distinction between the two, Kahn
argues, was firmly established only after John Stuart Mill
and there is no evidence of it in "the classical au t ho'r s ,
who pas~ blithely back and forth between uses which we might
identify as existential or copulative".18o As far as Plato is
concerned, Vlastos himself admits, as we have seen, that
Plato never made explicit the distinction; and Aristotle did
not identify a special existential use when he discussed the
basic senses of einai and esti in Metaphysics 1017a8ff., a
181text pointed out by Kahn. Kahn asserts that the "range of
meaning of einai in Greek is likely to be wider and richer
than that of the c or r e s pond i ng verb in any other
language-and certainly richer than the verb "to be" in most
modern languages. Fot this very reason, the traditional
dichotomy between the existential and the predicative use of
the verb would have to be rejected for Greek as a hopeless
oversimplification".182 Kahn attests that the primary meaning
of einai is veridical, i.e. that it is used to state what is
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the case. But he somewhat overplays the distinction between
veridical and existential use. In the statement "the book IS
on the table", "is" is used to denote something which is
true (provided that the book is actually on the table and
that one holds, like Plato, a correspondence theory of
truth), but the existential use is logically prior to the
veridical one. One has to assert that the book exists before
making any true statements about it. Therefore one could
argue that if the primary use of einai in Greek is
veridical, there is an existential use which underlies it.
If this IS the case, one can see how the common Greek
linguistic use of einai and its derivatives would lead Plato
in the direction of separating Forms and sensibles in
existential terms. To suppose that Plato could not have held
a position because we find it untenable today can be
decisively misleading. As we will soon proceed to see, the
degrees of reality doctrine is supported by one particular
aspect of Plato's theory of the Forms, and, moreover, it
contributes to the solution of some fundamental ethical and
political problems which Plato confronted throughout his
philosophical career.
In addition to the linguistic evidence, the argument in
476dff. itself decisively promotes a two-worlds view. In
this passage it is not the case that the cognitive subject,
,
possessing two cognitive powers (i.e. £1ILarT1IlTJ and 8ol;a)
then decides which to apply to a particular object.
~E1ILarDJ1T1 and sot;« are radically different exactly because
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their objects are radically different, and these objects
exist independently of the cognitive powers one might apply
to them, as indicated by the use of L£Lal~£v~v and
~ .
an£PlaCo~£u~u (477d) and proved by the fact that it is the
Form of the Good which makes the Forms intelligible and
gives to the soul the capacity to comprehend them (508e).184
One of the functions Forms perform in Plato's system is
,
that they operate as 1(apao£Ll~aLa, patterns to which the
particulars strive to assimilate themselves. Particulars, on
the other hand, "participate" in Forms. (Republic 472b-c,
476d, 484c-d). What characterizes the $LAOe£a~wu who is
dreaming IS "the confusion between a resemblance and the
reality which it resembles" (476c). Viewed from this
perspective, it becomes quite clear in what way the sensible
particulars belong to a different grade of reality than
their prototypes, the Forms: they are real to the extent
they share some property with a Form and unreal because they
can never reach, by definition, the absolute perfection and
reality of this Form. As Allen puts it: "[particulars] are
real in tha t they are resemblances, not real in tha t they
are resemblances. The copy theory of participation and the
theory of degrees of reality are not two theories, but
" 185one .
Moreover, separation effectively provides the absolute
ethical standard which proved so elusive for the Socrates of
the early dialogues. It is commonplace to suggest that Plato
was preoccupied In his earlier career with the ethical
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relativism of the sophists and how it could be refuted. 1 8 G In
the Protagoras t Socrates insists on a ~£LPDLLXD L£XVD (356d)
which will liberate the moral agent from the multiplicity of
.
the ¢aLvo~£Vat but this L£XVD remains a formal concept since
Socrates lacks a metaphysical theory which would permit him
to give it content. In the Meno t Plato introduces the
concept of recollection to account for the superiority of
knowledge to opinion (81b) in the search for the definition
of virtue t but his-Socrates is still unable to provide this
definition (100b). Even when t in Republic Four, the Platonic
Socrates takes the further step of giving definitions of the
indi vidual virt.ues t these def ini t. ions taken In themsel ves
remain wi thout metaphysical support as yet and therefore
they cannot be regarded as final and indisputable. As it
becomes clear after the theory of the Forms IS fully
deve l oped , no definition of justice is t.horoughly reliable
without knowledge of t.he Form of justice t and the same holds
for the ot.her virtues. 'I'h e r e f o r e , it IS only after Plato
postulates the existence of eternal t unchangeable Forms
(479a t 484b-c t 485b) that. he is in a posit.ion to prove the
truth of the previous definitions and to provide the
absolute ethical standard against which the virtue of
actions and individuals can be measured. It is here that the
Socrat.ic inquiry is finally satisfied and ethical relativism
irreversibly refuted. The t.heory of the Forms t then t
provides both the basis upon which the previous ethical
argument. s s t.and and the final phi losoph ical jus t if ica t ion
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for them. But it IS obvious that such a justification will
have full force only if Forms are separated from their
imperfect exemplifications not simply In terms of
knowability, but also in terms of existence. For the Form of
justice to become the absolute standard by which any just
act and individual is to be judged, this Form has to be
beyond the multiplicity of the particulars and therefore it
must be transcendent. Thus Plato needs the transcendence of
the Forms if he IS to resolve the problem of moral
relativism effectively.
ht~J\ .He also t h i s . transcendence to support the absolute and
unchallengeable rule of the Guardians. In order for this
extraordinarily strong claim to be legitimized, it is
necessary that the rulers possess qualities which the rest
of the cit.izens lack. Now, if through their infallible
knowledge the Guardians have access to an ontological
real i ty higher than anything the other cit izens can come
close to, their authoritarian rule becomes not simply
justifiable, but, as far as Plato is concerned, the only way
a political community can organize itself rationally. Thus
the degrees of reality theory permits Plato both to present
the absolute authority of his ruling class as dictated by
the structure of reality itself and to deny the rationality
of any other political constitution (i.e. of all actual
historical constitutions). Callipolis becomes the absolute
political standard in the same way the Forms of the
individual virtues become the absolute standard in ethics.
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In conclusion, there is overwhelming evidence that Plato
upholds a "degrees of reality" (in the sense of existence)
theory in the Republic. This theory provides the best way to
unde r s tand the argument at 4 76dff. and squares very well
with some of the central doctrines of the dialogue.
So far it has been argued that Plato adopts a two-world
view in his metaphysics in the Republic and that this helps
him to make some strong ethical and political claims. But
does he succeed in establishing the two separate grades of
being?
Plato attempts to justify his hierarchical ontology by
suggesting that no predicate can ever be absolutely
attributed to a subject in the sensible world. He uses in
this connection two types of predicates. The first (479a)
consists of aesthetic and moral predicates: beautiful and
ugly, just and unjust, holy and unholy. The second consists
of adjectives like double and half, heavy and light, large
and small (479b). As Cross and Woozley remark, the
1 I · 1 187 B tpredicates of the second group are clear y re atlona. u
Plato does not draw any distinction between the two groups
and appears to take the predicates of the first group as
relational in some way too. In what sense this might be
possible, they illustrate by a passage in the First Book of
the Republic, where Socrates says that an action might be
just under some circumstances and unjust under others
(331c). Therefore a just act cannot be judged ab s o l u t e l y ,
. I 188but has to be determined in relation with somethlng e se.
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On this basis they argue that Plato's attempt to establish
two distinct grades of reality fails because a relation
exists between two or more terms and therefore when one says
"x is double" one needs another term to specify In relation
to what it is double. "To predicate a relation of a single
term, to say simply "x is double" [is] to misunderstand the
logic of relational expressions".189 Plato finds the sensible
world semi-real because he believes that when we say of a
particular thing that "it is double", this is sometimes true
and sometimes not. From this he infers that the subject of
the predication sometimes exists (as double) and other times
it does not and therefore it is self-contradictory and comes
between existence and non-existence. But this argument
depends on a logical error and Cross and Woozley's assertion
that with it "nothing has been established about the
self-contradictory
justified.
nature of sense . ,,190experIence is
But this IS not the only problem with the closing pages
of Book Five. By drawing too rigid a distinction between
,
£1CL(J'{;TJIlTJ and oO~<X and between Forms and particulars Plato
seems to contradict what he himself says in other parts of
the Republic.
• :>'
Despite the fact that oO~<X and £1CL(J'{;TJIlTJ are described as
distinct OVV~Il£LS in Book Five, a number of other passages
in the Republic suggest that the gap between the two might
not be impossible to bridge. So in 429cff. the courage of
the Auxiliaries is described as opeD o~~<X about what is to
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be feared and what not and this class IS credited with
political virtue (430c) ; the latter, al though vastly
inferior to the full virtue of the Rulers, IS still a kind
of virtue based on opinion. What is even more important is
that the Auxil iaries, the class which is expected to form
its judgements relying on doxa, are given an education whose
final purpose IS to allow them to accept and recognize
reason (402a). Reason is of course the prerogative of the
philosophers-kings. 'Nevertheless, the fact that the
Auxiliaries' education IS designed with an eye to
rationality suggests that there IS indeed a continuity
between correct opinion and rational knowledge rather than
an unbridgeable gap between them. Furthermore, the Rulers
are selected from the Auxiliaries on the basis of their
ability to retain, in the face of adverse force or
,
persuasion, lithe conviction (<Sot;a:v) that they must always do
what is best for the 'community" (412e). Therefore, they are
not only likely to proceed to knowledge from opinion, as the
passage in 402a suggests, but, moreover, the resoluteness
with which they stick to correct opinions becomes a central
prerequisite for their eventual ascent to knowledge.
This assumption IS further fortified when we take into
account the image of the line in Book Six (509dff.). Plato
here suggests that there are four distinct epistemological
>
statuses referring to different objects: vona l S or £nlaLn~n
o
IS correlated with Forms; <SlaVola has as its objects
mathematical or geometrical entities; n i o r i s is correlated
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with visible things and :0£ LX(XO'L(X with the images of those
.
things. 60~(X is the cognitive condition that is referred to
in the latter two cases: at best it is belief about sensible
things t at worst it is sheer imagination. Its objects are
.
80~(XO'L(X, whereas the objects of knowledge and of dianoia are
lVWO'L(X (51 Oa). By emphasizing the difference between the
former which are usually untrue and the latter which are
always true (510a), Plato demonstrates the supremacy of
knowledge over opinion. Nevertheless t the line is
continuous. Moreover, and this is of particular importance
with regard to the relation between the line metaphor and
the argument at the end of Book Five, in the former Plato's
interest is concentrated on the four states of mind and not
on their objects. As Lee writes "[h]e is careful not to work
out correspondences between the different modes of
perception and their "objects"". 191 Although there is, t he n , a
substantial difference between knowledge and o p i n i o n , the
.
possibility that oO~(X could be used as a first, preparatory
stage on the route for the acquisition of £nLO'LD~D remains
open. This conclusion IS further supported by a crucial
passage in 518d: education, Socrates asserts, IS not
"concerned to implant (£~1COL11O'(xL) sight, but to ensure that
someone who had it already was not ei ther turned In the
wrong direction or looking the wrong way". It IS exactly
this possibility that Plato utilizes when he asserts that
the Rulers will start their career as Auxiliaries and
therefore will t most probably t proceed to knowledge from
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opinion. So there are two aspects in the relationship
between doxa and episteme in the Republic. On the one hand,
as already noted, Plato insists on the overwhelming
superiori ty of the latter; but, on the other, he does not
completely deny the possible usefulness of opinion. It is
because of this fact that he is actually able to use opinion
as the starting point of the Rulers' education.
The contradiction between 476dff. and the aforementioned
features of the Republic has been noted by commentators. So
Guthrie suggests that "[Plato's] talk here of different
faculties is misleading, but soon dropped. The analogy of
sight and hearing is faulty, but he himself corrects it to
the true one when, later on (484c), he compares the states
of mind of the philodoxos and philosophos with those of the
blind and keen-sighted". 192 Furthermore, Gosling has argued in
detail that in the whole argument from 477d onwards ouva~Ls
shaul d not be rendered as "faculty", but rather as
""ability", "capacity" or
193
"power"". Two of Gosling's
remarks are of great significance in the context of the
present discussion: first that "[a very] wide application is
,
given to ouva~Ls" and second "that sight and hearing are
simply mentioned as examples and then drop out of the
. ,,194
discussion altogether. We get no elaboratlon .
Guthrie and Gosling are right to point out that the
analogy with sight and hearing is not central to the
argument at the end of Book Five and therefore Plato's
epistemological distinction may not be as inflexible as a
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first reading of the argument might suggest. The fact that
£nLaLn~n and o~~a are distinct capacities does not entail,
though that the two are completely
unconnected. There are two things which are important to
keep in mind with regard to this matter. First, the argument
in Book Fi ve establishes two distinct ontological realms,
but the two are not completely unconnected: particulars
participate in Forms (again participation is the one aspect
of the theory of the Forms which appears to be particularly
relevant to Plato's epistemology). Second, the substantial
s upe rio r i t y 0 f know1e dge toopin ion is not c ompr om is edin
the education of the Guardians and the line. Although In
both cases one proceeds from the latter to the former, the
difference between the two stages when taken in themselves
remains immense. Therefore Guthrie is justified when he
suggests that "although in different dialogues Plato
are
emphasizes one or other feature of his theory of knowledge
and being [i.e. either their distinctness or the fact they
] d i . . . 1 d" 195connected , no real contra lctlon IS lnvo ve .
ThiSdol\bQb\d~Y)ess' IS in fact not confined to the Republic
but runs through Plato's corpus as a who l e . In the Meno,
Plato asserts that although aAn8ns is inferior to
3
£nLaLn~n in that it cannot provide the
3 '
"aLLLaS AOYLa~(j)"
,
(98a), it can be equally successful as far as practical
tasks are concerned: "aAn8ns o~~a r,yovJi~IJn L~ £pyoIJ £x~aLTJS
Lt}S np~~£ws OVO~IJ x£tPOIJ &n£PI'~C£LaL lj £nLa'LnJin" (98b). In
the Theaetetus he examines the possibility that knowledge
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, , ,
could be the "11£7:0: AO)'OV eXAl1e" OO~o:V" (201d). It IS in" the
Timaeus that Plato seems to present his most uncompromising
account of difference between lnLaL~l1l1 and o~~o:. In 27d-28a,
in a passage strongly reminiscent of Republic 476dff., he
declares that "what always IS and never becomes" IS
, ..
conceived by "Vol1a£L 11£7:0: AO)'OV", whereas "what becomes but
,
never is" by "8o~11 I1£L'
\
2 I ) I
O:LaeTla£ws o:AO)'OV". And in 51d he
asserts that "uon s XO:L o~~o: &ATle~S Loxov o~o )'~VTl". It is
this consistent ~R"ex~klLt4~ in his epistemological doctrine
that allows Plato to put the emphasis sometimes on the
,
practical usefulness of 8o~0: and at other times on the vast
superiority of ~£nLqLTlI1Tl without formally contradicting
himself. And it is exactly this flexibility of his
epistemological doctrine that he exploits in later dialogues
(the Politicus and the Laws), where he returns to the Meno's
suggestion that eXAl1e~S o~~o: can be just as successful as
knowledge as far as practical resul ts are concerned. (See
chapter 2, section 4 and chapter 3, section 6). This
interpretation squares well not only with the continuous
line, but also with the famous cave simile (514aff.). Plato
there compares sight, which enables one to see the sun, with
the noesis which comprehends the Form of the Good (508d-e),
and distinguishes four frames of mind. One is the frame of
mind of those who stay wi th their heads still inside the
cave (which corresponds to the visible world) and see only
the shadows different objects cast inside the cave (515c). A
second is the frame of mind of those who see the obj ect s
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which cast the shadows (515c-d). A third IS the frame of
mind of those who see the images of things In the wor ld
outside the cave (in the intelligible world) and eventually
those things themselves (516a) and a fourth of those who
reach the point where they can see the heavenly bodies and
finally the sun itself (516a-b). In 517a-b Plato himself
declares that the cave metaphor "must be connected
throughout with what preceded it", i.e. the sun and the line
similes. In view of this recommendation, it appears that the
:l 'bound prisoners have £txaata; the released prisoners inside
,
the cave nta~ts; the persons who look at reflections outside
,
the cave are characterized by oLavoLa and those who can look
:l
at the heavenly bodies and the sun itself £nta~n~n. But even
without taking the proposed correlation into account,
Plato's intention IS clear. He presents the four
epistemological stages as parts of a process. Their objects
are distinct and the difference between the stages IS
clearly marked, but still the process of their comprehension
IS a sing] e process. The cave is perhaps the one point in
the dialogue where Plato makes the immense difference
between episteme and doxa so clear (there could hardly be a
greater difference of human cognitive condition than the one
between the two extremes in the cave parable) without having
to separate them in water-tight compartments.
One last remark on the subject. It has been objected to
Plato that by giving too theoretical an account of the
philosopher's knowledge In the similes of the sun, the line
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and the cave he does not explain how this knowledge might be
applied to practice. Annas writes that "Plato seems to have
drifted away from what the argument needs, the philosopher
as practically wise, the good person who IS the norm for
moral judgements because judging rationally and from
understanding. We now find the philosopher raptly
contemplating Forms and only Forms t dismissing the world of
. b . h 196experIence as eIng on t e level of a shadow or a dream".
But it IS Plato's epistemology which acquits him of this
charge. If the intellectual process which leads to the
grasping of the Forms has opinion as its starting point, and
since every stage in the philosopher's ascent is a positive
development on the previous one, Plato does not have a
problem on this score. The philosopher's knowledge IS
immediately relevant to practical matters and the
philosopher can resolve such matters infallibly because he
or she has started from the intellectual capacity which is
concerned with sensible things. This is why the philosophers
provide infallible government when they return to the cave.
Their knowledge has different objects from the ones of the
visible wor l d , but it includes these objects. ;)ElILOTDPTJ is
,
not a negation of 8o~a but an improvement on it.
There are two distinct ways in which Plato's metaphysics
support his ethical and political assertions. The first
becomes obvious when his argumenta t ion about the natural
fitness of the Guardian class to rule is traced. Plato
argues that there is one cognitive capacity which is, if not
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distinct, at least hugely superior to any other, namely
episteme. This capacity is to be found only in the
Guardians. It consists In a full grasp of the ultimate
ontological reality, the realm of the Forms and especially
of the Form of the Good. This means that their claim to
power is based on the order of reality itself. They are the
only ones who can comprehend this ultimate reality and
transfer this comprehension into practice. Moreover, because
in the Republic Plato is thinking of Forms primarily as
moral Forms, and because he adheres to the Socratic belief
that knowledge IS sufficient for v i r t ue , he attributes to
this class perfect virtue along wi th perfect knowledge (he
nowhere specifically argues for this c o nne c t i on , but it IS
one of the governing principles of the Republic). It is
here, more than anywhere else, that the Republic's
totalitarianism becomes plain. To challenge the power of the
Guardians becomes equivalent to going against the ultimate
ethical, metaphysical and even cosmological reality (the
Form of the Good has certain cosmological connota t ions in
that the other Forms derive their reality from it (508e);
this is pursued further in the Timaeus, a work closely
connected with the Republic). 197 Consequently, there is no
Platonic premiss which would provide justification even for
the slightest dissent on the part of the Producers or even
the Auxiliaries. The necessity for this type of rule becomes
equivalent to a natural law. To defy it is to go against
both morality and nature itself.
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The second argument logically follows the completion of
the first and depends on the paradigmatic function of Forms.
When established, the ideal city is a "pattern" to be
approximated as far as possible, (though it may never be
fully real ized: practice IS more remote from truth than
theory-473a). This is effectively the note on which the
Republic closes (592b), g i v en that Book Ten confronts a
different (though closely related) set of problems. Plato
establishes on this basis a radical distinction between his
own ci ty and any. other, more specifically between his own
city and any actual one. The former belongs, by definition,
to the eternal and unchangeable world of the Forms and
therefore is ontologically on a different plane from any
historical city. This means that the final justification of
Callipolis IS metaphysical. Its paradigmatic ethical and
political value comes from the theory of the Forms. In this
sense, .P'l a t o l s final answer to the ethical and political
problems he confronts is metaphysical, and so IS the final
justification of the ethico-political theory of Books Two to
Four. We are now in a posi tion to discern that both the
basis and the ultimate justification of Callipolis are
transcendent.
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VIII HISTORY IN THE REPUBLIC
The fact that the final conclusions of the Republic are
justified on a transcendent basis entails that history is
ruled out from the outset as a source of useful political
insights. Furthermore, in the structure of the Republic's
ontology, history belongs to the world of particulars and
therefore Plato can ignore the possibility that it might be
a useful guide for political action without the need for
specific argumentation. But Plato IS not content simply to
relegate historical experience to a state of unimportance.
His disregard for it extends to the point that he almost
consistently ignores it even in the one area where one could
expect him to turn to it, namely in his discussion of actual
historical states in Books Eight and Nine.
Plato's neglect of history has been defended on the
grounds that because Callipolis, which is placed at the
beginning of the sequence of the degeneration of the
constitutions does not actually exist In the historical
world, this whole sequence must not be taken literally: its
purpose is to provide a typology of actual states as they
stand in relation to the ideal one, not to give a historical
account of them. Both Guthrie and Barker criticize Aristotle
for treating the constitutional transitions as if they were
historical in the Politics 1316a1ff. 1 9 8 Their argument
provides an accurate account of Plato's intentions in this
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section and clearly brings out Plato's disregard· for
history, since it underlines the fact that Plato comes to
judge existing states not by the use of historical
categories, but by measuring them against his transcendent
ideal (this is a direct consequence of the paradigmatic
function of the Forms). But it is unfair to Aristotle, r n
the sense that the latter is completely justified in asking
for historical accuracy from the moment that Plato passes
from the ideal to the actual. One of the pivotal aims of
Plato's metaphysics is to explain how the phenomena of the
sensible world relate to the Forms. But if too distorted an
account is g i ven of. these phenomena-and as we shall see
Plato's description of the existing constitutions does
include some gross historical inaccuracies-the whole
theoretical scheme comes into question, because in that case
the theory of the Forms does not explain the sensible world
but 1S rather imposed upon it. In this sense Plato cannot
afford to present a typology of constitutions which 1S
widely at odds with historical reality. Moreover, Plato
himself twice connects explicitly his timocracy with actual
states: in 544c it is called "T, KPD'rLXD 'r£ xa~ AaxwvLxD" and
, '
in 545a it is referred to as "'rDv AaxwvLxDV". It is also
difficult to accept that Plato would not draw from the
experience of his native city in his depiction of democracy,
and an indication of this is given by the Athenian Glaucon's
remark 1n 563d that "I've often suffered from it [the
disobedience of domestic animals] on my way out of town". In
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conclusion, Aristotle IS justified in criticizing Plato on a
historical basis.
But this IS not the only major problem with Plato's
philosophical procedure in Books Eight and Nine. Plato here
utilizes what can be called a "psychological" principle,
based on the assumpt ion tha t the const i tut ion of a s ta te
reflects the psychological characteristics of its citizens.
Plato's focus on psychology rather than history In his
discussion of the actual states clearly shows his lack of
interest in history, a lack which becomes even more evident
in the light of the fact that, as we will now proceed to
see, the psychological principle ultimately fails to produce
a coherent account of the "degenerate" states.
This principle is stated emphatically at the beginning of
the discussion of the corrupt constitutions, when Socrates
declares that "there must be as many types of individual as
of society" and that "societies aren't made of sticks and
stones, but of men whose individual characters, by turning
the scales one way or another, determine the direction of
the whole" (544d-e). This statement should not be taken as
implying that the state reflects the character of all its
citizens: Plato recognizes divergent elements in each city
(e.g. 547d, 551d). It IS rather what Williams calls the
"predominant . ,,199 fsectIon 0 a polis which determines its
constitutional type.
Plato is prepared to go into graphic detail to illustrate
this principle. He presents
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the transition from one
constitution to the next as taking place in one generation:
the democratic man is the son of the oligarchic man who in
turn is the son of the timocratic man and so on. The
psychology of each of them IS mainly determined by the
influences exercized on him inside his family. So, for
example, the timocratic man comes to be· dominated by the
,
middle part of his soul, the eV~O£LO£S, because he is pulled
into different directions by his rational father 2 0 0 on the one
hand and his mother, servants and fr iends on the other
(549c-550c). The suggestion that a constitution can be
described by the short story of one family probably appears
odd to the modern reader, but this IS not an argument
against Plato. The latter obviously wants to explain the
existing constitutions of his time In terms of his
psychology. He attributes a thymoeidic character to the
timocrat, an epithymetic character dominated by the "better"
,
(~£ALLOvs-554e) desires to the oligarch, a similar character
but ruled by "unnecessary" (LUW IlD &V<X1X<x~wv-559d) desires
to the democrat and finally an epithymetic character which
has no inhibitions and "no shame"
:> '
<XLOXVVDS-571c) to the tyr~nt.
The problem with the psychological principle is that it
depends on an equivocation oV~\ the character of the
predominant section of the citizens and that of the
constitution. But this equivocation breaks down in the cases
of democracy and tyranny. In the case of democracy, this
f 1 f "-rrX,rTLV ~ecaLv"constitution is made 0 peop e 0 nV.v '/ v
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(557c).
There is no unity of any kind, obedience to the government's
decisions is voluntary (557e-558a) and no common good IS
acknowledged (558b). This sociological picture of democracy
makes it difficult to see how there could ever be a typical
democratic character (and of course such a character is
required for Plato to claim that democracy takes its
character from its ci tizens). But Plato Ignores this fact
and paints the portrait of the typical democratic citizen a
few pages later. Plato's picture of the democratic man is
that of someone with no steady character and no sense of
direction; he is the man who makes no distinction between
necessary and unnecessary pleasures (561a), who indulges in
lustful activities on one day and in ascetic ones on the
very next, who engages In hard training on one occasion and
IS indolent on another, who might even lightly take up
philosophy or politics (561c-d). In 561e Plato argues that
"[t]he versatility of the individual, and the attractiveness
of his combination of a wide range of characteristics, match
the variety of the democratic society. It's a life which
many men and women would envy, it contains patterns of so
many constitutions and ways of life". But if the democratic
polis consists of citizens with all sorts of D8D, then Plato
is not justified in talking of a democratic type at all, let
alone in depicting him in such detail in 561c-d. If, on the
other hand, the majority of the people in democracy fall
under this description, then Plato is not justified In
taking democracy as including all sorts of citizens. Here
127
Plato's sociology is inconsistent with his psychological
typology: the way the former IS set up makes the latter
untenable. Or, as Williams puts it, "Plato seems disposed to
confound two very different things: a state in which there
are various characters among the people, and a state in
which most of the people have a various character, that IS
to say, a very shifting and unsteady character".201
One could perhaps argue that this logical error is not
due to Plato's adoption of the psychological principle
itself, but rather to the fact that his insistence on the
very different temperaments of the people who live In a
democracy is unfortunate. If Plato dropped his assumption
that in democracy we get all kinds of characters, he could
still present a coherent account of how a predominant type
of person, the uns teady indi vidual of 561 aff ., determines
the character
argument is
of the constitution.
that there IS little
One problem wi th this
doubt that Plato's
conviction that a democracy IS made up of "rraVTooaTCOL"
individuals (557c) is not a circumstantial remark, but an
integral part of Plato's overall disposition towards
democracy. Plato elaborates considerably on this point
(557b-558c) which thus cannot be summarily dismissed from
his argument. But even if the psychological principle is
defensible in the case of democracy, it is completely
irreconcilable with the rest of Plato's assertions in the
case of tyranny.
The reason why the correlation
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of a predominant
psychological type and the corresponding constitution is
untenable in the case of tyranny is very simple: it cannot
be claimed that a city has a tyrannical regime because the
majority of its citizens have tyrannical dispositions. Plato
makes a weak attempt to suggest something along these lines
in 575c, where he suggests that a number of individuals with
tyrannical inclinations are instrumental in the ascent of
the tyrant to power. Even in this case, though, they are not
a majority: the majority is the oDPos which helps the tyrant
unwillingly with its folly ("I1£'r~ ODI10V avo~as"-575c). And
the emphasis is. decisively on the fact that the tyrant
oppresses the citizens and is disliked by them. In 567a-b he
,
'rots 7rOAL'raLs". In 568a "OL 0'
£7rL£Lx£ts pLGOnGL t e xo t, <P£~"10VGL [avL~v]". In 569b the
tyrant uses violence against the citizens protesting against
his rule. There is no doubt, then, that tyranny cannot be
explained by the suggestion that a predominant section of
the citizen-body has tyrannical dispositions and Plato's
psychological principle collapses in this case altogether.
The fact that Plato prefers to apply to actual states an
ultimately disfunctional psychological principle rather than
to argue from historical experience demonstrates an almost
total disregard for historical knowledge. But this statement
has to be qualified in one way. Plato does contribute
occasional historical insights to the discussion of the
actual states. They are, however, only incidental and they
never get fully incorporated into his main argument.
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Moreover, any suggestion that these insights might indicate
a serIOUS Platonic interest In history is refuted by the
fact that some of the views that Plato puts forward in this
section strongly contradict historical truth.
The most clearly discernible historical insights that
Plato includes In his discussion of existing states occur in
the framework of his presentation of the transition from
oligarchy to democracy and of the process by which the
tyrant comes to power. In the former case Plato remarks that
because in 01 igarchy weal th is the most appreciated good,
the oligarchs try by all means to increase their fortunes at
the expense of other citizens (555b-556c). This inflates the
,
number of "ncvrrr<xs" (555d) in the state and increases the
social tension between rich and poor, until one of the
factions asks for the assistance of an external power (the
rich ask help from an oligarchy, the poor from a democracy-
556e). Democracy comes about when the poor achieve victory
in this conflict, either by force or because the rich
abandon the city out of fear (557a). These last two
propositions look as if they come directly from Thucydides'
History where friction between democrats and oligarchs, with
both sides often inviting the help of external powers, is a
recurrent
202
theme. Wha t IS particular in Plato's case,
however, is that these remarks remain on the periphery of
his main argument. Right after Plato has made these
, '
observations he asks "[r]l,v<x Or] OVLJ 00't"01, 't"ponOLJ
I I CI C
OLXOVOL.; X<XI, nol,<x 't"I,S n 't"OI,<xv't"r] <xV nOAI,'t"CI,<X; OnAOLJ l<XP 0't"1, 0
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:t I 1:1 I
TOLODTOS aVDP oD~OXpaTLXOS TLS ava~aV~a£TaL" (557a-b). This
passage shows that for Plato the true nature of democracy
can be revealed only by an inquiry made in terms of moral
psychology and that the aforementioned historical remarks
serve as little more than an introduction to this inquiry.
Plato also gives a plausible historical account of the
way a tyrant might come to dominate a city. The tyrant
starts as a npoaTaT~S (565d) of the on~os who feel
threatened by the oligarchs (565aff.) and wins the goodwill
of the people by promising "XP£GW T£ 2anoxona s xa l
&vaoaa~~v" (566a); and he is transformed from a prostates to
a t y r anno s when he asks-and is g i ven-a personal bodyguard
(566b) which he then uses for promoting his individual
interests. Even if this picture is not correct In every
detail, at least it reflects the historical fact that in
most cases tyrants arose by promising to protect the
interests of the of}~os against the landed ar istocracy. But
again Plato does not make much of this historical fact. In
566d he starts scrutinizing the actions of the tyrant and
the character they reveal, and the whole discussion IS
concluded in 576b where the tyrant IS denounced as "the
worst type of man" (T~V x~xLaTov). Once more, therefore, in
terms of the overall argument, moral psychology overshadows
history.
The extent to which Plato t s psychological principle-and
his disdain for democracy-lead him to historically
improbable claims is plainly illustrated by his description
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of democracy. As already noted, there are biographical
reasons which suggest that the democracy Plato portrays in
Book Eight 1S the Athenian democracy as he knew it. This
assumption cannot be proven by the text, but at least a
dramatic indication 1S given that it might be so (Glaucon's
statement in 563d). If this is the case, Plato's depiction
of the Athenian democracy 1S almost as remote from
historical truth as it could be. It is simply impossible to
see how a state where laws were disobeyed at will, where
anybody held office independent of merit and where court
decisions were not executed (557e-558b) could remain the
predominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean for the best
part of a century; and even if its prowess was diminished
after the Peloponnesian War, Athens ceased to be a first
rate power only after Plato's death. A state as anarchic as
Plato's democracy would hardly have been able to keep its
independence r n the compet it i ve Greek inter-c i ty
relationships, let alone reach the exceptional degree of
dominance Athens achieved. Insofar as Plato has Athens in
mind 1n Book Eight, then, his idealist preconceptions
completely blind him to the historical facts.
Similarly, it is very difficult to see how Plato's tyrant
could be a successful political leader, as many of the Greek
tyrants were. The bottom line of Plato's presentation of the
tyrant is that when he has relatively consolidated his
power, he satisfies every possible desire he might have,
without any inhibition of any kind. In the final stages of
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his career he loses every sense of reason, he becomes what
we today might call a sociopath. He is the individual who is
called upon to "[control] others though he cannot control
himself" (579c). But how such a person could ever remain in
power in the highly competitive arena of Greek politics 1S a
mystery, and Annas is absolutely right to claim that
"Plato's tyrant would not last a week,,.203
One could probably add other ways in which Plato's theory
violates historical experience. Aristotle, for example,
remarks that constitutions tend to change to their opposites
and that other transitions from the ones Plato describes are
possible (Politics 1316a18-26); and, appropriately, he
proceeds to give historical examples of different types of
changes (1316a23ff.). Plato's defenders might reply here
that Plato's concern is to produce a pattern which will
explain constitutional transition, not to account for every
such change tha t has ac t ua lly happened. Even so, however,
Plato's complete lack of concern about historical truth
cannot be seriously disputed.
The Platonic attitude towards history in the Republic is
particularly relevant to the development of Plato's
political theory. In later dialogues (in the closing pages
of the Politicus and mainly in the Laws), Plato moves
towards more moderate political positions. As we shall now
proceed to see, the historical experience which was
c omp l e te l y discarded in the Republic
methodological vehicle of this shift.
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becomes the
CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICUS
I THE MYTH
In the development of Plato's political theory the
Po I i t i cu s occupies a central position. It is the dialogue
where the ideal of the perfect statesman of the Republic is
restated in full force, but its achievability is seriously
questioned; f o r the first time Plato examines the
possibility, or indeed the probability, that ideal rulers
might not appear in contemporary society and recommends
strict adherence to the law as the best solution in this
eventuality. It is by advocating the rule of law as a
legitimate constitutional alternative to philosophical rule
that the Politicus anticipates the Laws; and it is by
explaining that this rule is to be prescribed only 1n the
absence of a philosopher-king that it elucidates the
relationship between the political positions of the Laws and
the Republic.
The main character of the dialogue is the Eleatic
Stranger, the man who in the Sophist utilized the method of
division to discredit any claim the sophists might make for
possessing genuine knowledge. In the Politicus he uses the
.
same method to define the noAL~LXOS. Politics 1S an
£nLaLn~n, an art that presupposes knowledge (258b). On the
basis of successive divisions which follow, the statesman is
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finally defined as the possessor of an art which nurtures
beings that are t ame , live on La nd , have no h o r n s , do not
interbreed wi th other species ~ have two legs and no wings
(264bff.). But there are a number of other artisans such as
traders~ farmers~ gymnasts or doctors, who could claim the
title of the "feeders of mankind" (267e). The Stranger
proposes then to tell a story which will demonstrate the
difference between the statesman and these inferior arts.
Plato has already made~ during the process of division so
far, a number of important political statements. The
Socratic thesis .that politics :)is an e n I.. 0"1:111.111 , an art that
relies on knowledge, is posited from the outset (258b) and
is accepted without contest. This position effectively
shapes the political philosophy of the dialogue; it serves
indeed as the prime principle of the work. The doctrine that
one can be a real statesman even wi thout holding power
(25ge) is perfectly compatible with the Socratic argument
from the arts~ because somebody IS an expert in an art when
he has the knowledge necessary for the exerciS~ of it~ and
this knowledge exists even if~ for some reason~ an
individual abstains from practicing his art. Plato here
explicitly defends a practice widespread in the Academy,
many members of which served as advisors to actual rulers,
with Plato himself attempting to play this role in Syracuse.
But despite the fact that Plato makes important political
statements before the narration of the myth~ the role of the
latter in the framing of the discussion which follows can
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hardly be overra ted. The myth sets the framework within
which political science is to be examined for the rest of
the dialogue. I t is al so intended to provide a number of
political conclusions to wh i ch , from its very nature as a
logical method t division is unable to lead.
The myth draws a clearcut distinction between two
specific states of affairs. According to it the Universe is
sometimes assisted in its rotation by the god "who framed it
in the beginning" (269d)t while at other times it is left to
its own initiative and rotates by itself because it is
living ("CG)ov oV"-269d). The cosmological assertions put
\
forward here present .an obvious resemblance to the Platonic
positions In the Timaeus. In the Timaeus there appears a
. ,
god-creator ("OT7/-LLOVPI'0s"-41a) who made the wo r Ld , butt
because the latter participates In matter t is not in
absolute control of it. Matter is always up to a certain
extent recalcitrant t and so god, even though absolutely good
in himself t is not able to create an absolutely good world
(29d-30a). The same point is made in the Politicus where it
is stated that the Universe "has received many blessed gifts
from Him who brought it into be ing t but it has al so been
made to partake in bodily form" (269d-e). When the universe
i sund e r i mm e d i ate d i v ine con t r 0 I we are 1 nthe " age 0 f
Cronus". In this age "all mortal beings began to grow
backwards, as it were t towards youth and ever greater
immaturity" (270d). Everything works in time not as we know t
but in exactly the opposi te way. Even the dead resurrect
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(271 b). Under Cronus' supreme government, lesser gods and
daimons were appointed as "shepherds" to every species.
"Each of them was all in all to his flock- providing for the
needs of all his charges. So it befell that savagery was
nowhere to be found nor preying of creature on creature, nor
did war rage nor any strife whatsoever" (271d-e). Living in
1
such perfect conditions, free from labour, men in the
Cronian age are vastly happier than the human beings of
Plato's time provided they engage in philosophical enquiry
(272c). But even if they do not do so, they still lead a
life without conflict .
. The bright colours used by Plato to depict the "age of
Cronus" become dark colours when we come to the "age of
Zeus". When the time came for Cronus' era to end ("nav'twv
'tOV'LWV XP~vos £'t£A£W81l " - 272d ) , God "let go the handle of its
rudder and returned to his conning-place" (272e). The lesser
gods followed him and the universe, after great upheaval and
destruction assumed control of itself. The universe, which
as we saw is e.ns ou l e d , tried to remember and follow the
instructions of its Creator, but "as time went on its
recollection grew dim" (273b). This was due to partaking in
matter (again a clear point of reference to the Timaeus).
The withdrawal of God's immediate care had devastating
effects for the human race. Men were ravaged by savage
beasts and did not know how to produce their food. In order
to meet their needs they were assisted by the gods:
Prometheus gave them fire,
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Hephaestus and Athena
craftsmanship and other gods the technical knowledge
required for agriculture (274c-d). Plato finally closes the
myth by stating once more its central idea: human beings
sometimes live In the perfect conditions of the
divine-guided universe, sometimes in the reverse situation
we find ourselves in.
There are a number of mythological threads that Plato
interweaves, with impressive literary ability, into his
2
myth. The most important in terms of the internal structure
3
of the myth is the "age of Cronus" fable. This was a common
tale In the fourth century B.C. and it was loaded with
political connotations. According to Vidal-Naquet, in this
period "[t]he age of Cronos, "life In the time of Cronos" as
it is called, is a slogan for philosophical and religious
sects that are not satisfied, or are no longer satisfied,
with the existing civil order".4 There is little doubt that
such dissatisfaction lies deep in the roots of Plato's
political philosophy. In giving his own version of the myth,
therefore, Plato enters a contemporary debate. The
philosopher conceives the Cronian age as being separated by
an unbridgeable gulf from his own era. Other authors of the
fourth century, however, take a different stand on this
point: "Dicaearchus and Theophrastus [both subsequent to
Plato but probably reflecting views current In the
philosopher's lifetime] see humanity's advance since the
time of the oak and the acorn which, for Dicaearchus too is
the time of Cronos, as a continual, historical evolution
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towards the age of cities and empires, the empires of Athens
5
and Alexander". Plato's rejection of this supposed
historical continuity (essentially the same kind of
continuity that Protagoras defends in the dialogue bearing
his name) obviously has a philosophical significance and has
to be taken into account in the political analysis of the
myth.
The first aim that the myth serves in the Politicus is a
formal one. It demonstrates that there was a mistake in the
process of diairesis towards the definition of the
statesman: the latter's art consists in being concerned for
herds, not in nurturing them. But, as Skemp remarks "[t]his
is manifestly not the real reason. So small a correction
could have been made in a line or two of argument".6 Plato's
myth is indeed intended as a political statement in its own
right. One of its main functions 1S to repudiate a
conception of the ruler which attempted to justify personal
as opposed to constitutional authority on the basis of what
Skemp calls "the innate or natural superiority of the
7
ruler", the conception that a ruler 1S superior to his
subjects in the same way that God is superior to man or a
shepherd to his flock. The idea that the good ruler is like
B
a shepherd to his subjects was as old as Homer and a
renewed vers ion of it was propounded a t the turn of the
fifth and fourth century B.C. by Xenophon and probably even
Isocrates. 9 What Plato finds most objectionable in this
particular conception of leadership is that the rule of one
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person IS sanctified not by knowledge but by some sort of
divine charisma. Plato categorically disagrees with this;
for h i m, In the absence of really divine rulers, like the
daimons in the myth t the only faculty which can fully
legitimize political power is philosophical wisdom. This
wisdom is indeed divine (e.g. 303b) because it involves
knowledge of a transcendent reality (it will be argued below
that Forms are present in the Politicus). But it is divine
only in the sense that humans achieve the level of knowledge
which allows them to become Ideal Rulers. Even as such t they
are still like their subjects in being human. Therefore for
10
a ruler to claim that he is the shepherd of his people or
to be eulogized as descending from the Gods (as in the case
of Cyrus' characterization by Croesus In Xenophon's
C ide i ) 11yropal la , IS to violate the principle that In the
present era rulers and ruled belong to the same species.
Plato could hardly be more explicit on this issue. In 275b-c
the Stranger himself analyzes the moral of the myth as
follows: "[i]t appears to me now, Socrates, that the Divine
Shepherd is so exalted a figure that no king can be said to
attain to his eminence. Those who rule these states of ours
in this present era are like their subjects t far closer to
them in training and in nurture than ever shepherd could be
to his flock".12
We can therefore identify three independent and yet
interconnected political assumptions as following from the
myth: first, divine guidance is immensely superior to human
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(even if sc i ent if ic) government. Second, all rul er s in our
present era are like their subjects, they belong to the same
species. The only divine property a ruler can have is
knowledge, and even this does not bring him anywhere near
the Divine Shepherd or the daimons of the myth who were
really divine and could provide for all the needs of their
,
subjects. Third, conflict in the forms of both nOA£~os and
a~aatS is an integral part of the cosmos we inhabit in the
present era, as can be inferred from 271d-e.
Another probable implication of the myth is that Plato
demonstrates in .i t a tendency to go beyond the polis, the
typical Greek political unit of his time, towards a state of
affairs which is irrelevant to the specific political
framework of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. It has to
be noted that whereas men like Protagoras and Dicaearchus
saw civilization as something continuous, gradually
developing from an initial stage of primitiveness, for Plato
there is a radical break between the "Cronian age" and the
civilization of his time. This point is proved by the fact
that in the former "nOAt~£ta~ ~£ oux fIaav ouo~ x r no e t s
,
I'vvatx(i)v xat ncxtowv" 13(271e-272a). Here we see the economic
(goods) and social (family) xot uox r nuoouvn of the Republic
radical ized: economic common possession is secured by the
fact that men live off the earth without labour, and common
possession of women and children is secured by the absence
of sexual reproduction. From this point of View the "age of
Cronus" provides a mythological blueprint for the cardinal
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arrangements of the Republic. Callipolis IS an attempt to
reproduce in the "age of Zeus" the ideal social arrangements
of the "age of Cronus". But because it is deeply rooted in
the historical world of conflict, the city of the Republic
can never fully realize the conditions of the Cronian age:
.
it remains a model in heaven (592b), a napao£Ll~a to look up
to.
In the myth Plato contrasts a literally perfect state of
affairs with contemporary human existence, an intrinsic and
inseparable part of which is conflict, and indicates that
although the f3aOLA.LXOS
,
aVTlP might provide the best
government possible,this will still fall short of a divine
guidance provided by beings superior to humans. Conflict is
part of man's present pol i tical existence, Plato assumes,
and as such it might be checked by a perfect Ruler, but it
cannot be eliminated. Political theory has to take into
account the "human condition" in the "age of Zeus". The myth
provides the first signs of Plato's increased realism in the
Politicus.
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II THE IDEAL RULER
As already noted, one of the principles informing the
political theory of the Politicus is the presence in it of
the :J£1Cl,o'tTJIlWV ruler of the Republ i c , whose political
judgement is formed on the basis of absolute knowledge. A
number of features of the Politicus certify that the Ideal
Ruler of the dialogue is hardly distinguishable from the
philosopher-kings of the Republic. 1 4
The first thing we learn r n the Politicus about the
, :J'
no~I,'tI,XOS is that he is 'tQv£nl,o'tTJIlOVWv (258b; the point is
repeated in 292b). It is true that Plato does not make
,
:J
explicit 1n the dialogue that the £nl,o'tDIlTJ of the nOll,'tLXOS
is knowledge of Forms and that, as Gill remarks, it 1S
knowledge of individual cases rather than of moral Forms
which provides the Scientific Ruler with justification of
his rule. 1 5 Given, however, that Forms exist in the Politicus
(as I argue in section 3), and that, from the Phaedo
onwards, episteme is for Plato knowledge of Forms, there is
,
no reason to doubt that the knowledge of the no~I,'tI,XOS is
knowledge of Forms; this fact places him 1n the same
position as his counterparts in the Republic. As regards the
fact that it is the Ruler's insight on individual cases
which particularly characterizes his political function,
Gill himself realizes that there is no necessary
contradiction between the Republic's position and that of
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the Politicus. 1 6 Plato·describes the knowledge of the Rulers
of the former dialogue in terms of moral Forms, but he also
states that this knowledge can be applied to particular
instances (520c). From this point of view it becomes obvious
that the insight covering particular cases is part of the
knowledge of Forms in general. What we. have therefore in the
Politicus is a shift of emphasis from the universal to the
particulars. But knowledge of the particular does not
preclude knowledge of the general; it is rather, as in the
Republic, a continuation of it.
The epistemology of the Republic, IS, however, qualified
in the Politicus in one significant way. This has been
demonstrated .by Miller, who argues that In the Po l i t i c u s
human speeches and actions (the material that any ruler has
to deal wi th) are purposeful in the sense of s t riving to
"realize or instantiate 17forms" and are evaluated on the
basis "of how fully such approximation is accomplished".18 In
other words, an action or a speech is good or bad depending
on the extent to which it approximates its relevant Form.
But because Forms as such are not sensitive "to the
existential limitations of 19context", a number' of
intermediary categories are posed by Plato as objects of
knowledge. Immediately below the Forms we have LO ~£LPLOV,
essential measure which is concerned with size "in relation
to the fixed norm to which they [in the particular context
the speeches] must approximate if they are to exist at all
, I I I I, I(LO ... X<XL<X LfJV Lfls y£v£o£WS <XV<XyX<XL<XV ovol.<Xv-283d)". This
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is opposed to relative measure, I.e. the measure which
compares the relative sizes of objects In the world of
particulars.
,
Essent ial measure is then exempl if ied In "ro
f • I •
np£nov xat 'tov xatpov xat 'to 5£ov" (284e). These three terms
signify norms according to which an action can be judged,
and all three, although informed by essential measure which
in its turn is informed by Forms, are close to experience
and therefore to the world of particulars. According to
Miller "[a]ll of these notions refer implicitly to concrete
historical context as orienting and delimiting". 20 Together
wi th essent ial measure, then, they br idge the gap between
Forms and particulars. It is important to realize that this
move does not invalidate the metaphysics of the Republic.
Forms remain ontologically prIor, and their knowledge
remains the sine qua non for the Scientific Ruler. But the
relationship between universals and particulars which was
straightforward in the Republic (Gill remarks correctly that
in 520c the thesis that a man who has knowledge of the Form
of justice will recognize what is just in each individual
case is asserted but not 21proved and this indicates that
Plato did not see a problem with this point), becomes
complex In the Politicus. Plato here comes up with an
epistemological model more subtle than the one of the
Republic, and the reason for this is of critical importance
for the understanding of the Politicus as a whole: it is his
attempt to accd'modate the "concrete historical context" of a
human action which obliges him to increase the flexibility
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of the ontological scheme of the Republic. We will have more
to say on the importance of history In the Politicus in
section 4.
The heart of the matter remains, however, that the
Scientific Ruler has absolute knowledge of the same kind and
calibre as the knowledge of the philosopher-kings. It is on
the grounds of this knowledge that Plato states one of the
most daring positions of his whole philosophical career:
that the Scientific Ruler should be above the law. How much
this runs counter to the most sacred political beliefs of
the o rd i na r y Greek is well demonstrated by the fact that
this is the only case In which Young Socrates, the otherwise
docile interlocutor of the Eleatic Stranger, utters an
objection in the whole dialogue (293e). Plato's argument for
the superiority of the
,.
£ n LaTll J1 ll of
,
the 11£'[a ¢povlla £WS
.
~aaLALxos in relation to law is that whereas the former can
produce the best judgement on each individual case, the
latter, by its very nature, "cannot prescribe with perfect
accuracy what is good and right f or each member of the
community at anyone time. The differences of human
personality, the variety of men's activities and the
inevitable unsettlement attending all human experience make
it impossible for any art whatsoever to issue unqualified
rules holding good on all questions at all times" (294b). It
is important that in this context Plato emphasizes the
,
wisdom ("4>pOVllaLs"-294a) of the Scientific Ruler. What
places him above the law is the fact that he possesses the
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kind of knowledge which permits him to Issue the best
decision on any individual case. In the Republic, wisdom,
the only virtue to be found only In philosopher-rulers is
exactly the virtue that guarantees correct political
decision-making. Law is disregarded as a triviality unworthy
of the attention of
,
XCXAOL :I 'XCX)'CXBOL (425d-e) and
although Plato never makes this point quite explicit, it is
obvious that the rationale behind it is that living wisdom
will always be superior to any inflexible written code. 2 2 In
this respect, then, the Ideal Ruler of the Politicus IS
exactly like the. apxovT£S of the Republic. Moreover, given
that law, as we will see below, is now valued higher by
,
Plato, as the imitation ("I1 LIlTJllcxTcx"-300c) of scientific
rule, it becomes obvious that the knowledge informing the
Ideal Ruler's decisions can only be of the highest possible
rank and this, again, puts this ruler on a par with the
,
knowledgeable ~VA<XX£S of the Republic.
Finally, another factor which identifies the two is that
the Scientific Ruler, exactly like his counterparts of the
Republic, puts the interests of his subjects beyond his
personal interest. As the extreme opposite of the tyrant who
is led only by "his passion and his ignorance" (301 c), the
Scientific ruler IS able "to rule with moral and
intellectual insight and to render every man his due with
strictest fairness" (301d). This IS not the picture of
absolute power that common men have: "[t]hey feel sure that
a man with such absolute power will be bound to employ it to
147
the hurt and injury of his personal enemies and to put them
out of the way" (301d). This passage illustrates what is a
cardinal property of the (3cxOLALX~S CxlJnp: that he uses his
power not to his own advantage but to that of his subjects.
In a similar vein in 296bff. Plato explains that even when
I
the ~CXOLALXOS coerces or injures his subjects he is
justified in doing so insofar as this is in their ultimate
interest, and culminates by declaring that whether a ruler
benefits his subjects or not is "the only genuine test of
good government" (296e).
The conception of a Ruler whose political prerogative is
grounded on infallible knowledge carries of course with it
the authoritarian overtones it had in the Republic.
Moreover, the auth6ritarianism of the work is reinforced by
the fact that the dialogue's political outlook is decisively
shaped by the old Socratic argument from the arts. (Plato
uses here the not ion of :l£1tLOTTlIlTl and this notion has a
specific technical sense. In the Republic, Plato does not
utilize the craft-analogy after Book One, because, in its
simple Socratic form the latter implied empirical knowledge,
whereas the knowledge of the philosopher-kings was
transcendent. In the Politicus, where the main function of
the argument from the arts is to underline the extreme
,
rari ty of the Ideal Rulers, the use of £1tLOTTlIlTl indicates
that Plato wants to retain the exclusiveness produced by the
craft-analogy, but drop its reference to an empirical type
of knowledge). Plato introduces this argument, i . e. that
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politics is a highly specified £nlaTD~D and political power
should be bestowed only on the
I
practi-cioners of this
)EnlaTD~D, from the very beginning of the philosophical
discussion in the dialogue (258b) and uses it extensively in
the shaping of the subsequent analysis. Campbell rightly
calls this argument "the postulate on which the whole
23dialogue proceeds". The strong anti-democratic implications
of this argument were evident already In the Protagoras,
where Socrates used it to define moral and political virtue
as a highly exclusive quality, attainable only by a small
minority at best. This aspect of the argument receives
considerable emphasis in the Politicus: at 292e Plato
insists that no n1neos could ever attain the political art;
at 293a he suggests that this art can "be found in the
possession of one or two, or, at most, of a select few"; and
in 300e he stresses that
. ,
"TO TG)V n xo uo l wv 1(1neo s xcx l co
)
OUX nOTE
,
1cx(3ol
So far we have explored those specific characteristics
of the Politicus which bring it into line with the
authoritarian trends of the Socratic dialogues and of the
Republic. But it has to be under lined tha t whereas the
Scientific Ruler and the philosopher-kings are identical In
terms of the knowledge they possess, they operate in
different political circumstances. Unlike the latter who
apply their rule in the politically sterilized enviroment of
the Republic, where" orthodox upbringing from a very tender
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age is designed to forestall any possible opposition, the
Ruler of the Politicus has to exercize his art on ordinary
men. He is therefore conditioned by the sociohistorical
framework he has to work wi thin i n a way the Republic's
ruling class is not. This factor, combined with the
equivocality of Plato's attitude towards the political
abilities of ordinary human beings, accounts for certain
ambiguities which exist in the dialogue. The ambiguities
concern primarily the clarity of the distinction between the
Scientific Ruler and his potential counterparts: the god of
the myth, the tyrant, and the law-abiding but
unphilosophical king. In each of these three cases there is
at least some doubt as to whether Plato has clearly drawn
. ,
the line separating the lnLarn~wv nO~LrLXOS from the other
types of rulers.
The problem regarding the demarcation between the god of
the myth and the Scientific Ruler stems from a passage 1n
303b where Plato declares that the constitution based on the
,
will of the £.nLarn~wv "must always be exalted, like a god
among mortals, above all other constitutions". Does this
phrase indicate that the Ideal Ruler has properties
analogous to the god of the myth, that he is beyond his
subjects in being divine? The answer to this question has to
be negative for two reasons: first, Plato is here speaking
metaphorically as the use of olav clearly demonstrates;
second, it is true that perfect Rulers, by having knowledge
of the transcendent Forms, do have a divine property; but
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they do so only to the extent to which this property is
attainable by human beings; there are no gods or daimons
undertaking the government of humans in the "age of Zeus"
and neither in the Republic nor in thePoliticus does Plato
claim that the perfect Rulers belong to a different species
from their subjects.
If Plato's arguments regarding the relationship of the
,
nOAL'LLXOS and the god involve no contradiction, the same
cannot be said of his attempts to distinguish the Ideal
Ruler from the tyrant. The problem is instantiated by two of
Plato's statements in the dialogue which flatly contradict
each other. The first IS 276e where he declares that
"[t]endance of human herds by violent control is the
tyrant's art; tendance freely accepted by herds of free
bipeds we call statesmanship". The second is 292c: "the real
criterion in judging constitutions must not be whether
rule is by violence or consent".
Attempts to explain away the contradiction of these two
statements have not been successful. Guthrie, for example,
has tried to resolve the issue by stressing that "the
essential difference between him [the Scientific Ruler] and
the tyrant is one of motive,,24 (i.e. the former promotes the
welfare of his citizens, the latter his personal interests).
Guthrie remarks that although people have learned to
associate arbitrary and capricious rule with the tyrant,
they would still be able to recognize the Ideal Ruler and
submit to his authority (he probably refers to 301d). For
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that reason, he claims, "[t]he question of force or consent
would not arise" 25
Miller's conception of Plato's two contradictory
statements is that they can be explained in terms of
context. According" to his interpretation the distinction
between ruling over willing or unwilling subjects in 276e is
part of Plato's argument repudiating the claims of the old
despot who appeared as "shepherd of the people". In the
course of this argument, Miller suggests, Plato invokes
common opinion in order to undercut the "despot's pretension
to
. 26
statesmanship". Having achieved that, and coming to
examine the art of statesmanship itself, Plato abandons this
distinction and claims that rule by force or by consent is
, ,
actually irrelevant to the essence of the nOAt~tXD £ntO~DMD
as such. In brief, the first statement 1S supported. by
common op inion, and PI a to accepts it r n a gl ven con text
because it serves his immedia te purposes. But it is the
second statement 1n 292c that represents the thesis
suggested by philosophical knowledge, and this should be
accepted as Plato's final position on the issue.
The reason neither of these explanations can be accepted
as finally resolving the issue is that, as I shall argue,
the problem 1S deeply rooted in Plato's atti tude towards
ordinary people 2 7 and neither Miller nor Guthrie take this
factor seriously into account. If the distinction between
rule by violence and rule by consent is finally dropped by
Plato, as Miller claims, what will happen if the tyrant
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poses as the Ideal Statesman and attempts to usurp the power
that can be exercized justly only by the latter?
Interestingly, Plato asks this question in 300a, and his
,
reply is that this would bea major "xoxou v, What Plato does
not ask however, is who is going to recognize the Scientific
Ruler and differentiate him from the tyrant. Presumably
carried too far by the implications of the argument from the
arts, Plato treats political authority in 300a as something
to be imposed from above (the rulers) rather than to be
accepted from below (the citizens). This attitude, though,
creates one principal problem. Given the extreme rarity of
philosophical knowledge which Plato repeatedly acknowledges
in the Politicus (e.g. 292e, 293a, 300e, 301d-e), it is of
course questionable whether there would be enough
philosophers around to tell the difference between the
disinterested Statesman and the capricious tyrant. How then
can the people choose between them? Plato's response to this
problem is optimistic. In 301d he writes that "if the ideal
ruler we have described were to appear on earth he would be
acclaimed, and he would spend his days guiding in strictest
justice and perfect felicity that one and only true
Commonwealth worthy of the name". For the citizens to be in
a position to identify the true Statesman in this manner,
however, it is presupposed that they will have at least a
minimal ability to form correct judgements. But if they have
this ability which allows them to identify the true
lnLaLn~WV nOALLLx~S and to set him apart from the Lupavvos,
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they will also have~ according to all probability~
sufficient rationality to accept his decisions and willfully
execute them. The question becomes~ then~ why there should
be any need to coerce such citizens at all. If, on the other
hand, one accepts a low estimate of the rational faculties
of ordinary citizens~ the need for coercion can be
justified. But the Issue then is how these citizens, who are
incapable of grasping the rightness of the Ruler's
decisions, will be able to recognize him the way Plato
expects them to do. So, either common people have the
ability to recognize the Scientific Ruler but coercing them
is unnecessary, or they do not have this ability, in which
case one cannot expect them to acclaim the Ruler In the
manner described in 301d. Plato cannot have it both ways.
It is this contradiction which lies at the heart of the
more apparent one concerning whether rule by consent can be
adopted as a criterion of distinguishing the Scientific
Ruler from the tyrant or not. And both are generated by
Plato's ambiguous stance as regards the common human being's
rational faculties. S i g n i fie ant 1y , i nthe c los ing par t of
the dialogue where a society composed of ordinary citizens
is described, Plato is ambiguous about the means that the
Scientific Ruler will employ to make sure the citizens act
justly. In 304c-d he explains that the Scientific Ruler will
employ rhetoric to persuade the general mass of people "oux
,
IlVeOA011,(XS,
,
oI, (X Ol,o(XXf)s". The distinction IS
,
important because IlveOA011,(X targets the emotions of an
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individual rather than his or her rational capacities. By
.
preferring it to 8l8aXD, which entails a certain involvement
of the rational abilities of the listener, Plato indicates
that he estimates the rational powers of the ordinary person
as inadequate even for the limited exercize of apprehending
orders before executing them. This picture, however, is at
odds with 309c, where Plato states that the Ruler will
implant into the souls of his subjects aADBDs 8~~a; aADBns
I
8o~a involves at least some rationality: it is uc t o
,
~£~alwa£ws, an expression which suggests at least some
limited rationality (see Republic 461e, 28Theaetetus 16ge),
I
and it brings about tPpovDals, i.e. rational wisdom, in the
souls of the a~tPpov£s citizens. 2 9 Finally, it has to be noted
that in the Laws, a work multidimensionally connected with
the Politicus, 6peD or aAnBn s 8~~a is systematically treated
as an acceptable alternative to knowledge and the
distinction between them is on occasion almost entirely
30blurred.
There is then a discrepancy, to put it mildly, between
the use of mythologia in 304c-d and the implications of the
.
8ol;a in 309c. Plato finally appears,
however, to opt for the optimistic estimate of common
people's abilities: in 308e-309a he declares that those
unable to acquire true opinion will be exiled, executed or
enslaved to the community. In this case coercion is
completely abandoned: Plato does not attempt to coerce the
citizens who are unable to rise to the level of political
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consciousness necessary for life in a perfectly governed
community; he simply excludes them from it. As for the rest
of the c i t i z e n s , through their true op i n i cn , they will be
a b 1e to f u 1fill the po 1 i ticaIrole pre s c r i be d for t hem by
the Scientific Ruler by means of their rationality. It 1S
significant that true opinion is introduced only a couple of
pages before the end of the dialogue and that after its
introduction Plato does not suggest anything which could be
interpreted as promoting coercion. On the contrarYt when he
proposes intermarriage between the avop£toL and the
,
aw~poV£St he insists that this will come about voluntarily
•
, ,
through their common opinion ("I1 La v £X£LV al1<Po'r£pa 'ra l£VT/
,
ool;av"-310e)t even though he is aware of the natural
tendency of members of both l£VT/ to marry somebody akin to
them in character (310d-e). From these facts it follows that
PI at 0 's finalp0 sit ion 0 nthe mat t e r 1 s t hat the comm 0 n
people's rational abilities, despite falling short of full
knowledge, have to be estimated as significant. This entails
that from the two alternatives (citizens recognizing the
Scientific Ruler but in no need of coercion or citizens in
need of coercion but unable to pinpoint the Ruler) the
former is preferable. This explains how the citizens will be
able to acclaim the Ruler in 301d; but at the same time the
use of coercion remains ultimately unjustified. The final
conclusion has to bet then t that as regards the whole issue
involving the distinction between the Scientific Ruler and
the tyrant by means of the use of coercion and the
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underlying problem of whether the rational abilities of
non-philosophers should be regarded as important or not t the
Politicus cannot be considered to present a coherent
picture.
The third contestant who might be confused with the Ideal
Statesman is the legitimate king who governs according to
laws but does not possess £nLa1:DPn. The problem is initiated
,
by the fact that Plato uses the term ~aaLA£us for both t butt
provided the text is followed closely, one is always In a
,
position to tell in which contexts ~aaLA£us designates the
Scientific Ruler and in which the non-philosophic monarch.
The difference between them IS that the latter's rule
constitutes the best polity in the absence of scientific
wisdom t but the non-scientific monarch can lay no claim to
the absolute rule of the philosopher. Plato admits that he
uses the same name for both
,
("fJexaLA£a xaAonp£v, ;)ou
povaPXonv1:a"-301a-b). But the distinction between scientific
government and all forms of human rule based on opinion is
forcefully made in 303b
;) ,
£X£LVTfV 1£ [the
,
constitution where the £nLa1:DPwV rules] £XXPL1:£OV t OLOV B£ov
£1;' &vep~nwv t £X 1:(i)V lXAAWV nOA L 1: £ L (i)v [the ones based on
opinion]"). Because of the exceptional clarity of this
distinction there IS no c on t r ad i c t i.on ,
involved in this issue.
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apparent or real t
III FORMS IN THE POLITICUS
As argued in the previous sections, the fundamental
political principle of the Politicus IS that knowledge
legitimizes political power, and in this respect the
Pol i t i cu s falls into line with the Republic. But is this
knowledge knowledge of Forms? Although we get no elaboration
of this theory, there are some passages in the Po l i t i cu s
which strongly suggest Plato's continuous belief in Forms.
The first such passage IS 278c-d, taken by Campbell,
Skemp, Moravcsik and Rosen3 2 to imply Forms. It comes in the
,
context of a clarification of the use of napao£t"'IJ.1a and
follows a description by Plato of how young children first
learn particular letters and simple syllables and then move
to more complicated elements. It reads "[w]ould we be
.
surprised, then, to find our own mind (~VXD) reacting in the
same way to the letters with which the Universe is spelled
out? Truth sometimes guides the mind to a comprehension of
every member of some groups of things and yet the same mind
a moment later is hopelessly adrift in its attempt to cope
wi th the members t ha t make up another group. Somehow or
other it makes a right judgement of a particular combination
of elements but when it sees the same elements transferred
to the long and very difficult syllables of everyday
existence, it fails to recognize again the very elements it
discerned a moment before". The first assumption this
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admi t tedly diff icul t passage under lines is that there are
fundamental abilities which are common to more than one art
(the wider context of the passage is the analogy between
politics and weaving). The real statesman has therefore to
look beyond the trivial features of different arts in order
to grasp their common element. The question is whether this
common element is a Form or not. Moravcsik remarks that "the
analogy between letters-and-syllables and the combination of
Forms is fairly standard in the later dialogues and it IS
33
clear that for Plato a syllable is no mere sum of parts".
The fact that a syllable is more than the mere sum total of
parts mechanically added does indeed indicate that Plato
here makes something more than a simple logical point and
one can sympathize with Skemp's assumption that in this text
"the use of the terms "letters" and "syllable" is at
once logical and me t aphy s ical or ontological". 34 But Skemp
provides no compelling arguments for this assertion and the
ontological reading, although plausible, is not made
b . b h . lf 35o llgatory y t e text Itse .
A clearer allusion to Forms appears to be made in
285d-286b, where, right after stressing that the aim of the
discussion is to solidify the dialectical excellence of the
interlocutors rather than to define the statesman, Plato
writes: "[l]ikenesses which the senses can grasp (cxLo8T}'tCXL
,
'tLIJ£S OlloL~'tT}'t£S) are available in nature (n£<PvxCXaLIJ) to
those real existents which are themselves easy to
understand, so that when one asks for an account of these
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existents one has no trouble at all-one can simply indicate
the sensible likeness and dispense with any account in
words. But to the highest and most important class of
existents (~ots 0' au ~£y~a~oLs ovaL xa~ ~L~LW~~~OLS) there
are no corresponding visible resemblances, no work of nature
clear for all to look upon. In these cases nothing visible
can be pointed out to satisfy the enquiring mind: the
instructor cannot cause the enquirer to perceive something
with one or other of his senses and so make him really
satisfied that he understands the thing under discussion.
Therefore we must train ourselves to give and to understand
. , .
a rational account (~oyov ... OOOvaL XaL o£~aaeaL) of every
existing thing. For the existents which have no visible
embodiment (~~ y~p &a~paLa), the existents which are of the
, ,
highest value and chief importance ([~a] xaAALaLa oVLa xaL
.
p£yLaLa), are demonstrable only by reason
, ,
(AOyW uouov ) and
\
are not to be apprehended by any other means. All our
present discussions have the aim of training us to apprehend
this highest class of existents".
This looks like a straightforward and almost unmissable
reference to the paradigm-Forms of the middle dialogues.
First of all the text appears to state, in hardly ambiguous
terms, the imi tation theory of the middle dialogues, i. e.
that the participants in a Form have a likeness (opOL~LnLa)
to this Form or, moreover, that they are its images or
copies :II ~ ) 36(£LuWAa . In addition to this, there are four
distinct statements in the passage that correspond to
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cardinal features of the theory of the Forms of the middle
dialogues. First, there is a distinction between aLOeDT~ and
,
VODTU (the latter are implied) and later between visible and
non-visible things. Second, the resemblances perceived by
,
the senses are by nature (rr£~uxuoLV): this indicates that we
are here concerned wi th resemblances between things which
.
exist ~UO£L, not with resemblances between things created by
humans. Third, the aim of dialectical training is to enable
us to give and receive a rational account of both sensible
and supersensible reality. This appears to be a powerful
reference to Forms, because exactly this ability 1S the
trademark of the philosopher-kings of the Republic (531d-e,
534b-c) and the knowledge of the philosopher-kings is
indisputably knowledge of Forms. Moreover, just a few lines
above this remark the Stranger identified dialectical
excellence as the primary aim of of the Politicus. Fourth,
there certain ~I which to be conceived only byare OVTU are
,
reason and these are XUAALOTU and I1£YLOTU. This use of
grandiose language is clearly associated with Forms in the
middle dialogues (see Republic 504d-e, 508e) and it is
difficult to justify it here unless accepting it refers to
Forms. There is one element in the text which might tell
against the presence of Forms in it: Plato says that there
is no satisfactory sensible likeness of the highest beings.
But this can be explained by the precedent of the Phaedrus
250aff. where Plato suggests that certain Forms, like
temperance and just ice, have no immedia tely corresponding
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sensible things, but accepts that even these Forms can be
recognized through the sensible world, though with extreme
difficulty.
Owen has challenged what appears to be a clear allusion
to Forms in 285d-286b, arguing that the passage has to be
taken as part of the Stranger's defence of the length of his
speech on . 37weav1ng. He goes as far back as 277aff. and
points out that in 277c Plato emphasizes the superiority of
explaining something by words to depicting it when the pupil
can follow the words. Owen argues that essentially the same
point is made in 285dff. Weaving can be depicted and
understood immediately by the senses, statesmanship belongs
to a different category and can only be accounted for by
words. Still, both belong to the sensible world and the
passage carries no ontological overtones of any kind:
"[r]ead i n context the passage says nothing of the
paradigm-metaphysics. It makes a sound philosophical
1n plain terms".38
point
Owen starts the defence of his position by capitalizing
on the Stranger's dictum that the higher Forms have no
sensible resemblances. The Phaedrus cannot explain this
anomaly, he assumes, because in 250aff. Socrates is speaking
poetically rather than philosophically; he engages 1n a
,
1(<X/'o/,<x and therefore his points must not be taken at face
value. 39 However, Guthrie has argued against this dismissal,
.
saying that the term f(<X(,o(,<x is also applied to the whole
dialogue (278b) and eventually to every written work (276d
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and 277e) and, moreover, that Socrates himself defends the
philosophical importance of the myth in 265b-d. 4o Given the
fact that there IS nothing unusual in Plato making a
philosophical point by means of a myth, the Phaedrus can be
accepted as reinforcing the ontological reading of 285dff.
In the final analysis, Owen's thesis depends on the
explanation of tpe four recognizable features of the theory
of the Forms which can be isolated In this passage. The
I •
distinction of cxtaBDLcx and VODLCX could be accounted for in
Owen's scheme: if Plato's a i m IS to explicate a specific
difference between the human activities of weaving and
statesmanship, i.e. that the former is sensible while the
latter is not, a metaphysical reading of this distinction is
not compulsory (although still
, ,
the use of ex LaBDL<X and the
implication of VODLCX is strongly reminiscent of the
relationship between participants and Forms In the
paradigm-metaphysics of Plato's middle period). With regard
I
to n£<pvxcxaLv, Owen accepts that if we take the "perceptible
likenesses" and the "image clearly made for men" as,
"applicable generally to the contents of the physical world
and not just to such human artefacts as pictures and
models",41 in other words if n£<p~x<xaLv designates not simply
human creations but also things which exist in nature, then
285dff. is most likely to be read in terms of the
paradigm-metaphysics of the middle dialogues. Owen realizes
that if Plato is here talking about natural things, then we
almost certainly have Forms in 285d-e; what else could
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natural things be likenesses of? If Plato is referring
excl us i vely to human artefacts t on the other hand t then
Forms need not be implied in this passage because one human
artefact can be made in the likeness of another. Owen claims
.
that n£~uxaaLv can be used to designate human artefacts and
that this is the case with 285d-e. He criticizes Skemp for
presupposing the existence of Forms r n this passage and
I
translating n£~uxaalv as "are available 1n 42nature". The
I
primary meaning of n£~uxaalv t however t 1S that something
exists by nature·and this recommends Skemp's reading of the
text more than Owen's. The lat ter has merely demonstrated
,
that n£~uxaalv need not be referring to natural things. He
has not proved that it definitely does not refer to such
things and therefore his argument does not preclude the
possibility that Forms are implied 1n 285d-e; it only
provides t at best t an alternative possibility.
We come now to the crucial phrase "we must train
ourselves to give and to understand a rational account of
every existent thing". Owen interprets this as stating that
"the most important things cannot be taught from
"d . bl "" 43pictures and models t [i.e.] ... they are not ep1cta e .
Butt in the middle dialogues t to give and receive a rational
account of every existent thing is the typical
characteristic of the philosopher-ruler. In 531e the sign of
.
the dialecticians is that they are "buva-rol ... bOnval X<Xl
&nob~l;aaeal IA0l'0V" and very similar language is used 1n
534b-c. Contrary to Owen's claims t then t there is linguistic
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evidence connecting the passage of the Politicus under
discussion with central features of the epistemology and the
ontology of the middle dialogues.
FinallYt
I
with regard to Plato's ta1k of X<XAALO'[<X and
PC'tLCJ'[<x t Owen remarks that exactly these words (though in
reverse order) are used in the Republic to characterize
purely human activities like wars and generalships and
government and the education of 44men. The remark IS
correct t but it has to be weighed against the use by Plato
of similar expressions to designate the Form of the Good. In
I
Republic S08e this Form IS "[xaAALOV] )'VWCJ£WS '[£ X<XL
aAlle£ ~<XS" and in S04d-SOSa the [yet unnamed]. Form of the
, ,
Good is three times referred to as the "P£''tLO'[ov p<xellpa".
Again t Owen's assertion might suggest an alternative reading
of the passage we are concerned wi th t but it by no means
precludes an allusion to Forms.
To conclude: a strong linguistic case can be construed
against Owen's interpretation of 28Sd-286b. It is important
that Owen does not suggest that some sort of change might
have occurred in Plato's metaphysical doctrine. He plainly
denies that the passage has ontological connotations of any
kind. But 28Sdff. does provide a number of clues to the
existence of Forms in the Po l i t i ctis . An interpretation of
this passage as implying the existence of paradigmatic Forms
1S t if not compelling t at least highly plausible. The
recurrence of a number of terms strongly associated with
Forms in other dialogues in the space of a few lines IS a
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fac tor tha t cannot be ignored. And the immediate context,
the emphasis on dialectics which is placed prior to politics
(278d), further fortifies this reading.
There are two more places in the Po l i t i cus where Forms
are probably 45present. The first is 269d-e, where Plato
writes that "to be the same, steadfast and abiding, is the
prerogative of the divinest of things only (r o t s 1(<XV'twv
, I
e£LO't"<X't"OLS 1(PO(HIX£L). The nature of the bodily does not
entitle it to this rank
,
(awj1<X't"os IO£
,
cPuaLs ~ou 't"<Xu'tl1S 'tflS
,
't<X~£ws). Now the heaven or the Universe as we have chosen to
call it has received many blessed gifts from Him who brought
it into being, but it has also been made to partake of
bodily form. Hence it is impossible that it should abide for
ever free from change, and yet, as far as may be, its
movement is uniform, invariable and in one place".
Unchangeability and divinity are two cardinal attributes of
the Forms ( Republic 478b, 479a, 47ge, 484b-c, Symposium
211b) and of the soul which contemplates them (Phaedo 80b,
95c,' 106d). They distinguish the Forms from the flux of the
material world and this contradistinction is clearly marked
out in 269d-e. Furthermore, it is difficult to see what the
" I
't"<X 1(<XV't"wv e£LO't"<X't"<X might be if they are not Forms. Again we
have in this case a text where the presence of Forms is not
explicitly stated, but which 1S difficult to interpret
without accepting them.
The second passage probably acknowledging Forms IS 297c:
the best consti tution is "OpeD"; the others are only its
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,"JiLJiTlJi<X'L<X" (imi tations) and their goodness depends directly
on the extent to which they imitate this perfect
constitution. This passage provides probably the strongest
evidence for Forms in the Politicus: not only is there a
clear reference to an unchangeable constitution, but also
the argument explicitly works r n terms of paradigm-
metaphysics, since the value of each other constitution
depends on the degree to which it imitates the opeD one.
In support of these textual references one can add a
historical and a poli tical argument for the existence of
Forms i n the Politicus. The historical argument 1S that,
according to a substantial· majority of 46scholars, Forms
exist in the Sophist, of which the Politicus is the explicit
continuation (258a). If Forms are present r n the Sophist,
immediately preceding the Po l i t i cus , and (as it will be
argued in the next chapter) in the subsequent Laws, Plato's
last work, their abando nme rvt in the Po l i t i cus would entail
that Plato temporarily rejected this doctrine only to return
to it. Though this possibility cannot be dismissed on
logical grounds, it is clear that it is extremely unlikely.
Finally, there is a strong political reason to accept the
existence of Forms in the Politicus. In 293c the Stranger
argues that the Ideal Ruler should not be bound by law. If
Forms do not exist in the dialogue, and this Ruler has no
knowledge of them, this position becomes objectionable. Even
if Plato accepted an alternative to Forms as the object of
£,TC/'(J'LTlJiTl (say, the knowledge of logical genera) this would
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clearly be knowledge of beings ontologically inferior to the
divine Forms of the middle dialogues and Plato's extreme
confidence in the political abilities of a leader possessing
this type of knowledge would not be equally justified.
Because knowledge distinguishes the ~aoLALxoS &VDP from the
~vpavvos and ~vpaVVLa is by far the worst constitution
(302e)~ it IS important that the distinction between the two
is made as clear as possible (a task in which~ as argued in
section 2~ Plato does not entirely succeed). From this point
of view, the po 1 it ical ra t ionale of the dialogue is more
solid if one accepts transcendent Forms as the highest
object of knowledge In the Politicus than if one takes less
exalted entities to perform this role. It is obvious that
the higher the quality of the objects of knowledge the
higher the quality of the knowledge itself will be and
therefore the higher the quality of government and the more
justified Plato's confidence in placing his Scientific Ruler
above the law.
Given the strong textual indications of the presence of
Forms in the Politicus, some of which come fairly close to
full proof, and given that this presence is supported by the
posi tion of the dialogue between the Sophist and the Laws
and invited by the political argument of the work~ the case
for the existence of Forms in the Politicus~ has~ I believe,
to be considered philosophically sounder than the case
against.
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IV TOWARDS THE LAWS: LAW~ VIRTUE AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE IN THE POLITICUS
No single text in the Platonic corpus has the crucial
significance of the last part of the Politicus (293a-fin) in
terms of the development of Plato's political theory. It IS
in this text that Plato brings together ~ and clarifies' the
relationship between, the philosophical principles which
shape his two major political dialogues: the scientific rule
grounded on absolute knowledge of the Republic and the
respect for law of the Laws. Because both principles are
vindicated in their respective realms, the Politicus can be
said to "stand midway,,47 between the other two dialogues.
Although the relevant discussion begins at 293a, Plato's
position on the value of law cannot be fully appreciated
without reference to the subsequent observation, made in
301d, that the Scientific Ruler hitherto described in the
,
Politicus "[LJ]vv O£ 1£ , ~ ,oux ccr i 1t1V0J1£vos ..• £v t o r s
,
nol£O't". This statement, in effect a bold Platonic admission
that the ideal of fully scientific rule might not after all
be realizable, at least in the present political
circumstances, puts into perspective the whole argumentation
from 293a onwards. Plato's main argument for the superiority
of philosophical insight to written legislation is, as noted
In section 2, that the former is able to cover all
particular instances, whereas the latter is inflexible and
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can only prescribe general directives. But the sensible
world is never in "tiO'UX~O:v" (294b) and therefore law, being
general and undiscriminating, is insufficient for infallible
government. Plato illustrates this point by the example of a
doctor who has to go on a lengthy trip and leaves certain
instructions for his patients. If on his return he finds the
situation altered, he will adjust his treatment to the new
situation, acting on the basis of his knowledge of medicine,
and he will not be'in any way bound by his previous written
orders (295b-d)., The analogy is successful because it
demonstrates both tenets of Plato's argument. ~ETCtO''tnJlT/ is
,
substantially superior to vOJlos, because of its power fully
to cover any eventuality. (The notions of the np£TCOV, the
, ,
8£ov and especially of xo:tpOS are implicitly present in this
line of reasoning). Written instructions can be justified,
however, as the sensible course in the absence of
philosophical intelligence.
Although Sientific rule and law are clearly distinguished
by Plato, the exposition of their respective merits is by no
means linear. So despite having acknowledged the usefulness
of law in 297d-e, Plato proceeds In 298bff. on a thinly
covered venomous attack· on Athenian democracy. The basic
premiss of the attack is again taken from the argument from
the arts. The Eleatic Stranger invites Young Socrates to
,
imagine a situation where an lXXAT/O'to: consisting of " ~IT}
O'ullno:v'tO:
, )I
r ov 8nllOV T/ 'tOU S nAOUO' l, OUS
I
JlOVOV" (298c) decided
that the arts should be performed according to its own
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written instructions rather than according to the
recommendations of the £nLa~D~ov£s. Now if anyone appears,
Plato says in a clear allusion to Socrates' trial, who
inquires into the nature of these arts, he will be rebuked,
tried and convicted to "suffer the utmost penalties" (299c).
This kind of dominance of common opinion and of law (because
the decisions of the Athenian Assembly had the force of law)
over epistemic insight is unacceptable, the Stranger
concludes in 299d-e; and Young Socrates adds, in a literal
allusion to the trial of his elder namesake, that life in
I 48
such a city would be "&fJLW~OS".
Despite this attack (which, it has to be noted, is an
attack on law contesting the predominance of science and not
on law as such), Plato is prepared to attribute significant
value to written rules and customs, provided the superiority
law is described as
.
"xaXXLO''t",
of
adherence to
is not questioned by them. So, in 297d-e
:»1 C£Xov WS
.
o£u't"£pov", wi th government by knowledge of course npco't"ov.
The point is practically repeated in 300b-c where the use of
I • •
"vouou s " and "auyypa~a't"a" is a "o£u't"£pos nXo'Os" (300c).
Plato states that laws are the result of much experience
I("n£Lpas noXXt}s") and have been put forward by "some
advocate" who was able to "[persuade] the public assembly to
enact them" (300b). (It is noticeable that persuasion is
here promoted as the right way to initiate a law).
Furthermore, the laws, their deficiency in comparison to
knowledge notwithstanding, are not void of any metaphysical
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.justification: they are "11L/111l1a:ra ;) ,t n s a'AT'/e£las" (300c)
and they are produced under the influence of the
;)£nlo-rlll1o V£S. The point is repeated in 300e-301a where Plato
.
again uses imitation terminology ("P ll111 0 £oe a l " - 30 1a ) and
spells out his conclusion on the subject: the non-epistemic
constitutions must adhere with the strictest rigidity to
their written laws and ancestral customs. By stating the
view that the law participates, even as a copy, In the
divine wisdom of the "£lo~-r£s" (300c), Plato ascribes to it
an undeniably positive value. The relevance of this positive
value becomes clear as soon as we take into account the
absence of a Scientific king which Plato acknowledges in
301d. In the light of this absence, regard for law becomes
automatically the best attainable policy. This increased
Platonic appreciation for law represents a major shift from
the dismissive attitude towards it exemplified in the
Republic (e.g. 425d-e). And its final vindication comes from
the fact that, the ideal polity of the Scientific king
excluded (by the fact of his epistemological superiority but
also by the fact of his non-appearance), law becomes the
criterion according to which the imperfect human
constitutions are to be evaluated. This evaluation commences
at 302b: constitutional monarchy is considered the best of
the knowledge-lacking constitutions, on the grounds that it
is in closest proximity to the ideal one. Aristocracy
(law-abiding rule by the few) is second and democracy third.
Of the polities disrespecting the law democracy is the best
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because of its little "potency for good or ill" which makes
it the easier to live under. Oligarchy (lawless rule by the
few) comes next and tyranny is, as in the Republic, the
worst constitution.
From the point of view of democracy's position in this
ranking, one remarks an improvement in comparison with the
Republic, where democracy rated higher only than tyranny.
There it appeared as an inherently lawless regime, an almost
anarchic state of affairs under which "every individual is
free to do as he likes" (557b). In the Politicus Plato does
not judge democracy from a moral point of view. He only
suggests that because of the wide distribution of power in
it, its. potency for good or bad is limited. Looked at from
this angle, democracy's eleva ted ranking does not appear
terr i b Ly important. To use Wood's and Wood's formula t ion
"[i]t involves nothing more than the admission that of evil
constitutions, democracy 1S easiest to bear, that it is
weaker rather 49than better". Even so, though, democracy's
relatively insubstantial improvement in the Politicus'
constitutional mapping is an indication of a change of
attitude on Plato's part.
The emphasis on the usefulness of law as a criterion for
correct government is one major way in which the Politicus
anticipates the Laws; 1n the latter dialogue Plato
explicitly repudiates the possibility of a Scientific Ruler
ever appearing (691c, 713c, 875b-c) and proceeds to a
meticulous description of a
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political system whose
cornerstone is unequivocal respect for law.
The second way in which the Politicus anticipates the
Laws is by the undertaking of a historical perspective by
Plato. Historical considerations were markedly absent from
the Republic. Although the result of some empir ical
observation finds its way into Plato's description of the
degenerate constitutions, the principle which shapes their
political outlook is psychological, based on the assumption
that the constitution of a state reflects its citizens'
characters. As we noticed in the interpretation of the
Politicus' myth, Plato's tendency in the Republic is to
reproduce, to the extent to which it is possible, the
conditions of the "age of Cronus", by denying property and
family to the Auxiliaries and the Guardians. This move
towards not simply pre-history but towards a state of
affairs which is plainly irrelevant to history, denudes the
latter of any significance whatever In the framework of
Callipolis. Historical experience, on the other hand, is, as
we shall see, the main principle informing the political
arrangements of the Laws. And it is again one of the factors
which come into play in the Politicus, in particular in the
closing section of the dialogue.
The turning point is, once more , Plato's admiss ion that
the Ideal king VOV o~x ~I£<Y'LL
,
YLlvo~£vos. First of all, this
admission itself is, as Gill asserts, "one of the lessons of
history".50 Moreover, it is immediately followed by an
explicitly historical remark: despite all the disasters to
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which cities are led by the absence of philosophical wisdom,
Plato states that "some of th h t . bem ave no come to rUIn ut
still stand firm" (302a). The remark is significant not only
for its historical origin, but also because Plato here
explicitly compromises the principle of the Republic that
successful government absolutely depends on transcendent
knowledge: even though all non-epistemic cities have to
suffer, some of them are still in a position to achieve a
hardly insignificant aim: they remaIn relatively stable
,
("OUX av(X-rp£1COV-r(XL"). In the light of historical experience,
then, Plato is prepared to modify his conviction that
£nLa-rDPD is the only saviour of a city and to accept that a
state's survival does not absolutely depend on it.
Another crucial manifestation of Plato's new interest In
history is the emphasis on the value of law itself. Although
his main stress lies on the quality of the law as a copy of
scientific wisdom, Plato does not ignore its historical
background: in 300b he explains that laws are introduced by
somebody who is able to persuade the people to adopt them.
This is a reference to an event in time, a historical event.
In the same phrase he states that laws are the resul t of
"much experience". The last observation proves beyond doubt
the connection of law with history. As Klosko remarks, Plato
"deals with laws ... insofar as they embody an expression of
. . ,,51
social desires and aspIratIons . One could add that he also
explicitly treats them as historical phenomena.
The historical dimension of the Politicus IS most
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forcefully exemplified In Plato's description of the society
on which the Ideal Ruler I'S to em I h' tP oy IS ar . The
philosopher introduces this society with a "startling
statement"
.
(BcxUllcx<JT:OV T:lVCX
,
AOlov-306b) : courage and
moderation are "in- a certain sense enemies from of old,
ranged in opposition to each other in many realms of life"
(306b). The assertion that two important parts of virtue
.
("IlOplCX :t :t • 52CXP£T:f}S OU 0lllXpcx"-308b) are strongly opposed to
each other runs of" course counter to the Socratic doctrine
of the unity of virtue. We will come soon to the
consequences of 306b for Plato's theory of virtue In the
Politicus. But first it has to be emphasized that what
informs the new Platonic position IS history. The
contradistinction of the two virtues is a fact of political
life and is attested by history: the picture of two opposing
parties, one promoting conflict and the other asking for
pacification is a recurring theme in Thucydides. 5 3 It is
startling not historically, but because it invites
reappraisal of the old Socratic thesis of the unity of
virtue. And it can only be fully understood by reference to
a specific historical context: as Lane remarks, in the fifth
and fourth centuries B.C. "such opposing [one aggressive and
one quietist] foreign policies and a predicted disastrous
outcome are a recurrent theme in Athenian political
argument. For Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War was
essentially a conflict between the aggressive imperialist
" d t ' f S t" 54policy of Athens and the qu i e t i s t mo era Ion 0 par a .
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Plato, living in Athens, could hardly avoid having some
first hand experience of debates fought along these lines.
This is politically important not s imply because it
demonstrates his attention to history, but because it also
provides an indication that the society of the last section
of the Politicus, the society on which the Scientific Ruler
, ,
is to apply his "{3cxOLALXT}V OVJ.L1CAOXT}V" (306a), is based on an
actual historical model: his contemporary democratic Athens.
Two suggestions made by commentators indicate how Plato's
preoccupation with history might penetrate into his
met a phys ics. The- first is Lane's assumpt ion that in the
Politicus the static political framework of, say, the
Republic is transformed into a dynamic 55one. Because
courage and moderation cannot temporally coinstantiate (they
have to be expressed one after the other), "their unity is
irreducibly temporal and so dynamic: it can only be achieved
over time, not in static composition".56 Therefore, the role
of the Scientific Ruler is not to resolve their conflict by
constantly promoting either (Plato explicitly treats them as
. 1 ) 57equlva ent , but rather by keeping a balance in time
between them. Lane finds the justification for the
conception of a dynamic framework in the Politicus in the
,
use of )CCXLpOS in 305d: "[t]he kingly art controls them [the
other arts] according to its power to perceive the right
occasions for undertaking
and se~ting in motion the great enterprises of state". Lane
concludes from this that "[k]nowledge of the kairos is what
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gives the statesman his right and writ to rule".58 Both these
claims are correct. The concept of a dynamic framework gives
a good account of the Politicus' political scheme and, one
c a n ' add, it has to be explained by Plato's decision to
examine the impact of the Scientific Ruler on an actual
historical society and his denial that this Ruler is a god.
Conflict is inherent in such a society, and the Ruler being
only human has to manage rather than eradicate it. As for
,
the fact that knowledge of the xalpos gives to the Ruler his
,
prerogative, the historical connotations of xalpos (meaning
the exactly appropriate time for an action) can hardly be
questioned. Continuing to resort to historical lessons,
,
Plato remarks that the excesses of either the aw~pov£s or
the &VOp£tOl can destroy the state; the terms used to
designate these excesses are "&xalp~1:£pOV" and "a<poopo1:~pav
.
1:0D O£OV1:0S" (307e and 308a respectively). This supports
Lane's claim that knowledge of the xo coo s gives to the
tnlaT;TJllwv the right to rule, because it is his role to
protect the state from such disastrous excess. It should be
noted, however, that this fact does· not invalidate the
significance of Forms in the Politicus, because xalpos
depends ontologically on essential measure and this in turn
depends on the Forms. This qualification notwithstanding,
the fact that Plato puts forward xo t p o s as the immediate
object of the Ruler's knowledge is a further demonstration
of the role history comes to play in the work.
An even more ambitious attempt to show how the opposition
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of the two types might affect Plato's metaphysics is made by
Skemp, who writes: "[i]t is significant that a metaphysical
ground is found for the restatement [of Plato's theory of
virtue]: the mutual incompatibility of the Form of Courage
and the Form of Moderation (307c). This is like the mutual
incompatibility of Rest and Motion in the Sophistes (254d
59
sqq.)". The precedent of the Sophist definitely strengthens
Skemp's case as far as mutual incompatibility between Forms
is concerned. The passage that Skemp refers to does not
suffice by itself to prove that Forms exist in the
Po l i t i cus . Given that in all probability they do, however,
as . argued in the previous sect ion, Skemp' s interpretation
makes sense. Skemp presumably finds "olav
,
nOA£lltaV
8taAaXO~oas [~DV o~¢pova ¢~otv xat ~DV aV8p£~av] o~aotv
l8~as" (307c) to declare the incompatible nature of the two
, , ,
Forms and "ov~' aAADAatS ll£tlvvll£vas £¢£vptaXOIl£V Ev r o t s
~<X
,
np<x~£otV" (307c) to state the
exemplification of this incompatibility In the sensible
world. The vocabulary of the text obviously supports his
reading, in particular the use of
,
and npal; £0 i i>, If
this inconclusive, but by no means implausible, reading of
the text is endorsed, we have here the strongest evidence of
how important history is in the Politicus, in the form of a
change from Plato's middle-dialogues metaphysics designed to
. 60
accomodate what is in essence a historical observatIon.
We come now to the c ompl ex ques t ion of the Pol it i cus'
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theory of virtue. Plato's statement in 306b that &vop£~a and
,
aw<ppoauvT} ::a I ::a I In oo s aAAT}Aas £xepa x« L aTaaLV
:>1 :t
nOAAots TQV ov'twv"£XOIJ't£ £v generates the problem of
whether we have in this dialogue an abandonment of the
Socratic thesis of the unity of virtue or not. In the
Republic there was one virtue proper t which included all
individual virtues t and one class t the Guardians t who
possessed it. The Producers had no claim to virtue at all
and the Auxiliaries had only a second-rate, inadequate
political virtue. Therefore the Republic did essentially
uphold the doctrine of the unity of virtue. Is this doctrine
abandoned in the Politicus?
The question has divided commentators. Skemp has produced
arguably the best defence of the thesis that there is a real
break between the Politicus and earlier Platonic accounts of
virtue t
6 1
while others have tried to reconcile 306b and
Plato's subsequent comments with the picture of the
Republic. 6 2 Skemp holds that the statement in question
represents "a denial of an important tenet of the Academy
itself at an earlier . ,,63tIme . More importantlYt it
constitutes a "frontal assault" on the Republic's standpoint
and "though it leads to a new "synthesis" in the sense of
the interweaving of the opposing characters t the new
statement must necessarily destroy the Republic's
psychological 64scheme." Skemp concludes wi th the argument
about the incompatibility of the Forms Courage and
Moderation we discussed above. But no matter whether one
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accepts this argument or not, his position remains strong:
the statement about the incompatibility of the two virtues
is not presented as merely an opinion of the many. The
,
Stranger supports it in his own person. The AOlOS is
,
ecxvllcxO"-ros not because common sense would refute it, but
because it IS not what young Academicians, represented In
the dialogue by the younger Socrates, would expect to hear.
The scholars attempting to bridge the gap between 306b
and the Republic's position have pointed mainly towards the
reconciliation of the two virtues by the actions of the
,
fJCXO"lAlXOS. So Klosko writes that "[t]he function of the
Statesman in the Statesman does not seem far removed from
that of the philosopher-kings in the Republic insofar as it
pertains to educating the lower classes in the state".65 This
is correct, but it does not invalidate the fact that in the
Politicus we have two specific virtues which are opposed to
each other in a substantial way. Even if the two can be
finally reconciled, the single fact that they are presented
by Plato as being mutually exclusive at one stage of the
moral development of the individual makes the universal
application of the reciprocity of the virtues required by
the Socratic position impossible to uphold. Guthrie has
pointed out that Republic 375c ("£vav-r~cx l~P nov eUIlO£lD£[
, 66
npa£tcx <t>uO"ts") is similar to Politicus 306b, but the former
\
phrase is a common sense statement not followed through in
any way or playing any part in the shaping of the moral
psychology of the Republic. He has also argued that Plato
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uses "simplified language,,67 In the Politicus, but this IS
obviously too weak a suggestion to explain away a point made
In quite unequivocal terms by Plato.
In 306b we undoubtedly have a serious compromise of the
old Socratic position. Plato does not merely claim that to
have one virtue does not entail having all the others. He
makes the much stronger claim that, as far as ordinary
people are concerned, there are two virtues which, by their
very nature, cannot possibly be coinstantiated in the same
individual. This. "incompatibility thesis" is definitely at
odds with the earlier Platonic faith in the reciprocity of
the virtues and, as we noted, historical experience as a
force at work in the closing part of the Politicus accounts
for this major change. Because at a certain stage of the
citizens' moral development we have two virtues inherently
inimical to each other, Skemp's conclusion IS formally
correct. The Politicus as a whole cannot be regarded as
upholding the Socratic unity of the virtues.
Nevertheless, Skemp's suggestion that this is a "frontal
assaul t" on the Republ i c ' s theory of virtue might be an
overstatement. Al though the uni ty of virtue is compromised
by the Stranger's dictum in 306b, it does not cease to exist
on a higher level. Despite the fact that Plato nowhere
argues specifically for this point, there are two reasons
for accepting that the Scientific Ruler possesses such a
perfect virtue: first, as already argued, this Ruler
personifies the same ideal as the philosopher-kings of the
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Republic; second, it IS obvious that the Scientific Ruler
needs to possess a full unified virtue if he is to succeed
in the major task of reconciling the conflicting virtues of
ordinary citizens. This indicates that Plato has abandoned
the strict form of the Socratic belief that it is absolutely
impossible for one to have one virtue without having all the
others, but not the conviction that on the highest level of
moral development there is one full virtue which includes
all individual virtues.
It also appears that the state as a whole becomes fully
virtuous through .the intervention of the Scientific Ruler.
One of the major functions of the Ruler is to make sure that
the long-term policy of the state does not become either
excessively aggressive or excessively pacifist, In other
words that neither the &V8p£tOL nor the aweppov£s become
predominant in the polis (the Ruler's knowledge of both the
"essential measure" and the kairos is obviously critical in
this respect). This carefully worked out balance, achieved
as we saw over time, ensures that the unity of virtue exists
(dynamically rather than statically) in the state. The polis
can be said to possess a unified virtue not in the sense
that all its citizens possess such a virtue, but in the
sense that the Ruler reconciles the opposing tendencies of
the two factions in the long run.
The reason why the unity of virtue in the state has to
come into effect over time rather than immediately is that
the Ruler, being human, cannot completely eliminate the
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natural inclination of the citizens towards either &v8p£~a
.
or aw~poauvD. There are two features of the Politicus which
demonstrate that the Ruler's intervention checks the
possible excesses of both the &VOp£tOL and the a~¢pov£s, but
does not install a fully harmonized virtue in their souls.
The first is the fact that the Ruler uses them differently
,
in his au~nAoxD: those who tend towards &vop£~a are the warp
,
of society, those who tend towards aw¢poauvD are the weft of
it.. It IS obvious that this differentiation would not be
valid if the citizens had achieved a full harmonization of
their respective trends of character. Therefore although the
education they receive from the Ruler does induce them to
avoid taking an extremist stand and does transform their
natural inclinations from being politically dangerous to
being politically useful, it does not completely eliminate
these inclinations. Some of the citizens remaIn
predominantly brave TDV &v8p £ ~ av
,
~~AAOV aUVT£Lvouaas
[1:~S ~~a£Ls]"-309b) and some predominantly temperate ("£n~
.
1:0 xoa~Lovlt-309b).
The second feature of the dialogue which suggests that
the citizens do not achieve full virtue is that the Ruler
insists on intermarriage between the two parties, on the
rationale that this will genetically balance their excessive
tendencies. Again it is clear that the full harmonization of
o&vop£~a and aw~poauvn cannot be achieved immediately or even
within the same generation; it is rather a task to be aimed
at over time.
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But the fact that the common citizens do not achieve a
fully unified virtue does not deprive the educational
intervention of the Ruler of its moral significance. The
very essence of this intervention is that it leads to a
higher synthesis of the two opposing trends of character, to
a harmonization between them. This harmonization, as we saw,
is not perfect: even after having been educated, some of the
citizens remain predominantly avop£tol, and some
.
predominantly awcPpov£s. However, the moral level to which
they are elevated is substantially superior to the level on
which they were before. In 308e-309a, Plato explicitly
excludes from the community those individuals who are unable
. ,
to participate in the av~~£I,~l,s (309b) of the no~I,~l,xos. But
those individuals possess exactly the crude, one-dimensional
virtue that the Ruler helps the majority of the citizens to
overcome. It becomes clear, therefore, that there is a vast
difference between the two moral statuses: the crude virtue
which characterizes common people before the appearance of
the Scientific Ruler is unacceptable both politically and
morally and those individuals who cannot raise themselves
beyond it are excl uded from the communi t y . The rest are
accepted, and this indicates that, despite being imperfect,
their new, partially harmonized virtue, is rated by Plato as
significant. The virtue they attain with the help of the
Ruler constitutes not simply a development on the crude
excessive virtues of 306b, but a positive supersession of
them.
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One can therefore identify three distinct conceptions of
virtue operating in the Politicus. The first is the Ideal
Ruler's virtue, perfect virtue grounded on perfect
knowledge. At its opposite extreme stand the mutually
exclusive courage and moderation. These parts of virtue
taken singly are completely inadequate and either of them
left unchecked can lead to disastrous political results.
Mediated though through the Ideal Ruler's pedagogical
programme these virtues can come to a partially harmonious
coexistence informed by aAnBn s o~~a. The latter IS clearly
deficient In comparison to full knowledge and it cannot
substitute for the absence of the latter. Still, however, it
is a "divine bond" (309c) and, as we saw in section 2, it
involves a certain degree of rationality. It therefore
blocks the tendency of crude courage and moderation to lead
to excess and it appears to put the average citizen of the
Politicus, at least potentially, on a higher plane than the
Producers of the Republic in terms of virtue.
, , ,
From this point of view aAnBns oo~a is the crucial notion
on which Plato's concessions to the many are based in the
Politicus. The strong authoritarian tendencies of the
Republic are also present In the Politicus and retain
considerable power. The Ideal Ruler wi th his absolute and
unchallengeable authority and the Soc~~tic argument from the
arts with its consequence of a highly exclusive, almost
unattainable virtue, form the core of the pol it ical
structure of the Politicus. The analogy between weaving and
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politics which Plato uses extensively 1n the work also has
an unpleasant corollary which has escaped the attention of
commentators. Having denied the idea that men can be, at
least in the present cosmological era, "flocks" of an
alleged super-human leader, Plato then depicts them as
inanimate matter, wool to be woven by the Ideal Ruler.
Perhaps no other metaphor in the history of political
thought has expressed so vividly the expectation of the
complete submission of the subjects to their ruler. There is
no doubt that the dominant ideological commitment of the
Politicus is to an aristocratic absolutism similar to that
of the Republic.
In this dialogue, however, largely because of Plato's
newly found interest in history, there 1S another side to
the story. So the particular function of <x'All0DS 8~l;<x not
only results in a slight improvement in democracy's position
1n the constitutional mapping of 302bff.,68 but also
signifies a more sympathetic Platonic attitude towards
ordinary people and their abilities. The philosopher's
stance as regards democracy is inextricably linked with his
evaluation of the intellectual and moral status of common
people. For this reason, any elevation of the latter 1S
bound to reflect on democracy. And the fact that Plato is
prepared to attribute a "divine" faculty, involving some
degree of rational reasoning, to ordinary people, is an
undoubted improvement in comparison to their positioning 1n
his earlier political constructions.
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It is also important that the society Plato describes in
the last pages of the Politicus corresponds, quite probably,
to the Athenian democracy of his time. This can be inferred
from the fact that, as we saw, the opposition between an
aggressive and a quietist policy was part of contemporary
Athenian political debate. Another democratic characteristic
of this society is that, with the exception of the
Scientific king, there is no stratification. Plato does not
suggest that either the brave or the moderate might be
superIor to th~ir opponents In terms of their moral
character. Both are equally dangerous when excessive and
equally useful when tamed through &AneDS bo~a. As Bobonich
puts it "[t]he differences of character do not establish a
h . h f . II 69 Th'i e r a r c y 0 v i r t ue ? • IS entails that the society in
question has an egalitarian element completely missing from
the Republic.
It is also noteworthy that Plato expects at least one
individual to possess both courage and moderation (311a).
This is interesting because it provides the possibility of a
leader who, without possessing the Ruler's £nta~D~n, might
nevertheless be able to understand the point of view of both
opposing factions and provide some mediation. In 302a Plato
remarked, with some astonishment, that some cities, despite
being guided by merely human devices, manage to survive and
"stand firm". Does this mean that there are cases where
non-scientific human wisdom, despite its deficiency in the
face of :»£nta~n~n, might still be able to save a city?
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or is
Moreover, IS aAnenS o~~a absolutely dependent for
appearance on the Scientific Ruler, ("£tlTCol,£(;V"-309d)
there a human faculty, independent of the Ruler
its
which
cons titute s the pre r e qui site for its a c q usit ion? ( In whieh
case those eliminated, exiled or enslaved-308b-309a are the
ones lacking this fundamental faculty). Given the rational
character of aAnens o~~a, this faculty would be something
like an inclination for rational thinking, and even though
like aAnen S o~~a it would be vastly inferior to lfiI,OTDMD, it
might still provide a useful guide for political action.
There is not sufficient textual evidence in the Politicus to
allow us to answer these questions. But the fact IS that
Plato's reasoning IS not a prIorI dismissive of common
people's abilities; the dialogue itself provides certain
premisses out of which a purely human but still
well-governed city might be produced. One could say that the
questions asked above are answered, in a broad sense, in the
Laws. Having definitely abandoned hope that the Ideal king
will appear, In the Laws Plato attributes paramount
political importance to law. Doxa is elevated to a position
where it constitutes an acceptable alternative to knowledge
itself. And the citizens' rationality is exalted in that in
all political issues they have a voice through the organs of
the state.
The roots of all these developments can be found In the
Politicus. But perhaps the most significant single link
between the two dialogues is Plato's emphasis on history. In
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the Paliticus Plato uses history as a. legitimate means to
reach political conclusions, but restricts its range:
history is confined largely to the periphery of the argument
with the Socratic idealistic conceptions of knowledge and
virtue operating in the centre. But even this limited
utilization of history is important. It provides some of the
conclusions which the argument from the arts could not lead
to (like the value of vaMos as second best) and it paves the
way for the Laws where historical experience becomes the
guiding principle of Plato's political philosophy.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LAWS
I THE SOCIAL QUESTION
Although the ideological stance of the Laws can be
described as aristocratic, 1 there are In this dialogue a
number of elements that show a considerable modification of
Plato's attitude towards democracy In comparison with
anti-democratic. From
previous works and
definitely degrees
especially the
to the extent
this point of
Republic. There are
tha t one can be
VIew the Republic is
Plato's.extreme statement against democracy, whereas in the
Laws his position is much more reserved. Not only is
democracy not rejected out of hand, but certain features of
it find their way into the administrative scheme that the
philosopher envIsages In his last work. Given that the
economic structure of the last Platonic polis is undoubtedly
a decisive factor for its political outlook, it would be
useful to start our examination of it from this point.
The aristocratic character of the Republic is certified,
from the economic point of view, by the fact that there is
in this dialogue a specific citizen class that produces the
necessary commodities for the maintenance of the two higher
classes which are not themselves involved In any
economically productive activity. The economic pattern of
the Laws, however, is identifiably different. Here we have
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five thousand and forty plots of land (737e), each alloted
to the head of a citizen family.2 The citizens are divided
into four classes according to their movable property
(744c). The crucial difference from the Republic is that
none of these classes 1S sustained on the labour of the
others. Therefore, from the very first moment, the economic
relations between the ci tizen classes of Plato's "second
best" state are set on a more egalitarian and consequently a
less anti-democratic basis than in the Republic. Less
anti-democratic, nevertheless, does not mean democratic:
land-owning, on which the society of Magnesia is based, has
been, historically, the cornerstone of aristocratic rule;
and by insisting on an unalterable number of plots Plato is
denying economic and social mobility, distinctive
characteristics of democracy. The case seems rather to be
that there is, in economic terms, a kind of balance between
the two; aristocratic elements may in fact be stronger,
since, as we shall see later, the higher classes have
certain political advantages and their members are not
obliged to work, whereas those belonging to the lower
classes may be obliged to do so.
Even so, there is a shift from the straightforwardly
aristocratic economic model of the Republic, where one
citizen class had to produce for all the rest. One attempt
to deny this shift has been made by Wood and Wood, who deny
any change of mind on Plato's part between the Republic and
the Laws. This is how they see the division of labour
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operating In the latter dialogue: "the Laws represents a
detailed programme for the establishment of a polis firmly
grounded in the aristocratic division between non-labouring
landowners and non-landowning labourers".3 They add that in
the Laws "society is without qualification divided between
landowning citizenry and everyone else <s Lave , Labour e r ,
artisan or metic-merchant- whose primary purpose is to serve
the landowning citizenry". 4 But there are some substantial
objections which can be raised to this interpretation.
It IS far from certain that Plato expects all his
citizens to be labour-free. The one passage that seems to
support Wood and Wood's interpretation occurs In 806d-e,
where Plato asserts that the Magnesian citizens are to get
the artefacts they need from others (he probably means
metics and foreigners) and that work in the fields will be
left to slaves:
,
oov)..OI,S" (806d).
Now, if this passage is taken literally, it definitely backs
Wood and Wood's assumption that the four classes "are not
classes at all" In the economic
5
sense. However, it could
well be nothing more than a general guidel .ine , a
commonplace: it most clearly corresponds to a practice
widespread in the Greek world t and therefore it could be not
a specific Platonic recommendation for the execution of
agricultural work, but simply an empirical remark. This
would explain why there are a number of points in the Laws
that plainly contradict it:
F'i r s t , Plato nowhere states that all citizens will be
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labour-free; and it IS very unlikely, if he really intended
to associate citizenship with leisure, that he would simply
by accident omit to refer to such a central feature of the
social and economic structure of his society, especially
given that there is·so much emphasis placed on this point as
regards the two higher classes in the Republic.
Second, although all plots are supposed to be equal, the
citizens differ in the extent of their movable property, and
therefore In the number of slaves they own. So, we can
suppose either that the lower classes have just about enough
slaves to cultivate their land and the higher classes more
slaves than they actually need, or that the more prosperous
citizens will own enough slaves, but the members of the
lower classes will not, in which case they will have to make
good this deficiency by working on their land themselves.
The first alternative is at variance with Plato's deep sense
of the. "due proportion,,6 and would practically mean the
existence in Magnesia of slaves that cannot be fully used in
productive activities. So, the second one appears to be the
most plausible.
Third, the agricultural laws of 842bff. are to be
,
I1(iAAOV np£novl:£s"
) ,(842d-£A£ue£poLs
here refers to citizens 7alone) , and this formulation
strongly indicates that there will be citizens working their
land themselves. This indication becomes almost a certainty
when, a few lines below in 842d the philosopher refers to
I I I "
the citizens as "Y£CJ}pyots {)£ xaL VOI1£f)(JL xaL I1£ALl:l:ovpyots ,
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words that are far more likely to apply to the actual
farmer, shepherd and bee-keeper than to a landlord who
simply oversees his estate.
Finally, the clearest confirmation of the fact that there
is a differentiation between the classes In the economic
sphere (and most probably in labouring status) as well as in
the political one comes at 756b-e: In the election of the
,
BovAn the participation of the two higher classes IS
,
compulsory; the third one has to vote only for the ~ovA£vTas
of the three higher classes; and the fourth for those of the
two higher classes. But this would count only as negligence
of civic duty if there was not a serIOUS reason for the
abstinence of the lower classes from one or two days of
voting, and it is diff icul t to see what else this reason
could be except that 8they are obliged to work. It seems
therefore that not only does Plato allow his citizens to
engage In physical labour themselves, but he actually
expects them to do so. Moreover, the differentiation of the
four classes in the voting procedure indicates that they are
not simply a decorative element In the Laws and thus it
makes the "no classes at all" position difficult to uphold.
But it IS not only the fact that certain categories of
citizens are to engage In physical labour that makes the
interpretation of the e c o nom i c structure of the Laws as
unqualifiedly aristocratic untenable. 9 It is also that this
interpretation takes the exploitation of slave labour to be
something that allows a distinction between democracy and
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oligarchy. However, to the extent that the whole Greek
world, irrespective of constitution, depended on slave
labour, it is evident l.y wrong to assume this. Furthermore,
it seems that it was democracies that developed the
institution of slavery furthest in Classical Greece. 1 0 It 1S
therefore wrong to assert, as Wood and Wood do, that r n
expecting slave labour to support his citizen community
Plato reveals his commitment to a reactionary aristocratic
position.
The existence 1n the Laws of citizen classes that are not
aristocratic in the sense of being supported by the surplus
of the p r o duc t ion of the res t of the communi ty, but tha t
engage themselves 1n physical labour and still have a
part ic ipa tory ro l e i n the government of the city is not
simply a slight deviation from a vital principle of the
Republic. It opens the way for a Platonic constitution that
draws partly on democratic practices and therefore entails a
certain degree of acceptance of these pract ices. In order
for this posi tion to be sustained, however, one has to
accept that, at least ln Plato's case, it is the relations
-social, economic and political-between citizens that
determine the political character of a constitution rather
than the relations between the citizen-body and the rest of
the population, i.e. metics and slaves. From a modern point
of view, of course, this 1S simply unacceptable. One cannot
i gno r e the exploitation of large numbers of people, the
metics and especially the slaves, when assessing questions
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ato
concerning Classical Greece. But within a society where the
institution of slavery had almost the acceptance of
natural law t
11 it is inevitable that political lssues are
. .
be defined within the framework of the nOALS and the nOALS
. 12
was by and large identified with its noALLaL.
The automatic exclusion of metics and slaves from
participation in the common affairs of the polis is plainly
attested by historians of such different backgrounds as
Finley and De Ste Croix. The first underlines the fact that
,
civil strife t oLaoLs t the strongest Greek word referring to
political contests "was by definition restricted to the
citizen-body".13 The second states bluntly that "[o]f course
it was only adult male citizens of a polis who could indulge
14
effectively in class struggle on the political plane".
It is important to realize that for the Greeks of the
Classical era the exclusion of metics and slaves from the
political process was an unquestionable reality. The
decisive political choice was one between oligarchy and
15democracy and Greek political theory was primarily
concerned with the antithesis of these two constitutional
types. It is therefore reasonable t I think t to look into the
relationship between the four citizen classes of Magnesia in
order to define the political outlook of the Laws.
Nevertheless, one further distinction has to be drawn at
,
this point. In his Politics Aristotle suggests that "xaL lap
( ,
. ~ ~
°
nOALLT}S &l1cPLof311 T£tTaL noAAaxLs· ou lap TOV aULOV
,
~I a ~
c £LvaL nOALTll V' £OLL lap TLS os £v0poAolonoL naVL£S
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,8T/l1 oxpcx'Clcx
,
,
fiOAl'CT/S
,.
WV )£V fiOAACXXlS )nux
fiOAl'CT/S" (127Sa2-S). In this model, democracy and oligarchy
are distinguished on the basis of how widely they confer the
political prerogatives of citizenship. Aristotle is right in
principle in making this suggestion as well as defining the
citizen as the individual who is permitted to participate in
the judicial and executive branches of government
("[fi]OA~'CT/S 8' afiA(1)S oiJ8£v~ 1:(1)V <XAAWV oP~C£'CCXl ,.HiAAOV 17 1:(1)
\
11£1:£X£lV XPlO£WS XCXl aPxn s " - 127 Sa 22- 2 3 ) . But this does not
entail (and Aristotle nowhere claims) that this is the end
ofthe rna t t e r . Fir s t 0 fall Ar i s tot I e him s elf a dmits t hat
his definition applies to democracies, but not necessarily
to other constitutions (127SbS-7). Secondly, Aristotle
,
recognizes that specifying the status of the pavauool can be
a difficul t problem. Al though he formulates the question
clearly ("[i]f, on the other hand, mechanics
,
[1:0US
,
~avauoous] should not-be called citizens, in what class are
,
they to be placed? They are not resident aliens [11£1:0lXOS],
,
neither are they foreigners [1;£vos]"-Politics 1277b35-39),
he has to go to great lengths to reach an answer, which is
finally a historical one: he correctly remarks that
different constitutions take a different stance on the
issue: some (the democracies) give political rights to the
banausics, others (the oligarchies) do not (1278a16-24).
, . , )
Aristotle of the latter: " e 8£ {J£A'ClO1:T/ fiOAlS ouapproves T/
, ,
fiOlT/O£l pcxvcxuoov fiOAl'CT/V" (1278a8). However, a
straightforward answer to Aristotle's own question would
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,presuppose the definition of the status of the ~avavaoL In
terms of the social categories known in the ancient world.
But this he IS unable to provide; if they are neither
, ,
citizens, as in his ~£ALtaLD nOAtS, nor metics or slaves, In
which dist inct soc ial stratum can they be classif ied? In
general terms, these three strata were the basic ones
recognized In Classical Greece. The fact that Aristotle
employs a historical/constitutional account to answer his
own question asked in sociological terms originates in the
fact that the social typology of his time did not treat the
banausics as distinct from one of the three maIn groups. His
final conclusion is that manual workers are treated as
citizens in democracies and as metics In oligarchies. In
this respect, they do not constitute a group whose position
in society can be decided without reference to particular
kinds of constitutions, and, furthermore, it seems that
constitutions themselves can be defined by the status that
,
they confer on the ~avavaot. But the single fact that
Aristotle recognizes the considerable difficulty involved in
this issue shows that the question of on what groups
citizenship should be bestowed was at his time a significant
problem.
Despite the fact that it does not answer fully all the
relevant questions,16 Aristotle's definition does give an
excellent account of what citizenship represented for the
Greeks in practice. The philosopher is right to claim that
the width of the social groups included in the citizen-body
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is characteristic of a constitution. But this by no means
entails that as soon as the citizen-body IS defined,
political problems cease to exist, or that the only
political problem in the Greek world is where one draws the
(irrefutably important) line that separates the citizens
from the rest of the population. Very often the drawing of
this line becomes the object of what for the Greeks is the
most common political antithesis, the one between democracy
and oligarchy; and this is a process in which the whole
communi ty of free and autochthonous residents of a ci ty
pa r t i c i p a t e s , whereas metics and slaves are unquestionably
excluded. That the victorious party might deprive its
opponents of their citizenship, is possible. But still, the
crucial factor in this process is whether one is allowed to
take part in the political struggle or not. This is the
story that Thucydides fleshes out in his History. Democratic
and oligarchic factions collide over power. The members of
these parties might or might not be formally recognized as
citizens, but, in any case, they are the ones who have the
prerogative to take part in the political debate.
There is therefore a political problem which goes beyond
the simple question who is to count as a "formal" citizen.
In approaching questions concerning Greek political theory,
one has to recognize that there is one particular section of
the population-roughly, the free, autochthonous, male
members of the community-which has the prerogative to
participate in the political struggle. Whether all or only
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some of these members of the communi ty are recognized as
"formal" citizens depends on a number of factors, mainly on
the type of the constitution. But it IS the relationship
between the different social groups of such free and
autochthonous male residents of a polis which primarily
defines its political character.
These assertions do not contradict the Aristotelian model
of citizenship, except if one takes it In the rather extreme
form where it would suggest that only "formal" citizens are
engaged in political disputes. But there is nothing in the
Politics suggesting that Aristotle himself ever held this
doctrine. As for Plato, the Republic's class structure makes
it crystal clear that he allowed for quite significant
differences of social and political status within the
citizen-body itself. 1 7 So in the Republic we have "banausics"
included in the citizen-body in a quite emphatic way and we
are obliged to consider the relationship between citizen
classes, not between citizens and non-citizens, in order to
provide a political analysis of the work. As I have already
argued, the latter can be no proper criterion because
democrats and aristocrats alike used to take for granted the
exclusion of non-citizens from the political process. The
same applies to the Laws. It is the relationship among the
four citizen classes which constitutes the political essence
of the work; and since this relationship IS much more
complex than the straightforward aristocratic domination of
the Republic, it is necessary to examine it in detail.
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II THE POLITICAL QUESTION
The administrative system of the Laws is characterized by
the coexistence of democratic and aristocratic elements.
Given the ideological orientation of Plato's political
theory as it appears in the Republic and in the greater part
of the Politicus (up to 300a), the simple presence of
democratic aspects in the government structure of Magnesia
demonstrates a shift in Plato's attitude towards democracy.
But as a closer examination of this structure reveals, those
democratic aspects. are strongly counterbalanced by
anti-democratic ones. It is this tentative balance between
democratic and aristocratic elements that shapes the
political character of the Laws more than anything else. 1 8
As already suggested, an the Republic Plato's atti tude
towards democracy is one of unc ornp r om i s i ng rejection, and,
for most of its length, the Politicus seems to reinforce the
principles established in the Republic. The Ideal Ruler of
the Politicus (despite being himself only human (275b-c) and
despite having to work with ordinary human beings, a
recalcitrant material not always easy to handle) has "expert
knowledge" and this brings him close to the
philosopher-kings of the Republic. The authoritarianism of
the Pol i t i cus is indeed grounded on the concept ion of a
Ruler who possesses absolute metaphysical knowledge and
whose authority cannot be challenged as a consequence.
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But the Politicus, unlike the Republ i c , IS not
unqualifiedly authoritarian. Plato's emphasis on the
political importance of law in the absence of philosophical
knowledge, his insistence on the practical usefulness of
I
oOl;<x, his approval of a society which (with the
exception of the Ruler) is not stratified in terms of virtue
and his increased interest in history are crucial features
of the closing pages of the Politicus which decisively pave
the way for the Laws. As regards Plato's position on
democracy, it is clear that both the elevated role of doxa
(which means that common people can have a stronger claim to
political power) and the existence of a society whose
citizens are not differentiated in moral terms indicate an
increased Platonic acceptance of democracy. This development
is related to the elevated status of history in Plato's
later political thought, as it will become more obvious as
we examine the distribution of power in the Laws.
This distribution falls into two parts. On the one hand
there is the "formal" administrative system, elaborated in
great detail from Book Four onwards, and, as it will be
argued, largely shaped by historical experience. On the
other hand there is the appearance, in the last pages of the
dialogue, of a peculiar Platonic institution, the Nocturnal
Counc i 1. Wi th the emergence of this Counc I l , me t aphys ical
considerations that had for the most part of the work been
subdued become predominant. The evaluation of the role of
both the "formal" admini s t rat ion of Magnes ia and of the
203
Nocturnal Council is critical for any interpretation of the
Laws, and it is not an overstatement to suggest that their
relationship by and large determines the whole outlook of
the dialogue.
Our examination will start with the "formal"
administrative system.
As we have seen, the first element that indicates Plato's
deviation in the Laws from an orthodox aristocracy IS the
fact, proved by the passage in 842b-d and the other passages
discussed in section one, that at least a substantial number
of citizens will be working their own land, being therefore
farmers rather than leisured aristocrats. This IS not
however in itself necessarily a democratic position. As
Saunders has argued farming is not included in the banausic
occupations that the aristocracy of the time used to look
upon wi th contempt. 19 Nevertheless, the trade mark of the
Greek aristocracy in· the Classical era is leisure and/or
military training. By expecting a substantial number of his
citizens to participate In agricultural production Plato
evidently departs from the standard model of the aristocrat
of his time. And this, given that the political prerogatives
of the working citizens are not insignificant or
non-existent as In the Republic, IS already a concession to
democracy.
This remark, however, can
Plato's conciliatory attitude
proved or disproved by the
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only have relative value.
to democracy can only be
distribution of power he
prescribes for Magnesia, i.e. by the nature of its
d '" 20a m1n1strat1ve system. In fact, there are elements of this
system that demonstrate some relatively pro-democratic and
even to an extent egalitarian inclinations.
The first of these elements is the role attributed to the
Assembly. The latter is constituted by all who bear or have
borne arms (753b), that is, practically, by all adult male
citizens (764a).21 The constitutional role of the Assembly is
nowhere elaborated in any detail. 22 Its main prerogative IS
to elect the officials of the state (753bff.). Apart from
that it has jurisdiction over crimes against the state
(767e-768a) (a "function of considerable importance"
according to Morrow)23 and it must approve any change in the
laws (772c). It can also extend the time that a metic can
stay in the country (a rather insignificant function-850b).
Most commentators seem to agree that the authority of the
Assembly 10 Plato's state is substantially restricted in
comparison with that of Assemblies In the Greek world at
that time. StaIley writes that "the new state's most
striking departure from the practice of fourth-century
Athens will be in the power bestowed on the magistrates ...
In the Athens of Plato's day, ultimate authority rested with
the Assembly and the large popular juries".24 Morrow talks
about the "limitations that Plato places upon the
. I" 25 KI ktraditional functions of the assembly and counCl. os 0
is the most explicit in this respect. After enumerating the
functions of the Assembly referred to above he adds: "[i]t
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is likely that the Assembly is also meant to have additional
powe r s , especially in the field of foreign policy. Plato
neglects to assign responsibility for such matters as war
and peace and alliances. But since these were prerogatives
of the Athenian Assembly tit is reasonable to assume that
they were intended for the Assembly in Magnesia. Even with
these functions added, however t the Magnesian Assembly IS
but a shadow of its Athenian counterpart".26
These views are-no doubt justifiable to a large extent.
It is beyond question that Plato strips the Assembly of
vital tasks it performed in contemporary democracies. This
analysis t however, fails to do justice to the fact that
Plato's concession to democracy in accepting an Assembly in
Magnesia is far from trivial. It is vital to realize that
had he acccepted a constitutional role for his Assembly
similar to that of Athens t in Klosko's own words "an extreme
27democracy"t Plato would have no real choice but to create a
predominantly democratic state. Neither is the
constitutional power of the
~ ,
Magnesian £xxADola negligible.
In a surprisingly modern way Plato creates a constitution
where the people (of course non-citizens excluded) have the
major prerogative of electing their officials. This of
course comes closer in spirit to modern representative
democracy than to Greek democracy. More specificallYt there
are two features of Greek democracy that are absent from
Magnesia. One is t.he use of the lot for major assignments
(we will examine the issue of the lot shortly); the other is
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the fact that in Greek democracies the Assembly was
unquestionably the ultimate authority of the state. From the
basic functions that guaranteed this constitutional
supremacy, Plato retains two pivotal ones: the appointment
of the magistrates 2 8 and the military officers of the state
and the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy (Klosko
is probably correct on this issue). On the other hand, Plato
does not accept that magistrates should be accountable to
the Assembly. Instead he creates a special body of
examiner s . These mus t be "divine" men because the surv ivaI
of the city depends on them (945c-d). But despite the fact
that they will be elected by the whole citizen-body
(945eff. ), the examiners do undertake a function that, had
it been g i ven to the Assembly, would have made the latter
29practically the sovereign intsitution in the state.
,
Even though the Magnesian lxxAT/aLex does not have the
extensive authority of its democratic counterpart, it cannot
be considered a mere shadow of the latter. No matter how
many matters are placed r n the hands of magistrates, the
Assembly still retains some principal functions. One could
1, n the sense that itsay that power originates from it,
chooses the magistrates. And the fact that Plato ascribes to
it the authority to try crimes against the state and
effectively to block changes in the laws 1S of no minor
importance. Its sovereignty is restricted not so much by the
matters placed in the hands of the magistrates but by the
, 30 Iffact that these magistrates are not accountable to 1t.
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they were, the Assembly would have been able both to give
power and check its use. Even as the matter stands, however,
the part of the Assembly in the Laws is more than simply
decorative. Looked at against the background of previous
dialogues, it does represent a movement in a democratic
direction.
This democratic tendency IS, however, partially
undermined by the procedure defining attendance In the
Assembly. Plato makes attendance compulsory for the two
higher classes, which are otherwise threatened with a fine,
but voluntary for the third and fourth classes which are not
obliged to participate unless they are instructed to do so
:> '
1;/,/)OS O:/)O:)'XT}S" (764a-b). The measure is designed to
control the extent' of popular participation in the Assembly
and as such it is straightforwardly oligarchic. 3 1 Morrow is
not convincing when he attempts to play down the political
character of the measure: "Plato's intentions may be
oligarchical, but another motive that is certainly
present in his thought is that attendance at the
assembly would be more of a burden for the poorer citizens
32 • t .than for the richer ones". To suggest that poor Cl i z e ns
might find it difficult to participate regularly in the
Assembly IS clearly in accordance with the division of
labour that Plato prescribes for Magnesia. But this is not
so much a "motive" for deliberately diminishing the
participation of lower classes in politics as it is an
excuse for it. Democracies had handled this problem by
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offering daily subsidy for attendance at the Assembly and
Plato was definitely aware of the fact. 3 3 Thus, although the
economic structure of Magnesia may make Plato's suggestion
seem reasonable, in no way does it cancel out its political
nature.
It is more this limitation on participation In the
Assembly than its restricted authority (which, as we have
seen, is not so restricted after all) that undercuts the
democratic tendencies existing in this section of Plato's
a dm i n i s t rat i v e s y s t em. The phi los 0 phe r coun t e r ba 1ancesthe
influence of the £xxADa~a, basically a democratic element in
the constitution, not by attributing to it a shadowy role,
but by ~ffectively allowing it to be dominated by the higher
classes. In a fashion typical of the Laws,· however, the
democratic aspect of the Assemply is in the end not
completely obliterated. In the exercize of two of its most
pivotal prerogatives, the election of the thirty-seven
,
Vop0<PvAax£s and the approval of any change in the laws,
Plato wants the participation of all citizens (753b and 772d
. 1) 34respectIve y .
The full Stuio« takes part also in the election of the
candidates of the members of the two higher classes that are
to sit on the Council. However, the fourth class is excused
from participating in the election of the members of the
third and fourth classes and the third class from the
election of the candidates of the fourth class. By adopting
this scheme of participation Plato both gives increased
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political influence to the higher classes and indicates that
the election of the candidates of these classes is more
important than the one of the candidates of the lower
classes. 80, in two respects this can be described as an
1 , h' 35o 19arc 1C measure.
Of oligarchic colour too is the fact that the Council,
, 36despite being modelled on the actual Athenian ~OVAD, keeps
.
only a part of the functions performed by its Athenian
counterpart: it controls the everyday business of the state,
it receives foreign representatives, it summons the Assembly
(758a-d) and it probably prepares its agenda;37 but it is
stripped of a number of important assignments that belonged
to it in Athens and that are attributed to other officials
'M ,38 8r n agrie s r a . 0, for instance, the general supervision of
public buildings goes to the &a~vvo~ot (763c-d), the
politically crucial function of examining outgoing officials
to the £v8vvot (945b-c) and though the Athenian Council
enjoyed judicial power Plato does not ascribe to its
Magnesian counterpart any similar role.
But the oligarchic tendencies running through Plato's
creation of his Council do not prevail uncontested. In one
important respect (maybe the most important) the Council
appears to be constructed on a conception that lies midway
between oligarchy and democracy: it is to consist of ninety
members from each class, therefore establishing a kind of
balance between rich and poor; Plato here deviates from
normal Athenian practice,39 but for a particular political
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reason: he wants to prevent the kind of civil unrest that
originates in the opposition of the rich and the poor. In
this respect he departs from his insistence on a strictly
stratified society; and the oligarchic standards applied in
the election of the Council are counterbalanced by its
defined class-composition designed to conciliate the two
factions whose opposition is the most likely cause of civil
unrest. True, the /3oV'AD, like the £.XXATJa~a, IS not of very
great significance in the administrative system of Magnesia.
Yet, both of them have their relative 40value; and it IS
quite obvious that cooperation between them could allow them
(and the lower classes which have political expression
mainly through them) a good degree of participation in the
decisions of the community.
Plato's conscious attempt to nullify a potentially fatal
threat to the internal stability of his community by
bringing together the rich and the poor IS closely linked
with his deliberate policy to prevent extreme weal th or
poverty by legislative measures (744e-745a). The philosopher
shows a keen hist.orical insight in recognizing the strife
between rich and poor as the main source of potential
pol it ical unres t in a city. To a cons iderable extent, the
political history of Greece in the fifth and the first half
of the fourth century B.C. consists of conflicts between
rich oligarchs and low class democrats and of cities
controlled by politically inimical factions. Furthermore,
this was exactly the problem that was confronted by Solon,
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the Athenian legislator of the early sixth century, and as
we will soon see, Plato in the Laws is in many ways indebted
.
to the ancient vOpOe£LDS.
We encounter a very similar interplay between different
political principles when we come to the administration of
justice. P'l a t o-ide s p i t e his statement in 766d that "OVL£
.
nOAAOVS :)1OVL<XS p~81.0V
\
:)\OVL£
:) ,
OAI.)'OVS
,
<P<XVAOVS"-
retains the democratic popular courts that were predominant
in Athens but he s~verely curtails their range of authority.
The first level on which any dispute might be settled is one
where the opposing parties choose some of their neighbours
,
as "OI.<XlLDL<XI." (956b-c). On a second level any party that is
not satisfied by the ruling might apply to a popular court
41(956c). In case of another appeal the case is presented to
the court of select judges (956c-d), a court consisting of
one member of each officialdom lasting more than a year;
this member will be chosen by his fellow-officials (767c).
As far as crimes against the state are concerned, Plato
follows the principle that these are crimes against each
citizen separately and gives authority to the Assembly to
try these cases (767e-768a) . The interrogation
,("I3<Xo<Xvov"-768a) 1S, however, entrusted to three senior
f f i . 1 42o 1C1a s.
In the formal juridical system of the Laws then, we find
again a conscious Platonic attempt to bind together
democratic and oligarchic practices. Oligarchic tendencies
are promoted further by the fact that magistrates are
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entitled to try offenses that belong to the area of their
responsibility. In Plato's words, "[e]very official
sometimes has to set up as a judge as well" (767a). Another
aristocratic aspect of the juridical system is that some
particular crimes against the state will be tried not by the
Assembly but by the nomophylakes and the select judges
43
together. Morrow also includes in the oligarchic features
of Plato's construction the fact that voting is to be open,
but his reasoning for this view is somewhat precarious. He
writes that "in any society the aristocrats worthy of the
name are likely to be surer of the grounds for their
opinions and more fearless in expressing them than the
44
common man" But this is not a proposition that really
covers any society. Few orators in Thucydides seem to have
the supreme self-confidence of a democratic leader like
Pericles (2.35-2.46) or even Alcibiades (6.16-6.18).
Moreover, open voting is closely connected with Plato's
principle that any officials, including judges, should be
accountable for their decisions; this is stated in the most
positive terms in 761e: "OlXCXC1't';'V o~ XCX~ apxov'tcx &vun:£~euvov
o£t" (see also 846b and 946e).
This exceptionally modern provision, clearly designed to
protect any citizen from miscarriages of justice, has a
particularly democratic aura and it is another indication of
the tentative political balance which Plato seeks to achieve
in the administrative system of Magnesia.
In conclusion, Klosko's
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statement that "[i]n his
treatment of Magnesian courts ... Plato creates democratic
institutions but limits their power,,45 is a correct assertion
as far as it goes. Going into further detail in the
juridical system we find the same interaction of opposing
political principles that we noticed in other areas. But the
final decision has to be that oligarchic schemes ultimately
get the better of democratic intentions. The most crucial
feature of the whole construction seems to be that, in
comparison to a democratic state, Magnesian legislation
gives more judicial power to the magistrates than it leaves
with the on~os.46 On the other hand, this is not an
unqualified aristocracy. One has only to remember how much
the accountability of all officials is at odds with the
spirit of the Republic.
The issue that perhaps typifies better than any other
Plato's stance with regard to democracy in the Laws is the
use of the lot. The lot is used in the appointment of many
of the officers of the state. But it is never (except for
the appointment of priests-759b)47 used alone. There is
always a procedure of election that brings the number of the
candidates to a certain low point; and the lot is only used
In the last stage where a number of candidates (presumably
of equal competence) have been shortlisted through a process
of election. So for example in the selection of the Council
the lot is employed to reduce the number from one hundred
and eighty to ninety for each property class (756e); but in
such a procedure it is obvious that it is the first stage,
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the election, that is important, since at this stage the
large majority of citizens is eliminated. Because Plato uses
the lot in such a way its political significance is next to
48
zero. (In the case of the powerful nomophylakes and the
military officials it IS not used at all-753bff.).
From the point of view of political utilitarianism, i.e.
measuring the result of the use of the lot on the politics
of Magnesia, it appears that here Plato makes little more
than an empty gesture towards democracy. The question that
then arises is why he uses the XADpoS at all. Plato gives an
exceptionally clear answer to this question: in 756e-758a he
contrasts arithmetical equality (giving equal shares to
unequals) with geometrical or proportionate equality (giving
to everybody his due). Plato confirms the superiority of the
. , ,
latter kind of equality which "hoI,OS "lap 81/ Xpl,OI,S £OLI,"
(757b) and asserts that this is the kind of equality that
should be employed In politics (757c). So far we are on
ground familiar from the Republic, where democracy IS
viciously attacked for putting into practice arithmetical
equality (557a, 561a-e and especially 558c). Unlike the
Republ i c , however, Plato IS ready in the Laws to accept
that, because of the possible discontent of the many
,("8voxoAl,as LCOlJ nOAAQlJ £lJ£xa"-757e) and in order to avoid
oLao£l,s, arithmetical equality must also be taken into
account. Plato makes it abundantly clear that this is only a
half-hearted concession to the many: " though force of
circumstances compels us to employ both sorts of equality,
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we s hou I d emp loy the sec 0 nd [ the a r i t hme tica Ione ], whi ch
demands good luck to prove successful,
possible" (757e-758a).
as little as
These passages provide the key to Plato's use of the lot
in the Laws. It is not that the lot is indispensable for
good government: it is rather a burden for it. So it has to
be used as lit.t.le as possible, just t.o the point where it
will keep the masses happy. This attitude evidently explains
the practical insignificance of the XADPos in the dialogue.
In terms of the development of Plato's political thought,
however, the passages referred to above signify a real
change of course in comparison with the Republic. Plato is
now ready to r e c ogn i ze , with increased political r ea l Lsrn ,
that the people by and large have a potential claim to a
certain degree of power and that concessions have to be made
to the 8n~os to guarantee political stability. So the use of
the lot marks not so much a simple political measure as the
recognition by Plato of the principle of the possible (even
if I i mi ted) pol it ical usefulness of ar i thmet ical equal i t y J
an intrinsic part of democratic ideology.49 From the point of
VIew of Plato's position on democracy it is the principle
that is far more important than its political
. 1 . 50Imp ementatlon.
On the other hand, the extensive use of election in
Magnesia can be interpreted as a step in a democratic
direction, at least
commentators on the
in comparison with the Republic. Most
51 h a s iLaws, following Aristotle, emp a s i ze
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that election was in Greece an essentially oligarchic
procedure while the use of the lot was democratic. 5 2 Although
this is generally correct t there are two points that can be
made on the issue. First t even extreme democracies like
Athens did not depend on the lot for some of the most
influential offices of the state that were filled by
election, notably those of the Generals; Pericles t for
example t who led Athens for almost half a century and who in
Thucydides' famous phrase transformed the Athenian
constitution to "A.~yw 1l~1) 0111l0XP<XL~<XJ £pyw o~ uno LaD npwLov
\ \
&vop~s &PXD" (2.65), exercized his authority by being
repeatedly elected General as opposed to being chosen by
lot. Therefore the Aristotelian assertion is not an absolute
rule. Second, by giving the citizen-body as a whole the
prerogative to elect its magistrates, Plato does give them a
certain degree of political participation; and this is
totally at odds with the political position of the producing
class of the Republic. From this point of view, and given
that election is not exclusively an oligarchic procedure in
the context of Greek politics, Plato does move in a
relatively democratic direction in the Laws.
Finally, one especially important characteristic of
Plato's administrative system is that election to the really
important offices (those of the nomophylakes t the examiners,
the official responsible for education and the select
judges)53 is open to all classes. Plato nowhere suggests that
property qualifications will affect in any way the election
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of these officials, whereas secondary posts like the
~
<xo-rVVO/l0l.. and the (763d-e) or the
temple-treasurers (75ge) are to be filled by the higher
classes. This is an evidently democratic feature of Plato's
administrative system, since, at least in terms of
eligibility for election to high office, all citizens have
the same opportunities.
To conclude: throughout the constitutional system of
Magnesia Plato mixes democratic and oligarchic devices. In
most cases, the final composition of the deliberative organs
of the state is such that oligarchic principles check the
democratic tendencies that find their way into the system.
Despi te this fact, however, democratic practices do play a
part in the Magnesian administrative structure. So, there is
an Assembly in Magnesia, but, unlike a democratic Assembly
it has limited authority and it is not expected that
officials are to be accountable to it. Also, by making
attendancy to it compulsory for the higher classes and
voluntary for the lower ones Plato allows a predominance of
aristocratic elements in it. Similarly, the higher classes
playa larger role in the election of the Council. The most
important judicial· decisions are placed in the hands of
select judges; and election, to a certain extent though not
absolutely an aristocratic procedure, is employed as the
dominant mode of appointing officials. Finally, 1n
comparison with a democratic state, Magnesia has far too
many decisions resting with magistrates rather than with the
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Assembly.
All these features severely limit the democratic
dispositions of the Lews , but they do not eliminate them.
The administrative system of Magnesia still includes some
democratic elements: the As s emb l y , despite its restricted
role t is still the organ of the state from which power
originates t since it elects the magistrates; the Council is
to consist of equal numbers from each class t Plato's
intention being to conciliate the four classes; popular
courts are retained though they are not entrusted with
capital charges; .the lot is used in what IS actually more of
a symbolic gesture towards the poorer classes than a
politically vit.al decision; a procedure is established by
means of which every citizen can individually call into
question an official's use of power; finally, and most
significantly, the major officialdoms are open to all
classes. These aspects of the political structure of the
Laws cannot be ignored. Taken cumulatively, they prove that
Plato goes some way In the dialogue towards a moderately
favourable assessment of the political characteristics of
democracy.
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III THE SOLONIAN MODEL
The question which follows from this political analysis
of Magnes ia 's adminis tra t ion 1S what factor accounts for
Plato's shift 1n his disposition towards democracy. Of
course his tendency to be practical in his political
proposals 1S evident 1n the late works, notably 1n the
closing section of the Politicus. But this is only a very
general way to describe the subject. In the Laws Plato is
not simply practical. He increasingly allows history to come
into play t n the shaping of his pol it ical phi Lo s ophy and,
moreover, the poli tical system of the Laws is based on a
plainly historical "model: the legislation of Solon. 5 4
Unlike Plato who contemplated politics in a theoretical
way, Solon was presented with practical and concrete
socia-political problems. Having won fame as a military
figure in Athens' war with Megara and being a recognized
poet at a time when poets had significant authority over
moral and political issues, he was asked to arbitrate
between the landowning aristocracy and the peasants, the two
factions being on the verge of civil war. By following a
middle course, Solon rescued the civic peace. He abolished
old debts and forbade enslavement for debt, therefore
removing an unbearable burden from the poor (the famous
,
G£ LGaxe£ LO:). On the other hand he did not go as far as
redestributing all Athenian land and the old aristocracy was
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allowed to retain much of its power. He also established an
administrative system the similarities of which to Plato's
Magnesia are, as we shall see, indeed striking.
Given the context of Solon I s reformation and his own
status of an of rather moderate 55means the
question arises whether Solon by his legislation effectively
favoured one of the conflicting parties. Was he an
aristocrat trying to save his own class from the
consequences of a popular rising? A democrat giving rights
to the masses and initiating the process that eventually
ended up in the full democracy of the fifth century? Or was
hea disinterested arbitrator trying to preserve a fragile
civil peace? The question was fiercely debated in Plato I s
time, with the moderate oligarchs and the democrats both
claiming Solon to be a man holding their own convictions. 5 6
In his Consti tution of Athens Aristotle describes Solon as
the first leader of the democratic party (28.2), but in a
number of other places he emphasizes that he held middle
. f . 57ground between the opposIng actIons.
Plato's opinion on this issue is difficult to define with
certai nty , because there is no expl ic itsta tement in the
Laws of how he saw Solon's political position. The fact that
Aristotle takes him to be essentially a moderate might serve
as an indication, since Aristotle was in the Academy at the
time of the composition of the Laws. 5 8 Most probably, Plato
did not conceive of Solon as a democrat. Wherever the name
of the legislator appears in the Platonic corpus Solon is
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praised either as a wise man, as a poet, or as a good
1 . 1 59egIs ator. Given the way Plato's Socrates abuses
democratic leaders in Gorgias 515cff., and Plato's overall
stance on democracy, it is very unl ikely that the
philosopher would praise Solon had he conceived him as a
democrat. On the other hand, the political structure of the
Laws which is directly related to Solon's measures can by no
means be defined as an extreme oligarchy. The most plausible
hypothesis, then, is that Plato saw Solon as an arbitrator
and a moderate conservative and this brings his
understanding of him close to that of Aristotle.
The most obvious case where Plato follows in the
footsteps of Solon IS in the employment of the four
'60 .
LtPDpaLa. Whether Solon invented this categorization or he
found it already existing is unclear. 6 1 It does not really
matter very much for our argument here, however, because
even if there were four classes before Solon he definitely
changed their constitutional role and it is exactly in this
respect that Plato adopts his system. The four classes are
in both cases defined in terms of wealth. The fact that in
Solon's case wealth is measured on the basis of annual
Income but in Plato's case on the basis of movable property
owned is not a real difference, because in an agrarian
society like Athens in the sixth century the income of an
individual is bound to reflect his (land) property and
therefore in both cases property comes to be the decisive
criterion. The important point is that both Solon and Plato
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use the distinction between the four classes for political
purposes. As we have seen, Plato makes the participation of
the two higher classes in the Assembly compulsory and gives
them a larger share of the vote for the Council; he also
considers that the election of the members of the Council
representing the higher classes is more important and
requIres the participation of all citizens. Finally, he
leaves certain off ices (though minor ones) to be filled
exclusively by the members of those classes. Solon, on the
other hand, made officials eligible from the three higher
classes and he left intact the role of the Areopagus and the
magistrates, thereby allowing the wealthy a predominant role
in common affairs. 6 2 There is of course a difference in that
Solon restricted eligibility to office to the three higher
.
~l~n~a~a, whereas Plato left it open to all. This, however,
can be explained; as Ehrenberg has demonstrated, the
original distinction out of which classes arose was their
63
ability to provide their arms. The fourth class in Solon's
constitution, the en~£s, were not able to do that and this
was the reason for their exclusion from civil service and,
correspondingly, eligibility for office. On the contrary, in
Plato's state all classes are able to provide arms. This is
one cardinal reason, along with the need for civic peace,
why Plato forbids anybody to fall below a certain limit of
poverty (744c). From this point of view, Plato departs from
Solon in form but not in content. In both cases the rule
that applies is that he who is able to do military service
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should be entitled to hold office. Or, to put it another
way, there are no en~£s in Magnesia.
Plato's modelling of the administrative system of
Magnesia on Solonian precepts becomes evident as we examine
the roles of certain deliberative organs of the state. One
of the major innovations of Solon, and one that opened the
way to democracy is that he allowed all citizens to
participate in the Assembly and Plato follows him closely in
that. 64 He also literally copies Solon In giving to the
o
£XXATJOL<X the pre.rogative of electing the officials of the
65
state, which means that the Magnesian Assembly performs a
constitutional role very similar, if not identical, with its
counterpart in Solonian Athens. Furthermore, Plato adopts
the procedure that Solon utilized for the election of the
officials. This method,
o
known as XATJPWOLS 2£X npoxp L'tWI) ,
consists in voting until a small number of candidates IS
elected and then employing the lot to choose among those; as
we saw, with the important exceptions of the election of the
nomophylakes and the examiners, Plato uses this method
extensively.
The Platonic Council IS also part of a Solonian
,
inheritetnce. Solon invented this Council ("£noLTJO£" in
Aristotle's words)66 and he probably intended it to check the
67
power of the older aristocratic Council of the Areopagus.
We know very little about the constitutional function of the
Solonian Council and therefore a detailed comparison of it
with the Platonic one
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is practicallY impossible.
Nevertheless t there are two aspects of their relationship
that have to be emphasized: f i r s t , in adopting the Council
Plato does not simply adhere to Athenian tradition t but
WO\
effectively accepts a state organ that initiated ~b1 Solon;
second t the number of the members of the Council that the
philosopher prescribes (three hundred and sixty) is closer
to the Solonian Council (four hundred) than to the later
Cleisthenian one (five hundred). Plato probably tried
roughly to square his number with the days of the year.
,
A difference between Plato's BOVAD and its Athenian
counterpart is that the former is elected on a class basis
as opposed to a tribal one. This t however t 1S in accordance
with Plato's general neglect of the tribes in his
constitution t and it is this neglect which explains Plato's
departure from his model in this respect.
Plato's juridical system is of a particularly Solonian
colour as well. Solon was the first to establish popular
courts (Aristotle says that this was one of his most
democratic measures and that it made the people dominant in
the citYt 6 8 but this could hardly be Solon's own intention
and Aristotle is probably judging the measure from its
historical development after Solon) . It is of great
significance that Plato retains these popular courts in
Magnesia despite the fact that he acknowledges that the many
are unable to pass correct judgement (766d) t in a sense
paying political tribute to their originator. Furthermore t
it seems likely that the
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Solonian system of the
administration of justice was very close to the one created
by P1ato~ though lack of information about the former does
not allow the drawing of indisputable conclusions. In the
LawS the first level on which disputes are settled is by a
neighbour-arbitrator (956c), a procedure definitely existing
in Athens at Plato's time. Whether it can be traced as far
back as Solon is unclear though it seems 1ike1y.69 What is
certain 1S that there is a c1earcut analogy between Solon
and Plato in the way the rest of the judicial apparatus
functions. So in both cases popular courts are entrusted
with minor offences, whereas capital crimes go to a higher
court, in Solon's case the Areopagus, in Plato's the select
judges (956c-d). It is obvious that both attribute to their
respective higher judicial authorities' a similar range of
cases, like homicide and conspiracy against the
constitution. 7o In more than one way~ then~ Plato's system is
informed by the Solonian one.
One of the most democratic measures of the ancient
1egis1ator7 1 that Plato follows is the provision that every
citizen can bring to a court a case where another citizen
has been damaged in any way. This was no doubt intended to
promote the legal cover that the poorer citizens enjoyed and
to prevent discrimination in judicial matters. Plato retains
this institution (928b~ 932d) and also creates a provision
that any citizen can accuse a judge for a wrong decision and
bring his case to court. Because every magistrate in
Magnesia operates also as
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a . judge under certain
circumstances (767e), this practically means that common
citizens are given a powerful device of controlling excesses
in the conduct of their officials. Even Plato's proposal
that no magistrate should be irresponsible (761e) 1S
strongly Solonian in spirit.
Where Plato fails to adhere to Solon's model is in the
accountabil i ty of the magistrates. Solon made the latter
directly accountable to the people7 2 and this was a
democratic move the significance of which can hardly be
overestimated: the onpos had now the authority both to
appoint magistrates and to control their holding of office.
We have already noted how much the absence of public
accountability restricts the democratic outlook of Plato's
state, especially as it was out of measures l·ike this that
the Athenian democracy developed.
This difference, however, despite its significance, does
not cancel out the fact that Plato's political construction
is largely modelled on the Solonian one. Not only are there
the many unquestionable similarities between the two
indicated above, which cover almost the whole of the
administrative function of the state; there is also the fact
that Plato employs a political principle which is
essentially (though not uniquely) Solonian: the principle of
the "mixed constitution".
From the very nature of his pol it ical assignment Solon
would have failed if he did not keep the balance between the
aristocrats and the people. The former would not have
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allowed their power to evaporate without dynamic protest,
the latter would hardly have borne their suppression much
longer. The greatness of Solon consisted largely in that not
only did he realize the exact situation, but he consciously
chose to adopt policies that would give something to each
faction: he thoughtfully took a middl e 73course. In his
Politics Aristotle says that the Athenian legislator is
.
praised by some people for breaking up the "A-texv axpex'tov"
,
oligarchy and for masterfully mixing ("J1£tl;exv'tex") the
constitution (1273b37-39). Aristotle also defends Solon from
the charge that he brought about the extreme democracy of
later times: this was the work of other men and of
circumstances (1274a2ff.). The essence of Aristotle's
remarks is that Solon created a "mixed constitution", mixing
oligarchic and democratic elements, a view definitely
supported by Solon's poems themselves. Aristotle himself
seems to be approving of the views of those "people" who
took Solon's constitution to be a "mixed" one, and, as
Morrow suggests, Aristotle probably means here by "people"
Plato and his entourage in the Academy: "the suggestion is
made at least plausible by the fact that in the Laws Plato
points out the danger of having unmixed offices, and insists
throughout on the necessity of a moderate -or "mixed"-
. . ,,74
constItutIon. This not only squares with Plato's
admiration for Solon throughout the corpus of his dialogues,
but establishes a relationship between the legislations of
the two-one imaginative, one real-which goes deeper than the
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resemblances between their administrative systems. In fact,
this view would be tenable even if Aristotle did not refer
to Plato in this passage. There IS little doubt that Solon
did endeavour t o create a legislation that balanced
oligarchic and democratic elements, and which therefore
unquestionably fell under the description of a "mixed"
constitution. In this sense Plato follows him not only in
the particulars of his legislation, but also in its basic
principle.
The theory of a "mixed cons t i tut ion" did not h\;;~i\1
with Solon. Despite his fame and consequent influence Solon
was not a political theorist in any consistent way. It
, ,
appears that the idea of a "1l£L.XTfl nOAL.T£L.<X" must have been
a current,· though largely undefined political ideal In the
fifth century, if not earlier, applied to politics by men
like Theramenes. Somewhat anachronistically men like Solon
and Lycurgus were given credit for being the first to employ
it, in Solon's case justifiably so.
,
In insisting on the need for a mixed nOAL.T£L.<X, then,
Plato again follows in the footsteps of Solon. But he
significantly widens . 75 Ithe range of this c on ce p t i on , n a
long historical narrative Plato describes how Argos, Messene
and Sparta created a Peloponnesian confederacy. The first
two, however, soon declined because their kings viol~ted the
laws they had sworn to obey. Only Sparta retained its
political prowess due to the successful combination of three
separate authorities, the two kings, the gerousia and the
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ephors (691d-692b). The secret of its success was that the
combination of different authorities secured ~O ~~~PLOV, the
due measure (691d) in political power. Sparta had a moderate
constitution with no authority left unchecked.
Sparta's example serves as an introduction to Plato's
assertion, stated in 693d, that there are two
mother-constitutions, monarchy and democracy, the former
typified by Persia and the latter by Athens. "It is
absolutely vital for a political system to combine them"
Plato says "if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship allied
with good judgement". Plato goes on to narrate how Persia
declined from a moderate monarchy to a despotic one (694a)
and how Athens similarly was transformed from a city where
people lived "in willing subjection to the laws" (698c) to
one where unreigned freedom prevailed. The rationale of the
myth is that both Persia and Athens did well under moderate
political systems, but they both decayed when they moved to
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extremes (701e).
In a clear demonstration of his interest in history in
the Laws, Plato produces the theory of the mixed
constitution, to a large extent the informing principle of
his political syst~m, from a historical narrative. This
principle, stated explicitly in 756e in the form that a
constitution must always be in the middle between a monarchy
and a democracy, shapes his political construction along
with the specific historical patterns he adopts, the latter
coming mainly from Solon. The constant interplay of
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democratic and oligarchic devices in the political structure
of Magnesia can be seen, in the light of this doctrine, as a
deliberate Platonic attempt to keep the constitution
balanced. From the same principle also originates Plato's
continuous preoccupation with providing means of checking
the authority of each magistrate, since any abuse of power
will essentially violate the mixed constitution that he is
at such pains to establish. Aristotle has often been
criticized for his remarks in Politics 1265b26-28 and
1266a5ff. that the constitution of the Laws combines
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oligarchy and democracy rather than monarchy and democracy.
Most commentators on the Laws agree that Plato means with
"monarchical" not a literal king present in the state, but
the implementation of a principle that will counterbalance
democracy and the freedom that was historically associated
with tt. So Von Fritz finds the monarchical principle to be
the Nocturnal 'I 78Counc1 , Morrow by the
, d h 79nomophylakes, the examiners and the select JU ges toget er,
. 18 0 dStaIley thinks it means respect for the law 1n genera an
Klosko takes it to be applied in the combination of the
democratic principle of freedom from arbitrary authority
. 81
with powerful magistrates and of the lot with election. Now
the problem with Von Fritz's interpretation is that the
Nocturnal Council, al though in a sense the most powerful
institution in the state, does not participate
straightforwardly in the administration of Magnesia;
therefore it is not the most obvious embodiment of the
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monarchical principle which is clearly connected by Plato
with the administrative system (the remark in 756e occurs in
the context of the election of the Council). From this point
of view Morrow's suggestion is more plausible .. StaIley's
proposal is too general. Why should respect for law occur
only in monarchies? Finally Klosko's position makes sense,
like Morrow's o ne, but, since Plato himself does not give
enough clues as to what exactly he implies by monarchy in
this context, any suggestion has to be speculative. Overall,
Klosko might be closer to Plato's intentions, since his
hypothesis is based on a scheme (protection from arbitrary
power-strong government) which is confirmed by the political
structure of the Laws.
One can find bdth ethical and metaphysical analogies to
the Theory of the Mixed Constitution. Persian despotism and
Athenian freedom are ethical qualities that need to be
mediated because otherwise they can be destructive, as the
passage in 701e suggests. Morrow points out the Pythagorian
influence on Plato in relationship with the theory of the
M· d C . . 82i xe on s t i t u t i on and the latter is probably connected
with the art of essential measurement which is vital for the
political art in the Politicus 273bff. In the Laws Plato
strives to achieve in politics the "due measure" emphasized
in the Politicus.
But this theory is, in the Laws, primarily political and
practical. It is instantiated by history and supported by
his tor ical examples. In a sense the whole of Book Three,
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filled with historical material t serves to introduce this
doctrine that is later carefully instilled in the political
structure of Magnesia. By originating in history and then
being used as a central principle in a practical political
proposal t the theory of the "Mixed Constitution" becomes the
vehicle of Plato's partial change of disposi tion towards
democracy. The abandonment of the absolute metaphysics of
the Republic as a justification for political proposals in
favour of a principle that emphasizes moderation explains
this shift. But it is the increased Platonic interest In
history that makes the shift possible in the first place.
The theory of the "Mixed- Consti tution" does not operate
only in the Laws. It also operates on the Laws. It makes
this dialogue a middle ground between the realism of history
and the idealism of the Forms t a middle ground between the
proto-democracy of Solon and the aristocracy of the
Republic. In this specific sense the Laws is Plato's most
complex political dialogue.
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IV FORMS IN THE LAWS
Is the theory of Forms still upheld by Plato in the Laws?
The question is obviously critical for the estimation of the
political scheme of the Laws and of the exact meaning that
. .
Plato attributes to nOALLLXD ap£LD in the dialogue. As will
be argued in the following pages, the theory of Forms does
exist in the Laws, but because Plato no longer believes in
the possibility of the appearance of an incorruptible human
ruler, his metaphysical doctrine comes to playa different
role in this work in comparison with the middle dialogues.
In the Laws Plato creates a political body oriented towards
"higher" studies, but refuses to allow it dictatorial
powers. Unwavering respect for law becomes the central
political principle of the work instead.
It has to be stated from the outset that the theory of
Forms is nowhere elaborated at any length in the dialogue.
But if one were to try to construct an argument against the
existence of Forms in the Laws, one would have to tackle two
important problems: first, the fact that Plato, although
giving very few clear signs of his adherence to the theory
of Forms in the Laws, does not give any indication that he
has abandoned . . h 83 d t1 t e i t er an pu s forward no alternative
metaphysical doctrine;84 second, the fact that there is at
least one passage which would be extremely difficult to make
sense of, unless one assumes the presence of Forms in the
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d i 1 85la ogue.
However, because of the scarcity and obscurity of
references to the Forms in the Laws, the specifics of the
theory, In other words the exact ontological status of the
Forms in the Laws, cannot be decided. There is not nearly
enough textual evidence for any attempt to define the
precise character of Plato's beliefs about the Forms at the
time of the composition of the dialogue and Saunders is
undoubtedly right when he claims that "it is impossible to
know whether the full hierarchy of Forms elaborated in the
Republic, culminating in the "Form of the Good", is implied
[in the Laws]". 86
As already argued, historical experience provides the
informing principle of the Laws' political system and
Plato's opportunities for expressing his metaphysical
beliefs are consequently limited. It IS not so much the
subject-matter of the dialogue, politics, that prevents a
metaphysical discussion from evolving, as the historical
approach that Plato adopts and consistently follows in it.
His insistence on institutions modelled on their real-life
Greek counterparts, and consequently measured, to a certain
extent, not by a metaphysical principle but by their
historical success, appears to restrain any straightforward
metaphysical expositions In the Laws. Furthermore, the
Athenian Stranger's [i.e. Plato's] interlocutors in the
dialogue are in this spirit chosen not for their
philosophical expertise but rather for their lack of it:
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they represent a typical Spartan and a typical Cretan, and
al though PIa to portrays them as respectable old men wi th
common sense and some political e xpe r i enca , he emphasizes
again and again their philosophical . d 87Ina equacy. This
attitude is most clearly illustrated at 892dff., when he is
about to argue for the most crucial position of his theology
of the Tenth Book, namely that the soul was the first thing
to
.
come into existence
I
("tpUXll f> ' npWTOLS
I
1£1£ lJlll.L£ lJll"-892c) and therefore is prior to the natural
world. At this point Plato completely drops his
interlocutors and introduces an imaginary young man to whom
the argument is addressed. The reason 'for this is that
Cleinias and Megillos are "&D8£LS OlJTCXS &noxp~(J£WlJ" (893a),
i.e. they do not possess dialectical skill either in the
common Greek or in the Platonic sense of dialectic. They are
not, then, the right company for fully fleshed metaphysical
inquiries and even when Plato comes to such matters, in the
second half of the last Book, he is reluctant to go too far
in their exposition. The Laws is a work undoubtedly designed
for the unphilosophical public, personified in the dialogue
itself by Cleinias and Megillos. It is therefore an unlikely
dialogue for metaphysical disquisitions.
It is for this reason that the suggestion that simply
because the Laws is Plato's lengthiest dialogue the
philosopher would have had a chance of referring to his
ontological doctrine is unconvincing. The only place in the
Laws where this can really happen is in the last pages of
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the work, from 951d onwards, where Plato discusses the
Nocturnal Council, a state organ devoted to higher studies.
It is indeed exactly in this part that we have the clearest
reference to the Forms (in 965b-d).
It is also vital to notice that the political ideal of
the Republic is not renounced in the Laws; on the contrary,
it is restated in full force: in 739b-e Plato explains that
in a perfect city women. children and possessions should be
common to all. But such a city could only be inhabi ted by
gods or children of gods. The alternative of the Laws is
merely a "second best" state, created by men and for men
88(see al so 7 32e ) . Such a "human" city cannot be perf ec t, a
point stated forcefully in 713e: "where the ruler of the
state is not a god but a mortal, people have no respite from
toil and misfortune". 89 Furthermore, in 804b Plato asserts
, ,
that the human race hardly participates in truth: "OllLXpcx 6£
&Ane£~CXS aLLcx ll£L~XOVL£s". If then the human race has such a
distant relationship with truth, it is hardly surprising if,
in the construction of a human (as opposed to a divine)
state we find little or no mention of metaphysical
principles. Plato no doubt feels that the city of the Laws
is hardly good enough for philosophers, let alone gods: in
753a the Athenian Stranger politely but firmly refuses to be
a member of Magnesia. All the passages mentioned above
strongly indicate that the viewpoint from which the
enterprise of the Laws is undertaken has to do with human,
From t h i s POI' nt of view itunphilosophical intelligence.
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becomes clear not only why the architectonic conception of
the Laws justifies the absence of references to Forms, but
also why this absence in no way entails that this theory is
abandoned.
There seems to be a large majority of scholars who accept
that the theory of Forms still exists 90 .in the Laws. But
their opinions can only be measured against the textual
evidence they provide for this claim. We have already
suggested that there are sufficient philosophical reasons
which explain why the scarcity of references to the theory
of Forms in the Laws does not mean it has been abandoned. We
will now proceed to an examination of certain passages which
support this assertion.
Some of the features of the Laws which Brochard uses to
prove the existence of Forms in it are admittedly weak. For
example, he takes the distinction between empirical medicine
and medicine that proceeds scientifically and the "necessity
for the legislator to justify rationally the laws he creates
and to [use] persuasion,,91 (he probably refers to 71geff.) to
imply Forms. But although there is a clearcut division
between the knowledge of the free doctor and his slave
assistant who only empirically follows his orders, it does
not follow that this knowledge has to do with Forms. In fact
nowhere in the PIa tonic corpus do we hear of a Form of
medicine, and doctors in Greece did not necessarily enjoy a
.
higher status than the L£xvLLaL. Brochard also suggests that
the preambles to the laws indicate Plato's commitment to a
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science which goes beyond experience,92 but this is doubtful.
As Morrow remarks, in writing the preambles Plato "draws
from his long experience in life,,93 and this means that the
preambles can be based on common, unphilosophical
intelligence. Moreover, Plato emphasizes that they are
intended as introductions to the actual laws (723a). Since
not even the language here includes anything reminiscent of
the theory of Forms, there is no comI-~eeiV)9 reason to accept
that these passages imply them in any way.
A better case for the existence of Forms In the Laws can
be made out of the argument at 859dff. Here Plato argues
ex~licitly against public op"inion (859c-d) and says he will
, ,
try to talk "n eo i DLxcxLoavvlls o'Aws" (about justice in
general). A few lines on (85ge) he argues ,In a passage
worthy of citing In full, that
,
"{n jo t nuo l1£v, Cl 2' l'on c o CXV T}
\
,
DLXCXLOV, Cloaovn£p 2'CXV TOn
,
DLXCXLOV XOLVWVf)J
\
XCX'CCX
ToaOVTOV XCX L
,
TOn xcx'Aon I1£T£Xov 2£aTL.
,
-TL
.
-Ouxonv XCX L
1[~eOS on£p av DLXCX~OV XOLVWVD, XCXT~ ToaonTov y~yv£aeCXL xcx'A~V
\
,
0110AOYOVI1£vov". It is noticeable that we have here not only
the beautiful and justice, which both have corresponding
Forms according to the Symposium and the Republic, but also
that the participation theory is indicated
XOLVWVf)). There is therefore a good linguistic case for
\
accepting Forms in this part of the text. The problem is,
however, that this passage is a somewhat isolated case,
occuring in the context of a discussion of moral
responsibility and there IS not, strictly speaking, an
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undeniable reference to Forms. 9 4
It is only in the· Twelfth Book, at the end of the
dialogue, that Plato gives us the best clues for the
presence of Forms in it. As already noted, this IS the
appropriate place for him to do so. It is here that the
higher education of a part of the citizen body IS discussed.
It is here that the aim of political science, virtue, IS
explicitly and forcefully declared (963a). And it is here
that the metaphysics and the theology of the Laws are bound
together.
The Nocturnal Council is the institution that IS
entrusted with the task of providing the higher intelligence
(962b) needed for the preservation of the laws (96Gb). It is
composed of men who have distinguished themselves in serving
the public interest and are renowned for their virtue
(961a). These men have to understand how the four virtues
are one. And although- dialectic is not formally included in
their studies, it is difficult to imagine what other
Platonic name one should give to this exercize.
The two vital passages which probably offer the solution
to the riddle of Forms in the Laws occur in 965b-d and 966b
and are part of a wider argument that can roughly be
summarized as follows: in order for a city to surv i ve , it
needs a kind of intelligence which will realize the supreme
aim of politics (962b). This aim is virtue (963a), and the
intelligence that will perform this role in Magnesia is the
Nocturnal Council which has "virtue in all its completeness"
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(962d). But to exercize their function, the members of this
Council need first and most of all to be able to understand
how virtue is one in all its manifestations:
" [A] really skilled craftsman
,
(OTlJ1LOVP101)) or
,
guardian (<PVAexXex) in any field must be able not merely to
see the many individual instances of a thing, but also to
win through to a knowledge (ll)(iwexL) of the single central
concept, and when he's understood that, put the various
details (OVI)OPG)I)'Cex) in their proper place in the overall
pic ture" ( 965b). What exac t Ly thi s means we 1earn in the
next sentence: "[s]o what better tool can there be for a
penetrating investigation of a concept than an ability to
,
look beyond (~A£n£LI)) the many dissimilar instances to the
single notion (np~s J1~exl) lo~exl))?" (965c). And 1n 965d Plato
wr i tes tha t "we have to compel the guardians of our di vine
foundation to get an exact idea of the common element in all
, ,
the four virtues (axpL{3G)s lo£tl) npG)'Col) 'CL 1£o'C£ OLo: nexl)'Cwl)
:>
'CexV'COI)
,
'CV1Xexl)£L)-that factor which, though
single (£1) 01)), 1S to be found in courage, restraint,
justice and wisdom ... [on] [t]his element ... we must not
relax our grip until we can explain adequately the essence
('C~ nOLI £OL~V) of what we have to contemplate, whether it
1S (n~<pvx£l)) a single entity (£1)), a composite whole (OAOI)),
or both, or whatever".
Th b i l i t " t i de a" of somethinge all y to acqu1re an exac
entails of course being able to give an account of it. In
the Republic A~lOI) OLO~l)exL xex~ o~~exaeO:L is presented as one
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of the main features of dialectic (531e, 533c, 534b) and In
the Philebus to be able to give an account of a thing IS
equated with knowledge (62a).95 In the Laws itself this point
is emphatically repeated: 'tOVS ~IoV'tws
,
epVAO:XO:S
~£00J1 £VOV s't(i)V VOJ1WV ~Iov'tws 'tnV
0:v't(i)V , XO:~ AOY~ 't£ txo:vo~s £PJ1n v£V£tv £rvo:t"-(966b). We have
here, in the space of two lines,· four words which in their
Platonic use can refer either to a reality beyond the
sensible world (OV'tws twice, or to knowledge and
the ability to g.ive an account of something (£tO~LJo:t, AOYW
,
~ ,
£PJ1nV£v£tv). Taking also into account the passages from the
Republic and the Philebus referred to above, the conclusion
that true knowledge is the aim the members of the Nocturnal
Council will strive for is inescapable. And it is further
strengthened by 968e where Plato explicitly declares that
the members of the Nocturnal Council will be able to leave a
curriculum for their successors only if they possess
~£1tto'tnJ1n of the subjects . 1 d 961nvo ve . Finally, there IS a
passage at 632c, where Plato most explicitly declares that
some of the guardians (presumably the administrators not
included in the Nocturnal Council) will proceed by true
,
opinion, while others will do so by knowledge ("eppovno£ws").
Who can these others be if not the Nocturnal Council? It
seems, then, that the existence in the Laws of a political
body which aims at the acquisition of knowledge is
irrefutable. (Plato, however, is not certain that the
members of this Council will succeed In their aim of
242
acquiring full knowledge and for this reason does not allow
them absolute power. This subject is developed in the next
sect ion) .
Yes, but knowledge of what? Guthrie argues that it can
only be knowl edge of the Forms: "[ f] rom the Meno onwards ,
and especially in Rep. 5, the objects of knowledge have been
Forms ... and those of belief their changing copies in this
world. The distinction was made most emphatically in the
Timaeus (27d-28a), and could scarcely have been retained if
Plato no longer believed in the existence of transcendent
97Forms". This is a good argument, but Guthrie somewhat
weakens it by not allowing for any passage in the Laws to be
considered as conclusively proving the presence of Forms
(with the merely possible exception of 966b).
It appears, however, that Plato does include an express
reference to Forms in the Laws. It is 965b-d that gives us
the clue for this. From 963d onwards Plato argues that the
four virtues are actually one and that the knowledge of this
fact is necessary for the Nocturnal Council in order to
perform its political role. From the Republic and the
Politicus we know that only true knowledge of Forms secures
perfect government. From this point of view it is difficult
to imagine what else this single virtue would be and why its
political role would be so crucial if it was not a Form,
. h t des the sensiblei.e. a transcendent notion t a superse
real i t y , And there are very sol id 1 Lngu i s t ic grounds for
holding that 965c makes a clear reference to Forms.
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The critical expression IS npos "J1~al) i.o~al)
(965c). The word i.o~a is one of the three (the other two
being 1£VOS and £[oos) that Plato uses In general to
identify Forms. Its use here can only be justified by
asserting that it does refer to actual Forms. Otherwise one
would have to explain wha t PIa to means wi th it in this
context t which clearly IS not one where the word is likely
to be used in its common t unphilosophical sense. (We do not
have a discussion of common things t but of the moral
virtues, and it IS stated that these virtues are in fact
98
one) . Moreover, the whole phrase IS practically
interchangeable with the "np~s (1) ,[~A£n£Lv]" (963a), and, as
Cherniss has remarked, this expression in either form runs
through the text from 963a to 965d as "a dominant theme". 99
,
With regard to the use of ~A£n£LI), sight is used in the
middle dialogues as the predominant metaphor designating
one's contemplation of the Forms, notably in the Republic's
Sun simile and in the ascent towards the Form of the
Beautiful in the Symposium 20geff. In the Republic 532c
, ,
Plato talks of the "TTpOS TTlLl LoD apLoLou ll) Lots OVOl [i.e.
,
the Form of the Good] BEaLl" and in the Symposium he uses
I ~ I I I
expressions like "B£wJ1£vw aULo LO xa'Aol)" (211d) and
\
~' ,
"aUTO TO
xa'A~1) [o£(V". In the Republic 596b Plato describes the
relationship of an artisan with the Form which he imitates
in language clearly close to that of the Laws 965c:
,
°TJJ1louP10 S TT pOS T TILl
, )1 "(3AETTGJLl oULW n o i c r . Another
passage which shows Plato making in the middle dialogues a
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point very similar, if not identical, to the one made in
965b-d is Phaedrus 265d, where the "dialectician" (266c) is
said to be the one who was able :J •to" [£ ] L S J.l LQf) T£
:JI
aUf)OpCJf)TQ CXl£ L l) LCX l(OAACXX1}
,
,
8L£CJl(CXPI1£1JCX". Finally, in the
Republic 507b the Form of a thing is ,,~ ~CJLL1J" and in the
.
Laws 965d the guardians have to look for the "LL 1(0L' ~CJ'tL1J"
of the essential unity of virtue. The comparison of such
middle dialogues passages to 965b-d provides us wi th the
final necessary link needed to assert the existence of Forms
in the Laws. All the elements required to support this
thesis fall into place: first, Plato's distinction of
knowledge and opinion, the· former being consistently from
the Phaedo onwards knowledge of Forms. Second, an argument
purporting to show the unity of virtue and to support the
familiar position that knowledge secures infallible
government, i.e. a position practically impossible to argue
for on an empirical basis and therefore strongly suggesting
the metaphysics of other dialogues. Finally, a vocabulary
that includes crucial terms used in the middle dialogues in
connection with Forms. In view of all these Platonic
assumptions, the evidence for the presence of Forms in the
Laws has, I think, to be considered substantial.
At this point one final question remains to be settled.
Could we suppose that in the Laws Forms lose their position
as the highest metaphysical entities to WVX~ or to the gods?
After all, unlike the scarcity of references to the Forms,
there is a whole Book in this work devoted to the proof of
245
the existence of the gods and of the anteriority of the Soul
in comparison to matter. Severe punishments are prescribed
even for socially harmless atheists (908d-e).10d Theology is
included in the subjects that the Nocturnal Council IS
obliged to study with the utmost care (966cff.) and
astronomy is strongly associated with it.
For us, approaching this subject after two millenia In
which Christian theology has been interacting with Western
Philosophy this might appear a difficult problem. In the
framework of Christian theology, where God has created the
world and is unquestionably omnipotent, there IS no space
for entities independent of God acqUIrIng the highest
metaphysical status. God, by definition, stands at the top
of the metaphysical pyramid and to suggest anything
different would be blasphemy.
But Greek religion had none of these characteristics. The
gods had not crea ted· the wor ld and they were by no means
omnipotent.
:0 •AvayxT}
o
(Necessity) and MOLpa (Fate) stood
beyond them and restricted their power; Plato himself
submits on this point to popular opinion (Laws 741a). This
completely un-Christian character of the Greek gods meant
that a philosophy where gods did not occupy the highest
metaphysical position was absolutely possible. In the Laws~
Plato produces exactly such a philosophy.
Brochard has produced six good reasons in order to prove
that the theology of the Laws is not at all incompatible
with its metaphysics. 10l He argues that the popular character
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of the dialogue explains why Plato emphasized more the
theories of a universal Soul and of divine Providence,
theories which would be more familiar to the unphilosophic
reader, instead of the more demanding theory of the Forms.
He remarks that the theory of the universal Soul is espoused
in the Phaedrus (245d) and the theory of Providence in the
Republic (613a), the inference being that since nobody
doubts the existence of Forms in these dialogues, the two
theories are perfectly compatible. He also points out that
the Soul participates in degeneration (Laws 967d) and that
Plato accepts a bad soul (he probably refers to 896e),
whereas he nowhere admits that there could be a bad Form.
(In fact, there IS a single reference in the Republic
suggesting the existence of Forms of bad things (476a), but
Plato never follows up this remark and therefore this
reference remains an isolated case). Brochard also draws
attention to the fact that the Soul is described as in need
of "necessary lessons" (967d). Finally, he adds that there
IS no text.ual evidence whatever for a change in Plato's
metaphysical scheme that would bring the Soul, the gods, or
both, to the position previously occupied by the Forms.
These arguments are decisive. There is no reference
whatever in the Twelfth Book that would justify the
conclusion that the study of theology is more important than
the metaphysical issue of the uni t y of the
. 102
vIrtues and
given the points made by Brochard on the inferiority of the
Soul in comparison to the Forms it seems quite likely that
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the opposite might be the case. In the Phaedrus 247d we read
that god contemplates the Forms and returns to them after
being separated from them. This passage leaves little doubt
that the god is not omnipotent and has no control over the
Forms. In the Laws ~96d Soul is accepted to be the cause of
bad as well as of good things. At 897b it is stressed that
the Soul needs "intelligence" (V01)s) to guide everything to
"£VO<XI,POVL<X" , but it can also "all[y] itself with unreason
and produce the opposite results".
On the other. hand, Plato IS anxious to present the
priority of the Soul as a response to the materialists of
his time (889b-e and 891b-c) Ln : order to defend idealism.
Although, by making the Soul the cause of all things, Plato
has to admi tit can be the cause of bad as well as good
things (896d), the emphasis in the text from 897b onwards
lies significantly on the beneficial work of the Soul,
rather than on the "bad" Soul, which is hardly mentioned as
anything more than a possibility. We are entitled then to
say that the cosmic and the moral role of the Soul to which
Plato pays most attention is a positive one. The gods, for
their part, also take care of the universe and of men
(905dff. ) and they promote morality (e. g. 906c-d) . From a
moral point of view, then, both Soul and gods are in the
same camp with the Forms. The role of theology in the
curriculum of the Nocturnal Council can therefore be
considered supplementary to that of the study of the Forms
and, in any case, the two are not contradictory.
248
The final conclusion has to be, then, that neither gods
nor Soul, itself a god (899a), qualify for a metaphysical
stance higher than the Forms, although they can playa role
supportive of them. Their study, as prescribed in the
Twelfth Book of the Laws, is definitely no more important
than the study of the Forms. The latter, as argued, do exist
in the Laws and they remain the guiding principle of Plato's
metaphysics to the very end.
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V THE ROLE OF THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL IN THE LAWS
With the question of the Forms l'n the Laws settled, we
can now proceed to an examination of the political role of
the Nocturnal Council. At first sight, it might appear that
the Council represents a collective version of the
,
~aaLA£ts-~LAoao~oL of the Republic and the ~aaLALx~s &VDP of
the Politicus. As already argued, the text from 962b to 966a
leaves little doubt that the object of the Counsil will be
to acquire as
,
opposed to ool;a, the distinction
being clearly marked at 632c. This )£1CLaTTJIlTJ will be
knowledge of the Il~a Lo£a that makes the four virtues one.
From this point of view, and provided one takes the Council
to exercize political authority in a disguised but efficient
manner, the Laws might appear to end with a political
message identical to that of the Republic: political power
should be
knowledge.
entrusted to the people with metaphysical
d h i . . 103A number of scholars have adopte t 1S 1nterpretat1on.
So Klosko, even though he does not fully accept the analogy,
admits that "it seems at least possible that the nocturnal
council is meant to playa role in the state similar to that
of the Guardians in the Republic" .104 Guthrie takes the
Council to be "in fact philosophers, analogous to the
b l i " 105 S dGuardians or philosopher-kings of the Repu lC. aun ers
insists that "[t]he Guardians of the Republic were the
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supreme guiding authority of the state, the embodiment of
full wisdom. The Nocturnal Council IS intended to control
Magnesia over and above the ordinary magistrates and
deliberative bodies (964+); the studies it will pursue are
at least similar to those pursued by the guardians (965+)".106
Finally Barker writes that "[t]he end of the Laws is thus a
return to the doctrines of the Republic ... Once more Plato
turns to the rule of "genuine free mind", lof which in
earlier books he had almost despaired, and for which he had
sought to substitute the rule of law: once more he turns to
the ideal of unity In place of that of compromise and
mixture; once more he turns to a scheme of philosophic
training, and, with it, to the sovereignty of
philosopher-kings. The nocturnal council is the "perfect
guardians" of the Republic, turned collegiate and set to
system of
fitted".107
aexplained,neverarethatwaysIn
political machinery into which they are never
Barker's statement is quite useful because not only does it
give some of the maIn reasons for taking the Nocturnal
Council to be the Guardians of the Republic revamped, but it
also clearly gives away the inability of this interpretation
to explain much of what happens in the Laws. In order to
control,
support this argument Barker IS obliged to accuse Plato
(somewhat covertly but still quite clearly) of one gross
defaul t: that he is unable effectively to incorporate the
Nocturnal Council In the political system of the Laws or
even to explain the position In which it stands in
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relationship to this system.
There are definitely serious problems arising if one
takes the Laws as ending with a note practically
indistinguishable from what was said In the Republic. The
first is that, in this case, almost the whole of the former
dialogue appears to be purposeless. From the Third Book
onwards, Plato takes great pains to create a political and
legislative system that does not depend on any metaphysical
justification, bu-t is deeply rooted in historical
experience. In - the central Books, the administrative
apparatus of Magnesia is described in minute detail without
the slightest attempt at a metaphysical justification of
this system. Legislative issues are discussed almost to the
end (they occupy even the first half of the Twelfth Book and
they are given up only in order for the role of the
Nocturnal Council to be discussed). Again, Plato's guiding
principle in this most detailed exposition is not
metaphysics but common Greek . 108experIence. Is it then
possible that after such a painstaking exposition covering
practically eleven and a half Books the philosopher would in
the few closing pages of the Laws, simply return to the
ideal of the Republic in its full force? This would mean in
practice that all the strenuous effort of composing most of
the dialogue had been pointless. For what would be the aim
of fleshing out a detailed political and legislative scheme
if in the end Plato simply returns to the philosopher-
k i ? 109Ings.
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There are strong reasons suggesting that Plato never
really intended the Nocturnal Council to be something
similar to the ideal philosopher-rulers of the Republic and
furthermore that by the time he composed the Laws. and maybe
even as early as the PoliticuS. 1 1 0 he had given up hope that
scientific rulers could appear. As we have seen. r n the
former dialogue Plato three times emphasizes that human
nature precludes the possibility of a ruler staying
incorruptible when he acquires absolute power (691c: "eVTJ"Cf}s
I , I' I(mortal) lIJvXr,s <1>voI,s"; 713c: "aVepWll£l,a <PUOI,S"; 87Sb: "eVTJ"CTJ
,
<1>VOI,S"). In the .f i r s t two cases Plato is quite unequivocal
in his statements: he insists that unrestricted power (691c:
"&vvn£~evvos"; 713c: "av"Coxp~"Cwp") always brings about V~pI,S
and &<Sl,x~a. In the third case (87Sb-d) he declares that an
incorruptible ruler should be above the law. but he
immediately proceeds to declare with particular emphasis
:11 (" 2s:: 2s:: ~'\'\' TJ21that such apxov"C£s do not appear ovua~on ovua~Qs, ~hh
,
xa"Ca ~paxvlt-87Sd: the particular force of the double
negation definit.ely nullifies the possibility of an
,
exception implied in xa"Ca (3paxv. In Vlastos' opinion the
latter expression means only that. the possible exceptions
111
are "too slight t.o be wort.h talking about").
These stat.ements flatly contradict the spirit of the
Republ i c where uncontrollable power is unhesitatingly
bestowed on t.he philosopher-kings. If the political ideal of
the Republic was restated i n the Laws with the Nocturnal
Counc i 1 a s s um i ng t.he rol e of the phi losopher-kings. PIa t 0
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would be guilty of an undoubted contradiction. The force of
the language he uses in the three passages referred to above
leaves absolutely no room for a compromise between these
passages and an interpretation of the political part of the
Nocturnal Council that would make it the corresponding
feature of the rulers of the Republic. There are therefore
two alternatives at this point: either we accept the
identification of the political roles of the Nocturnal
Council and the philosopher-kings, 1n which case Plato
undoubtedly and straightforwardly contradicts himself 1n the
Laws, or we reject the notion that the Nocturnal Council was
ever intended to be the collective absolute ruler of
Magnesia.
The real test case for either of these two alternatives
1S the relationship of the Nocturnal Council to the law. One
of the pivotal political exhortations of the Politicus was
that in the absence of scientific apxovT£S the law must
always be obeyed. The same point, as we have seen, 1S made
again in the Laws at 875d. Consequently, if the Nocturnal
Council was designed to assume absolute power in Magnesia it
should accordingly be placed above the law. But not only, as
Morrow justifiably remarks, is there no "evidence that Plato
intends to give it [the Nocturnal Council] power to override
the law", 112 but one of the main (and indeed the basic
~ractical) aim of the Council is the discussion of the laws
("rr;£p~ v~l1wv", "T~ rr;£p~ V~110VS") of their own and of foreign
countries (952a) In order to instil the results of this
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inquiry into the legislative apparatus of Magnesia
(962bff. ). This meticulous study of particular V~t10L would
be completely out of place if the Council was supposed to be
positioned above the law and it stands In sharp contrast
with the spirit of the Republic. In the latter dialogue such
issues are dismissed as trivialities unworthy ("aux al;LOv")
of in tens i ve study by good men ("av8p~a L XCXAOt s xaycxeo t s" )
who will easily work them out for themselves ("pcx8~ws TrOV
\
£DpDaovaLv"-425d-e).
It IS true that the Nocturnal Council is characterized by
Plato as the "head" and the "intelligence" (voD-969b) of the
state and that this expression has been taken by at least
one commentator as indicating an omnipotent political role
for I, t . 113 But th th te way a the philosopher specifies the
sense In which the Council is the "intelligence" of the
state points exactly to the opposite conclusion. In 962b
Plato says that the Council will perform its guiding role if
it comprehends the aim of all legislation (which turns out
to be virtue in 963a), the means to be employed for this alffi
to be achieved and which laws, first, and which men, next
("Tt:J!J
;)
!J 0 j.J(jJ !J aUT C; !J 7T pC;T O!J , will give the
best advice in this direction. What is stated here is not
that the Council does not need laws or is in any way beyond
them, but, on the contrary, that its real role is to select
the best possible laws. Crucially, laws are to be chosen
before men, clearly because the laws are more important than
individuals, no matter how intelligent or virtuous the
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latter may be. The conclusion then can only be that the
Nocturnal Council is to abide by the laws of the state
these have been created, and that it is there to serve as a
consultative legislature and not an uncontrolled
executive capacity like the rulers of the Republic.
Not only is the Council not placed above the laws, but it
cannot even change them without wide consent. There IS one
single case in the Laws where Plato discusses explicitly
the procedure for changing a law; it occurs in 772c-d, long
before the introduction of the Nocturnal Council. Here Plato
insists that a particular law should be altered only if "all
114the officials, the entire citizen body and all the oracles"
agree. Significantly, if one single party does not accept
the new proposal, the amendment to the law is abandoned. If
we compare the procedure set up here with the absence of any
explicit reference, on Plato's part, to the way that the
Nocturnal Council might initiate, let alone dictate, changes
in the laws, the natural conclusion seems to be that the
Council is not given a free hand on this issue and that it
has to operate through the existing administrative machinery
of the state. This conclusion is confirmed by two cases
mentioned in the text: if a convicted atheist is entrusted
to th h t t i f the Counc i I but after his release- e ex or a Ion 0
offends again, he is not punished by the Council but he goes
on trial (909a-c); and if a visitor to a foreign country has
been corrupted he is allowed by the Council to live as an
LOL~LDS; if he does get involved in common affairs, though,
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he is to be tried by the courts of Magnesia. In this case
the Councilor at least some members of it act as
prosecution (952c-d). So, on two occasions directly
involving the Nocturnal Council, Plato positively refuses to
allow it. dictatorial powers, but insists that the final
decision should come from the ordinary courts of the state.
Far from being an unchallengable political authority, then,
the Council has to restrict itself to an (undoubtedly
influential) advisory role. Otherwise, one has to admit that
both the passage r n 772c-d about the revision of laws and
those r n 909a-c and 952c-d proving the subjection of the
Nocturnal Council to the laws of Magnesia become pointless
and that another insoluble contradiction is included in the
La w.s .
The fact that the No c t u r naI Council has to work within
the limitations of the law, rather than being positioned
beyond it, is a decisive argument against the thesis that it
represents an equivalent to the philosoJer-kings. It is not
simply that, to use StaIley's formulation, "with the
introduction of the scrutineers and the nocturnal council,
the top of the political pyramid becomes dangerously
115 I I PI t 'overcrowded". It is also that it is comp ete y un a on i c
to expect a clearly large body like the Council to possess
the political expertise that Plato has always insisted is
116 f h b h i fextremely rare. There are two accounts 0 t e mem ers 1P 0
the Council in the Laws (951e and 961a) and they are not
entirely consistent. On either account, however, the number
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of the members is too high to allow the suggestion that all
of them could be philosopher-kings In the style of the
Republic. Klosko calculates that "membership IS in the range
. 117
of one hundred, a h i gh f i gu r e !". Even if we suppose that
the junior membe r s, -included In the Nocturnal Council to
provide it with the "senses" (964e) which are as crucial as
vons for the salvation of the city_118 are not "full" members
(Plato never quite clarifies this issue), we are still left
with a large number of members of the Council. Moreover, the
,
ten senior VO~Q$vAax£s are included In the Nocturnal
Councii; but these are initially chosen by the Cnossians and
the colonisers, neither of whom seem to have much
qualification for identifying philosophers, in view of the
notoriety of the lack of higher education among the
Dorians. 119 Cleinias, whose ignorance of philosophical issues
IS, as we have seen, repeatedly exposed during the dialogue,
is to be one of the law-guardians (753a). So Strauss has
good grounds to remark that "men of Kleinias' kind will form
no insignificant part of it [the Nocturnal Council]".12o But
Cleinias is not the obvious candidate for the part of a
philosopher-king either alone or as member of a wider body.
Furthermore, the higher state honours in life and in
death are attributed not to the Nocturnal Council but to the
scrutineers (946e ff.). 121 This feature of the Laws is not
simply at odds with the position that the Nocturnal Council
is to be the equivalent of the philosopher-kings, but even
undermines the assumed superiority of the Nocturnal Council
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to all the other institutions of the state.
Finally J one more consideration can be brought against
the position that the Nocturnal Council is to be composed of
philosophers. At the very end of the dialogue Megillus urges
Cleinias to join him in employing whatever means necessary
to make the Athenian participate in the foundation of the
new city and the two promise to help each other in this
task. The At hc n i an , howe ve r , i.e. Plato h i mse I f , does not
answer. It is diff icul t to see why he would hold such a
meaningful silence had he been completely satisfied with
everything said so far in the dialogue or had he conceived
Magnesia to be a state ruled by philosophers in the manner
of the Republic. The reason Plato refuses to commit himself
unconditionally to the Magnesian experiment is that despite
its meticulous planning it still falls short of his
I · . I' d I 122 H h PIt . d t . tpo ItIca I ea. ere we ave a 0 USIng rama IC means 0
make a philosophical point J and this is even more important
sInce the Laws is arguably one of his poorest dialogues in
f d . I . 123terms 0 ramatIc qua Ity.
The one passage which gives rise to the assumption that
the Nocturnal Council is intended to represent the
personification of the philosopher-kings occurs in the very
last page of the dialogue: "£~v ,,/£ I1DV ofrr o s nl1 t v 0 e£tos
1£VllTCXL
,
aVAAo,,/oSJ
,
ncxpcxooT£OV
,
TOVTW TnV nOA LV" J
,
Plato
writes in 969b. Here the philosopher comes closer than
anywhereel s e In the LawS J 0 I' so at 1e as tit a Ppea r s , to
bestowing upon the Council the unlimited powers of the
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Republic's rulers. However, to hang an interpretation of the
whole dialogue on this one phrase 1 2 4 IS extremely precarious.
First of all, the phrase itself IS far from unamb.iguous;
, .
napaooT£ov TOVT~ TDV nOALV could mean either that the
Council is to be entrusted with the highest political power
in the state, or that its wisdom should be acknowledged by
the other organs of Magnesia so that they take seriously its
advice. The difference between these two versions is, from a
pol i ticalp0 in t 0 f view, 1 mmens e . I nthe fir s teaseth e
Council is to be the highest, though unofficial, executive
organ in the state. In the second, Plato simply encourages
the holders of constitutional power to pay serious attention
to its recommendations. The text itself does not contain
anything that makes either interpretation more likely. But,
for the reasons suggested so far in this section, the second
alternative IS by far the most plausible. Moreover, Plato's
abandonment of the ideal of the incorruptible ruler clearly
makes the first interpretation of 969b untenable.
Consequently, far from proving Plato's intention to give
full power to the Nocturnal Council, the expression
, "
napaooT£ov TOVTW TDV nOALV is perfectly compatible with the
\
suggestion that the Council is to play an advisory role in
Magnesia.
Furthermore, Plato here uses a hypothesis, indicating
that he is not confident how easy it will be to set up a
body with the superior knowledge required from the members
of the Nocturnal Council. A close examination of the passage
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in question reveals that, far from saying that the Nocturnal
Council should be entrusted with the highest political power
in the city, Plato seriously doubts whether it can appear at
all. Plato employs here a hypothetical form signifying that
something might occasionally happen at present or in the
,
future (£a/)
,
),£/)Tl1:ar.), whereas, had he wanted to place
emphasis on the fact that the city is indeed to be entrusted
to the Council he could have used a stronger hypothetical
,
type (£l .•• £1£/)£1:0), indicating that the emergence of the
Council is something very probable. Plato's choice not only
to use a hypothesis (whereas he could of course plainly
state that the city should be entrusted to the Council
unconditionally), but moreover to select a hypothetical form
suggesting something that is possible though by no means
very probable, indicates his doubts over the possibility of
h b d b . d all. 125 11suc a 0 y elng create at Actua y, every measure
has been taken, before the appearance of the Council on the
s c ene , for the cor r e c t go ve r nmen t 0 f Magne s i a . A comp I e t e
administrative apparatus is in place by the middle of Book
Twelve, which can guarantee the welfare of the state. This
explains why Magnesia would be able to survive even if, for
some reason, most probably due to lack of the high
intelligence required from its members, the Nocturnal
Council does not appear or is unable to perform its function
properly. Therefore Magnesia, unlike the state of the
Republic, does not ultimately depend on philosophical
intelligence for its survival.
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So far we have argued about what the Nocturnal Council is
not. What now remains is to clarify what it IS, r v e . to
specify the political role it is intended to play In
Magnesia. There are two passages which provide the key to
the answer to this question. The first one occurs In
951e-952a and we have already referred to it. Plato explains
there that the meetings of the Nocturnal Council will have
as their object the laws, a point underlined by the fact
,
that the word vOMOL is used twice. ~he second one is placed,
importantly, in the introductory remarks before the last
pages of the work which Plato devotes to the examination of
the Nocturnal Council. Here Plato states that what is still
missing from the laws is a way In which they could be
rendered irreversible' ("&M£1:~a1:p04>oV"-960d). This will be
provided by the Nocturnal Council, who, inquiring into the
"real nature" of the laws (966b) will, hopefully, be able
both to intellectually grasp this nature and to apply the
results of their studies to practice.
But in order to be able to grasp the nature of the laws,
the members of the Council must be able to recognize the aim
of the political art, i.e. virtue (963a), and the means by
which this aim can be attained (962b). It is here that the
essential link between politics and metaphysics occurs in
the Laws. The real grasping of virtue, which as we have seen
IS one but manifests itself in different forms (in the
f h d) b Ln the f i na l pages ofcommon sense ate war , ecomes,
the Laws, the prerequisite for a deeper understanding of
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what legislation and politics are about and how the best
result can be achieved in both.
One can now see why Plato expects the Nocturnal Council
to play a central part 1n the political and constitutional
life of Magnesia. It is designed with the purpose of
providing the superior wisdom required to remedy for what he
conceives as a vital deficiency r n written law, i v e . its
inability to cover particular instances. Already In the
Politicus the philosopher had laid his finger on this
serious defect of the law (294aff.). The Nocturnal Council
will be able, provided it apprehends not only the letter but
also the spirit of the law, to make sure that the law takes
the right form and is applied correctly in individual cases.
Furthermore, Plato recognizes that no law can last for ever,
and in a long metaphor from 769a onwards he explains how the
laws are like the work of a painter that might be damaged by
time or need improvement in details. What the painter needs
is an equally skillful successor who will take care of his
work after his death. It follows that if the successor is
not good enough, or if nobody takes care of the painting,
the latter will fade away. The same, says Plato, is true of
the legislator. He also needs talented successors if his
work is to be preserved. The Nocturnal Council, then, is the
successor of the Athenian Stranger in Magnesia. It possesses
the wisdom that will correct the "inescapable" errors of the
legislator (769d) and will guarantee that the laws remain as
good as possible.
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The crucial Issue, though, from a political point of
view, is whether the Council will perform this function by
having absolute power, or by employing the constitutional
channels already existing in the state. As we have argued,
the latter is definitely the case. The Nocturnal Council
will restrict itself to an advisory role. Since most of its
members hold very high official posts, it is clear that they
will have ample opportunity to put the Council's wisdom into
practice. Perhaps -th i s IS the reason that the philosopher
does not feel. the need to prescribe a specific
constitutional role for the Council. Moreover, Plato nowhere
suggests that a difference of opinion might occur between
the 0 the r a dm i n i s t rat 0 r sand the Counc i 1. Sh0 u1d , howe ve r ,
this ever happen, it is clear that the Nocturnal Council is
not armed with the means dictatorically to enforce its
position on the rest of the citizens. As indicated by the
passages in 772c-d, 909a and 952c-d, the opposite is
probably true.
The Nocturnal Council operates then on what could be
called a meta-political level. Its maIn function is to
clarify legal questions that the original legislator did not
tackle and to offer its insight when changes in the law are
deemed necessary or desirable. To the extent that it
possesses philosophical knowledge, its aIm is to instil the
results of this knowledge into the legal system of the
state.
The underlying principles that run through the
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institution of the Nocturnal Council are identifiably
Socratic. So, in 961dff. Plato compares the legislator and
the politician to the captain, the doctor and the general,
the inference being that each one of them should positively
know the aim of his art, if he IS to perform his duties
efficiently. This is indeed the old Socratic argument that
politics is a specified T:£XVT/. In the Protagoras and the
Poli ticus this argument became a basic element of Plato's
attack on democracy. In the Laws, too, the introduction of
this Socratic spirit at the end of the dialogue carries
some of its anti~democratic overtones with it. Whatever its
actual powers, the Nocturnal Council can claim that, by
being the only institution In the state to aim at
metaphysical knowledge, it functions on a different level
from the rest of Magnesia's constitutional authorities. But
this time the authoritarian tendencies inherent in this
argument. are proper Ly checked. PIa to 1 snow di sill us ioned
about the possibility of actual philosophers coming to rule
states. There is a clear tension in the last pages of the
dialogue between his desire for a philosophical authority
with knowledge of the Forms to which the state could be
entrusted and his realization that absolutism cannot be the
answer to the riddle of Greek politics, since incorruptible
government is beyond human limitations. So, on the one hand
he often uses language that indicates that the constitution
of the Nocturnal Council is a fait accompli (961aff.,
964eff) and that this Council might have metaphysical
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knowledge (962b, 965b). But, on the other, he realizes the
exceptional difficulty of a full apprehension of the Forms;
so he refuses to specify the studies of the Council (968d-e)
and he suggests, by the hypothetical form he uses in 969b,
that the appearance of a Nocturnal Council worthy of its
task cannot be taken for granted.
In the end, it is the historical principle and the rule
of law tha t prevai lover the "Socra tic" ar gumenta t ion and
the rule of the philosophers as such. There is little doubt
that by creating and emphasizing the importance of an organ
like the Nocturnal Council on top of a political
construction informed by experIence, Plato strives to
achieve a high synthesis of the two. To a large extent, this
attempt is successful. Provided that the Nocturnal Council
operates within constitutional limits, it can undoubtedly
integrate with the existing political apparatus of the state
and provide it with much required wisdom. But Plato cannot
avoid al together the di lemma of choos i ng between the two.
Either the Nocturnal Council has to be entrusted with
absolute power on the basis of its provisional metaphysical
knowledge, or the rule of law and a legislative construction
based on historical grounds are to prevail. By choosing the
latter alternative, by not sacrificing his "mixed
constitution" right at the end, Plato permits his final
political legacy to be one of moderation.
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VI 808A IN THE LAWS
One of the features of the Laws which is decisively
connected with its political outlook is the role that o~€a
:J ' ,
plays in it. Correct opinion (aAT]eT]S oo~a) is presented time
and again as an extremely useful guide for practical action
and even as an acceptable alternative to knowledge.
For example, in an important passage in the First Book
,
(632c), Plato declares that some of the ~vAax£s will proceed
, ,
"oLa ~povT1a£ws" and others " 0 L ' aAT1eODS OO~T1S". In 645e
, ,
"oo~aL II are grouped with "~POVT10£LS". In 688b the greatest
virtue (lithe first In the list")126 is said to consist of
I 1 I I I
"epPOVT10LS xo t uon s xo t oo~a". In 653a "epPOVT10LS xo t aAT1B£ts
o~~aL f3~f3aLoLII pave the way to virtue. In 689a "allaB~a" is
" ,
explicitly declared to be the opposite of "xa'ta AO)'OV oo€a".
In 689b, In one of the strongest acknowledgements of
opinion's usefulness,
,
:JPlato groups oo~a with £1tLO'tf)ll a L and
,
AOyOS. In 770d opinion is something that helps in the
acquisition of virtue. In 864a Plato writes that "[r,] r oo
.
apLo'tov oo~atl should dominate in the soul of a man. Finally,
in the Tenth Book, Plato declares that opinion belongs to
the properties of the soul and as such is (both temporally
,
and metaphysically) prior to VAT] and OWllaTa (892b, 896c).
In the 1 ight of these passages it becomes obvious that
o~~a constitutes a substantial part of the intellectual
qualities expected both from the citizen-body of Magnesia as
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a whole and from its administrators; given that, unlike the
Republic, no barriers exist to exclude any particular class
from administrative duties and from the share in political
power that these duties entail, it is apparent that Plato
, ,
expects cx'Allells to be not a prerogative of a single
class, but a property of the virtuous citizen as such. In
putting forward a conception of opinion which emphasizes the
o
decisively positive role 8o~cx can play in correct political
decision-making, Plato in fact follows through a remark made
in the Politicus. In the latter dialogue
o
oo~a IS
I
described as a "Oc t o s Se o uo s " (309c) which alone can bring
together the conflicting elements In the soul of the
individual (310a).
One critical question IS whether this elevated position
of doxa invalidates the epistemology of the middle
dialogues. In the Republic Plato underlined the substantial
difference between episteme and doxa and asserted that only
the former can legitimize political authority, an assertion
inextricably linked with the authoritarianism of the work.
But, on the other hand, he did not deny that opinion could
have any positive value. Doxa served as the epistemological
basis of the political virtue of the Auxiliaries, and,
o
moreover, as a preparatory stage to knowledge: £ntOrnJ1n and
.
oo~cx, their immense difference notwithstanding, were not
distinct faculties but parts of the same cognitive process.
This continuity between the two is the crucial factor that
allows Plato to attribute a higher status to 8o~a in the
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Laws without formally contradicting the epistemology of the
Republic. Such a contradiction would only exist either if
Plato had asserted in the Republic that episteme and doxa
are distinct cognitive capacities, or if he had denied the
superiority of knowledge to opinion in the Laws. As argued
in chapter 1, section 8, the former position IS untenable
and, as we will now proceed to see, there IS no real
evidence that Plato disqualifies ~£1lLaTDPTl from being
,
superior to 8o~a In the Laws.
In two or three of the passages of the Laws mentioned
above Plato comes close to treating opinion as something of
equal value with knowledge: The first is 653a where ~pOvTlaLS
, ,
is linked with oo~aL &ATlB£ts f3£f3aLoL. In 688b the most
,
important virtue is said to consist of "<ppovT/aLs xo t
VOnS xce t
,
oo~a u e:t:' :JI£pWTOS T£ xaL
:J '£1lLBVIlLas TOVTOLS
£1l01l~VDS". It IS clear that doxa is here grouped with
phronesis and nous as one of the powers which control
"desires and appetites", and therefore opinion belongs to
those intellectual properties which are crucial for virtuous
moral behaviour (see also 770d). The fact that in both cases
,
phronesis and doxa are connected by the conjuction xaL means
they are syntactically equivalent and the same syntactical
structure occurs in a second passage on the next Stephanus
page (689b) where
t
oo~aL are connected wi th and
,
AOyoL, this time by the conjuction
:JID. This syntactical
structure seems to suggest that opinion is here regarded as
equivalent to knowledge. Does this entail an abandonment of
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the epistemological dogmas of the middle dialogues?
The answer is no. First of alIt the fact that we have an
enumeration of intellectual properties that contribute to
virtue does not necessarily entail that they are all of the
same v a l ue , although it could point in such a direction.
Syntactical equivalence does not necessarily mean equality
of value. An indication, albeit slight, that doxa might not
be the most prominent member of any of the groups referred
to above is given -by the fact that it IS always mentioned
,
after <PpOVT}O'LS ~ Whator £TCLO'1:11J1aL. IS more revealing t
however, is the context in which the last two (and probably
the most crucial) of those passages occur. They appear in
roughly the middle of the Third Book, the most explicitly
his tor i c a I Boo k 0 f the Laws . T11 e i r i mm e d i ate con t ext i s
Plato's attempt to explain the decline of the powerful
Peloponnesian Federation. It is obvious why Plato would try
to be as practical as possible In this context; given that
the Laws i s t as a whole t a work composed for the
unphilosophical public, and also given that this is a point
in the work where Plato needs to be particularly practically
,
minded t it is understandable that oo~a should be placed next
to £TCLO'LDJ1T} without any reference to their difference .
.
One passage which indicates the imperfection of oo~a is
864a. Plato there declares that it IS important for one's
, ,
one'sthe :J oo~a dominating inmoral character to have CXPLO'LOV
,
Opinion t then t issoul t but he adds "xav O'<paAAT}1:aL 1:L".
important for practical purposes, but it might be slightly
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off the mark: as the use of :Itxav
, ,
O<t>aAAT}TaL TL indicates, it
is by no means infallible. In the Republic Plato stated that
.
£nLOTT}~T} is infallible (477e). There is no similar statement
in the Laws, but this could perhaps be explained by the
practical orientation of the work. In any case, this passage
provides an indication, however slight, that doxa might not
be the highest cognitive capacity which exists, though it
may well be the highest capacity expected by ordinary
cit i zens ( PIa to' s r e 1uetanee topr esc r i be a curl' i cu l urn for
the Nocturnal Council and to bestow on it unconditional
power clear Ly s uppo r t th is reading).
A better case for the supremacy of knowledge can be made
on the basis of 632c, where it is declared that some of the
, ,
a dm i n i s t r a tors will pro c e e d <5 L a <t> pov TJ 0 £ WSandothe r SOL '
aATJBons o~l;TJs. This entails that the possession of a'ATJBDS
ool;a can be considered sufficient qualification for holding
, ~'
office, but the distinction between </>POVTJOLS and a'ATJBTJs ool;a
clearly holds in this passage: there 1S little doubt that
the officials operating with the help of phronesis (provided
such officials can be found) will be better ones, because
otherwise there would be no point in Plato making this
remark. So, in this text, true opinion 1S accepted as an
alternative to knowledge but it is also made clear that it
is no equivalent to it.
In conclusion, although Plato does not explicitly state
,
his adherence to the supremacy of £nLoTTJ~TJ over ool;a in the
Laws, there is no evidence that he has abandoned it either;
271
and, as can be inferred from 632c, an epistemological
distinction along these lines is probably at work in the
dialogue. Therefore the new, ,elevated position of 8o~a can
be accepted as not formally contradicting the epistemology
of the Republic. Nevertheless, it defini tely leads in a
different political direction. Whereas In the Republic
almost all the emphasis was placed on the difference between
knowledge and opinion, this difference becomes in the Laws
d . t a i It· . bl 127very narrow an In cer aln cases amos Imperceptl e.
This interpretation squares well with some central
features of the Laws. In this work Plato reinstates, albeit
in somewhat ambiguous terms, the theory of the Forms, but
gives up the demand for philosopher-kings. He insists that
,
XOLVOXLD~oavvD is the best arrangement for a state (739a-e),
but he goes into great detail in outlining a society where
the criterion for. political classification IS movable
property. In other words, Plato indicates that he still
considers the political arrangements of the Republic (and
their underlying metaphysical basis), as the best in
absolute terms, but he does not prescribe them for Magnesia
because this city is composed of ordinary human beings. The
rationale behind this strategy becomes clear when we take
into account the Politicus. There Plato dedicates a
considerable extent of the dialogue to emphasizing the
importance of a knowledgeable philosopher-ruler, only to
concede in the last few pages that such an ideal is probably
unattainable and that, given that this is the case, the best
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has to be made of the purely human potential available in a
state. It is the same philosophical movement away from the
ideal towards the practical that determines the higher
status of :I 'OpeTJ in the Laws. Without abandoning the
doctrine of the supremacy of £nLaTDPTJ Plato accepts that, in
the absence of "d i v i ne " Lde a l 1 h hru ers w 0 possess suc
knowledge, opinion is a perfectly legitimate guide for moral
and political action. This explains the large number of
passages in the Laws where the usefulness of doxa 1S
underlined. Since no "divine" human rulers are at hand to
take control of the state by virtue of their knowledge, the
lawgiver has to accept ordinary citizens, relying on their
,
8ol;cxL, as the administrators of the state. In this sense,
opinion does replace full metaphysical knowledge as the
primary intellectual quality at work r n the Laws, a fact
which 1S 1n accord with the principle that practical
historical experience and not metaphysics should be the
basis of a humanly created and governed state.
It is for this reason that Plato stresses the importance
,
of VOlloB£TTJPcxTcx which £nL£Lx£ts av8p£s (based of course on
their opinions) in other cities may have created and asks
from the lawgiver to put them to the test of experience
(957a-b). He does not only permit, but actually encourages
his citizens to travel abroad and study the laws of other
cities because "[w]ithout this observation and research a
state will never stay at the peak of perfection" (951c),
Magnesia 1S, then, unlike Callipolis, to inquire into the
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(opinion-based) wisdom of other cities and, moreover, such
interaction IS deemed necessary for constitutional
f t . 128per ec Ion. So, In the final analysis, opeD o~~a plays In
the Laws a political role which was unequivocally denied to
it in the Republic. It becomes the main qualification
required for holding political power.
As far as the purported change in Plato's attitude
towards democracy is concerned, this undoubtedly constitutes
a vital step: in the Laws Plato is ready to recognize that
the intellectual capacities of the average citizen can be
enough for a reasonably, if not perfectly, well governed
state. His or her intellectual facul ties not only do not
preclude him or her from political participation but are
emphatically acknowledged as entitling him or her to it.
Furthermore, nowhere in his discussion of the intellectual
capacities of the citizens or the education connected with
them does Plato make the slightest distinction among members
of the four classes. It becomes obvious, then, that although
he does not regard all citizens as equally gifted in their
intellectual capacities, he does not distinguish among them
in terms of class. This fact is, from a political point of
view, decisive: it testifies how the elevated position of
o~~a, to the extent that it is a substitute for the
unattainable and the confirmation of historical
experience as a guide for political action, Le d Plato to
moderate
Republic.
the extreme anti-democratic
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attitude of the
The elevation of doxa to a position where it acts, in
practice if not in theory, as a substitute for the episteme
of the Republic means that In his last dialogue Plato
demonstrates an increased acceptance of the moral and
political capacities
aADBDs o~€a of the
of the
latter
average
were
citizen. But
the resul t
if
of
the
pure
indoctrination, if Plato denied individual choice In the
Laws, then his concessions to the ordinary citizen would be
significantly qualified, if not actually made pointless. In
this case, would not be the result of the
citizens' rational capacities but of the state's
brainwashing and educational authoritarianism. As we will
now see, despite the fact that there IS a strong
authoritarian element in the Laws, Plato does not deny
individual moral choice and for this reason his concessions
to the common citizen are not rendered insignificant.
Plato's educational proposals in the Laws have often been
criticized, and with considerable justification, as leaving
very little space for individual choice and therefore as
being authoritarian. So Klosko writes that "[t]hroughout
their early years children are watched closely; no aspect of
their lives should be left unsupervised; no subject is too
insignificant for the state's attention. Education is, thus,
all-pervasive,,;129 and he adds that "[t]he end result of
Plato's prescriptions is an all-embracing public opinion,
, 1 . ,,130 S t 11 yintruding into every aspect of people s r ve s: . a e
remarks that the city of the Laws "severely limits personal
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freedom and initiative" and supports this claim by
referring, among other things, to the "rigid control of
. d th h ,,131 hmu s i c an e at er arts t e educational importance of
which is taken for granted by Plato. The main exponent of
this view is . Popper. Although for his charge of
authoritarianism against Plato he relies mostly on the
Republic, Popper quotes freely from the Laws in support of
h i 1" 132IS calms.
Plato's starting point In his educational policies 1S
that young children have great plastici t y , and therefore
early education is crucial. The children should get used to
a balance between pleasure and pain (792c-d), which will be
extremely useful in later life since nobody can avoid pain.
Plato considers this point so important that he suggests
that pregnant women ought to be supervised in order to be
made sure they have the appropriate psychological condition
during their pregnancy (792e). Proposals like the
supervision of pregnant women, the minute detail in which
the education of young children is prescribed in Book Seven,
the prohibition of innovation in their games (797aff.) and
measures like the permission given to all citizens to punish
children and tutors alike if they misbehave, with danger of
being punished themselves if they ignore this duty
(808e-809a), leave little doubt that Plato's educational
ideal does not include anything like the free individual
development of the children into adults with a powerful and
t i "to 1 i r i t Ce ns o r s h i p in the arts is alsoac lve crllca splrl ..
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envisaged: poets are not to teach children whatever they
like (656c). The love of innovation in poetry is rejected as
morally destructive and Egypt~ with its ancient and
unchanged musical norms~ is declared to be the ideal pattern
in this respect (656dff.). The judges in musical contests
must be the eldest~ who judge on the basis of the content of
the works presented~ not of the pleasure they give (658e).
The poets should teach that the just life is the happy life
(660eff.). The substance of these Platonic remarks in Book
Two is canonized in the Seventh Book where a body of judges
aged fifty or over are given the authority to approve of
poetic works or to reject them if they do not satisfy the
necessary moral criteria (802a-b). 133 And In 811b-d Plato
explains that the best napao£Ll~a of a poetic work
f d '1 'h . 1f 134appropriate or e ucatl0na purposes IS t e Laws Itse .
Given that Plato holds views such as the ones presented
above, it is undeniable that there are strong authoritarian
tendencies in the Laws. This statement, however~ has to be
evaluated on the basis of certain features of the dialogue
which do not neutralize it.s authoritarianism, but severely
c ond i t i i t There I s Li t t l e doubt that Plato considerson 1 •
education as the paramount function of the state (the
education officialdom IS the greatest in the state-765e).
Its purpose IS to train children In virtue (643e); in
Plato's opinion the way for this to be achieved is by strict
adherence to a specific and almost unchangeable system of
values. It is clear that in this framework~ individual
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initiative is more likely to hinder the achievement of the
educational ideal than to promote it. But does Plato go as
far as to deny any personal judgement or expression to the
Magnesians? Although primarily ethical and po l i t i c a I , this
question has ultimately to be answered In the wider
framework of the theological doctrines of the Laws; because
if Plato denies any value to human deliberation In the
fabric of his theology135 t if he envisages an omnipotent god
annulling human deliberation t then not only does his
political message become plainly authoritarian t but Magnesia
itself becomes a fully fleshed theocracy.
In his much quoted "puppet metaphor" In 644d Plato
suggests that human beings are puppets of the gods t who
created them either as a "plaything" , "(ncxvyvLov £X£LVWV) or
for some serious reason beyond humans' grasp. Prima facie,
this text seems to deny any significance to human free will.
The central inference of it appears to be that men are
completely dependent on the gods. The visual image of
creatures controlled in their every single movement by a
mighty power does appear to nullify human ethical autonomy.
But one should not be carried away too far by the force of
Plato's poetic language in this passage t for in the
subsequent discussion Plato does not confirm this
conclusion; on the c on t r a r y , he asserts the importance of
human deliberation.
The philosopher declares that human beings are driven by
powerful emotions (he likens these to cords) and are brought
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back and forth by them, "across the boundary line where
virtue and vice meet" (644e). The one cord that men "must"
(<SEt) try to hang on to is the golden cord of ,
"AOYL<JIlOS, "
terms
which is also the "public law of the city". The force
,
exerted by the golden cord is np~os, not ~LaLos (a strong
indication that one's adherence to logismos and the public
law is to be by accord, not by coercion-645a); and if human
beings cooperate with it "the meaning of the
"self-superior" and "self-inferior"
,
[>CPEL'r'rW 2Eav'rOO >CaL
D'r'rW] will somehow become clearer, and the duties of state
and individual will be better appreciated. The latter must
digest the truth about the forces that pull him, and act on
it in his life; the state must get an account of it either
from one of the gods or from [a] human expert and
incorporate it in the form of a law to govern both its
internal affairs and its relations with other states"
(645b-c). This text provides a number of indicators that
Plato does not imply with the puppet metaphor any kind of
predetermination theory. Human ethical choice, and even the
adequacy of man's intellectual abilities are established in
this passage in more than one way. First of all, OEt is
repeated three times in the space of a few lines. The fact
that Plato exhorts human beings to do something by using
"must", indicates that he regards them as having a choice.
The conception that human beings have a duty which they
ought to fulfil presupposes free ethical choice, because if
they were predetermined, the exhortation would be pointless.
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(Kantian ethics is a typical case of "duty ethics" and of
course it emphatically verifies the individual's moral
autonomy). This point IS fortified by 727b where Plato
remarks that it is the citizens' own duty to be virtuous,
and they should not avoid this responsibility by accusing
others of their own faults. Plato also asks for the
co-operation of the citizen with the law and of course
co-operation presupposes free choice. Moreover, Plato uses
the concepts of self-superior and self-inferior. In their
context, these notions refer to the individual who does not
give In to emotions and follows the orders of AO)'LGIlOS,
consequently being self-superior, or does the opposite and
is self-inferior. But neither of these terms would be
meaningful unless we accept that one is free to choose
between the two al ternatives. Finally, god is not the only
source of political wisdom: the alternative of a wise
lawgiver is seriously proposed (645b). Therefore, not only
is man not deprived of his ethical choice by an almighty
god, but human wisdom is treated as a valid alternative to
divine wisdom as far as constitutional issues are concerned.
The possible contradiction between a notion of man as a
puppet of the gods and man as a free moral agent is removed
if we realize that, in this passage, god is presented as the
originator of a framework within which human beings are
obliged to operate ethically. The cords that end up in them
are held by god, who therefore provides the setting for
their actions. But these actions are the resul t of free
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(though not unlimited) human choice. From this point of VIew
what Plato suggests is that both individuals and states find
themselves In a battle to promote virtue and to defy vice.
But the outcome of the battle IS by no means decided in
advance by the gods. It is the net result of human
deliberation. So, In the final analysis, god is not
omnipotent (in this Plato is in accord with Greek religious
tradition) and does not annihilate human ethical choice.
A number of other features In the Laws reiterate the
conclusion that human choice is accepted in the work. One
has to remember that Plato relies on the administrators of
Magnesia (and to a certain extent on the whole citizen-body)
to take the right political decisions for the city. But it
would be absurd to allow this kind of authority to such men,
who, moreover, rely simply on opinion, if Plato believed
that human deliberation was of no importance and that there
was no human choice. Even though Socrates' position that no
one is a wrongdoer voluntarily is reinstated (731c), it IS
not accepted in essence by Plato. This axiom does refute
free ethical choice, since if wrongdoing is a resul t of
ignorance it is fully involuntary and all ethical problems
are reduced to questions of knowledge, not of choice.
However, as Blair Campbell remarks, ignorance is only third
In importance among causes of vice in 863c (Socratically it
IS the only one) and Plato also suggests that individual
choices do not necessarily coincide with rational judgements
(689a).136 The inevitable conclusion is that Plato does not
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regard human agency as nullified by an almighty god. 1 3 7
Plato goes even further: in a crucial passage in 904b-c
,
he declares that god "'L1")s O£ )'£v£a£ws T01) nOlOU TlVOS eX4>T/x£
Tats
,
(3oUAT}a£alv c£xaaTWV Tas ;) ,alTlas". Far from
obliterating humanwill t god imposes it on men as a duty.
This entails that vice is the choice of the vicious man
himself. The force of the emotions 1S considerable: a war
takes place within each man (626e) between those powers that
drive him to virtue and those that propel him to vice. But
god is in no way way responsible for the outcome in each
individual case: man is the master of his own fate.
Platonic theology then does not simply accept human
ethical choice, but practically r mpos e s it as a duty. The
problem, then, is how this attitude can be reconciled with
the undeniably restrictive factors that are at work 1n
Plato's educational system and 1n Magnesian society in
general. Is there a 'contradiction at this point?
The issue is resolved if we realize that Plato considers
that it is the uppermost duty of the state to provide for
its citizens the conditions that will allow them to become
virtuous, xp c l'L'LOV£S £auTG)v. By making virtue the primary
aim of education, by attempting to forbid practically any
innovation, Plato g r ve s to the individual the utmost help
the state can provide in his or her war with his or herself.
However, the state (at any rate the human state of the Laws)
can only have an auxiliary role in this conflict. It does
all in its power in order to lead the citizen 10 the
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direction of virtue. But the final resul t, on which the
individual's virtue and happiness depends, IS up to the
citizen himself. That IS why there will always be atheists
in the state, sometimes more and sometimes less. The state
is not omnipotent: all strictness In education and all
censorship cannot eradicate atheism and vice. 1 3 8
This rationale means that Plato can be vigorously
anti-liberal (to use an anachronism) and uphold free ethical
choice at the same time. Given the antithetical character of
these two predicaments, this is no small achievement. As far
as the politics -of his Cretan city is concerned, Plato is
able to give an all powerful role to the state, but leave
the responsibility for moral failure with the individual.
It remains to see how Plato's authoritarianism relates to
his stance on democracy. First of all, by accepting human
free will, Plato indicates that the doxa of the citizens and
the virtue these citizens acquire is not merely the result
of indoctrination, but is also due to the capacities of the
citizens themselves. This IS important, because Plato's
estimate of the moral and intellectual abilities of the
average citizen is directly connected with his attitude
towards democracy. Second, given that education is the
principal area of the Laws where Plato's severe restrictions
on what we would call "civil liberties" appear, it IS
interesting to see how Plato defines naLo£La: it is
"education from childhood in virtue, a training which
produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows
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to rule and be ruled as justice demands" (643e). 'I'he : one
factor in this definition which is crucial from a political
point of view is that the citizen is to be prepared to rule
and be ruled. The ideal that one should rule and be ruled in
turn is, historically, a democratic one. It could perhaps be
partly applied to moderate oligarchies, but definitely not
to hard-core ones like Sparta. So, in an important area of
the Laws, Plato's authoritarianism, to the extent that it
exists, does not entail opposition to democracy.
But the main feature of the Laws which divorces its
authoritarianism from unconditional opposition to democracy
is that here, unlike the Republic, Plato's anti-liberal
measures are not directed to a specific class and are not
envisaged as part of a strategy designed to keep one class
in perpetual subjection by means of psychological repression
and/or physical force. Plato's arguments apply to all four
classes. Nowhere does he indicate a distinction between
classes in discussing the moral and theological issues
touching upon freedom of choice, and it is clear that such a
distinction would run counter to the spirit of his
assumptions. Quite unlike the Republic, we have in the Laws
an authoritarianism that is not socially discriminating. No
matter how much Plato might insult modern liberal
sensibilities (which undoubtedly he does), his authoritarian
stance is not a vehicle for the suppression of a part of the
citizen-body and in this pivotal respect it IS not
unreservedly anti-democratic.
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VII VIRTUE IN THE LAWS
Virtue 1S not only the aim of education in the Laws. As
Plato repeatedly underlines, it is al so the aim of
legislation as a whole (688aff., 705d-e, 707d, 708d, 770d,
963a). In a sense, this position constitutes the pivotal
ethical and political axiom of the Laws. (As we know from
650b politics and ethics are inextricably tied together:
politics is the art that creates good characters). Plato
leaves no doubt whatever that virtue as a whole has to be
the exclusive aim of any legislator worthy of the name. He
declares this in explicit terms i n 963a. And it is on the
basis of this principle that he criticizes and ultimately
rejects the widely respected legislations of Minos and
Lycurgus: they did not target with their legislations virtue
as a whole, but only one aspect of it, courage. (Plato makes
this point by ironically suggesting that he and his
interlocutors made the mistake of misunderstanding the two
ancient legislators, but he most clear l y places the
responsibility for the monolithic Dorian emphasis on courage
on them-630d).
However, as soon as we attempt to determine the
particular conception of virtue that Plato puts forward in
the Laws, a specific problem presents itself. While in all
the passages mentioned above Plato refers to virtue as a
, 139
whole either explicitly (e.g. "n;(iGCXLJ [ap£l:l1 LJ ] " - 6 8 8b , 705e)
285
or quite clearly in the given context (707d, 708d, 770d) and
while in 964a he unequivocally states that the four virtues
,
are essentially one ("l:£l:l:<XP<X OVl:<X £V ~ .£Ol:L"), there is one
passage in the Laws where a qui te diff erent approach to
virtue is adopted. More specifically, In 630aff. Plato
suggests that andreia can be demonstrated even by
mercenaries, who are otherwise, with very few exceptions,
"reckless and insolent rogues, and just about the most
witless people you could find" (630b). If such people, who
in Plato's opinion can hardly present any claim to virtue as
a whole, are able to possess courage, then the latter must
be distinct from the rest of the virtues and consequently
the unity of virtue is contradicted. Furthermore, in 631bff.
the philosopher distinguishes human from divine goods and in
his enumeration of the latter he spells out a full hierarchy
, "
of the virtues with ~POVDOLS first, oW~POOVVD second,
,
8Lx<XLoavvD (for some reason a combination of the other
three) third and &v8p£t<X last. This stratification clearly
defies the "unity of virtue" thesis in its strong Socratic
form where virtues are all in the final analysis reducible
to knowledge and therefore identical wi th each other. As
StaIley remarks "[e]ven without the doctrine of the unity of
virtue this ranking of the particular values would require
I ." 140exp anatl0n, an explanation which IS obviously not
provided in the relevant passage. At the same time it IS
equally unclear why justice is a combination of the other
. 141
three vIrtues.
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Plato had only slightly modified the Socratic principle
of the unity of virtue in the Republic, without in essence
abandoning it. There the Ideal Rulers possessed full virtue
in the Socratic sense, whereas the Auxiliaries had a
second-rate bravery based on doxa but not wisdom and the
Producers no virtue at all. The reason for this slight
modification of the Socratic thesis was clearly political:
full virtue entitled the Rulers to an absolute claim to
power, while the Auxiliaries were attributed the virtue
which was necessary for them to perform their military
duties and the Producers were deprived of virtue and
consequently of any claim to power. Bravery, In its "raw"
state, was also problematic in thePoliticus. There it
appeared as incompatible with the crude form of temperance
(306b) and the intervention of the Scientific Ruler was
necessary to reconcile them. Here the unity of the virtues
was seriously compromized, given that at least at one stage
of the individual's moral development two individual virtues
were inimical to each other. The separation of courage from
the rest of the virtues was probably part of common Greek
opinion and Socrates encounters it as ear ly as the
Protagoras. There the sophist claimed that lin 6£ &v6p£~cx
I I I I I
ncxvv nOAV 6LCX~£POV ncxv~wv ~ov~wv [the rest of the individual
virtues]" (349d). Does Plato, late In his career, come to
accept the Protagorean dictum? As we will now see, the
answer to this question is negative.
Plato's position on virtue culminates In the last Book.
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In 963a Plato states that "every detail of our legislation
ought to have a single end in view and the proper name to
call it was, I think we agreed, virtue". He then goes on to
argue that what the Nocturnal Council need to understand IS
how virtue is essentially one although it IS expressed In
four different· ways. Plato does not explain what is the
"ral)'t"~v" which makes the four virtues ultimately one, but he
does indicate that the answer presupposes training in the
method of division, the method that characterizes the
metaphysical inquiries of the late dialogues.
In this late stage of his career, Plato IS obviously
discontented with the strict form of the Socratic doctrine
of the unity of virtue. This doctrine, by reducing all
virtues to one thing, knowledge, tended to obscure the
differences between the particular virtues. In fact, it
practically left no scope for differentiation between
individual virtues, because according to it, either one had
knowledge and consequently virtue as a whole, or one lacked
this knowledge and possessed no virtue at all. This aspect
of the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue is clearly
demonstrated in the Protagoras, where Socrates claims that
,
indi vidual virtues· resemble each other 1 ike "La rat) xpvaot)
1l0pLO:" (329d), i.e. they are practically indistinguishable.
Plato's dissatisfaction with the Socratic thesis is already
evident In the Politicus where Plato admits that the
reciprocity of virtues is not a universally valid position
(306b). This admission demonstrates that In his later
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ethical philosophy Plato becomes increasingly aware of the
different character of individual virtues, a development
which, as we saw in chapter 2, section 4, is closely related
to his interest in history. On the other hand, Plato clearly
wants to uphold the essential unity of virtue: in the
Politicus this is demonstrated by the Ruler's reconciliation
of the conflicting virtues and in the Laws by his repeated
emphasis on a single and unified virtue. But if Plato is to
resolve this issue, if he is to show how the unity of virtue
is not invalidated by the differences between individual
virtues, he needp to formulate a thesis which will confirm
the unity of virtue without obliterating these differences.
It is here that division comes into play. Division IS a
method designed to produce exact definitions. If such
definitions were provided for each virtue separately, while
at the same time the essential unity of virtue was upheld, a
major advancement In Platonic ethics would have been
achieved, In the form of a higher synthesis explaining the
simultaneous unity and multiplicity of virtue. What Plato
clearly aims at IS a notion of the unity of virtue which
goes beyond Socrates' strong identity thesis. Unfortunately,
Plato does not clarify in what sense the four virtues are
distinct and one at the same time. Guthrie's explanation is
that "this was not the place for I" t,,142 dan a similar
suggestion is made by 143StaIley. However, the undeniable
philosophical complexity of the task could well mean that
Plato had not reached the level of elaboration necessary to
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present his solution of this problem in a written dialogue.
An indication that this might be so is given by his obvious
reluctance to prescribe a definite curriculum for the
Nocturnal Council in 968d-e. In any case, though, the lack
of textual clarification of this problem means that any
interpretative suggestion has to remain speculative.
Nevertheless, there is one passage In the Twelfth Book
which shows the way that one virtue might be differentiated
from another. In 963e in a passage worth citing In full
Plato writes: CI£v npoaayop£VOVT£S
,
ovo
,
naALV :0aVTa npoa£LnOjl£V, TO jl£V
&vop£~av, T~ o~ $p~VDOLV. £PQ y~p aOL TDV aLTLav, OTL TO jl£V
£aTLV n£p~ $~~OV, OD xaL T~ eDP~a jl£T~X£L, TDs &vop£~as, xaL
I I I I I I I
Ta y£ TQV naLowv ~eD TQV navv V£WV: &v£v lap AOyOV xaL $va£L
y~lv£TaL &vop£~a WVX;l, av£v o£ aD A~YOV WVXD $P~VLjlOS T£ xa~
:0, :01:0 :>l:O':O ~ , 1"
voDv £xovaa OVT' £Y£V£TO mon o r c OVT' £OTLV OVu <XVeLS nOT£
, ,
C 21 C "y£vnO£TaL, WS OVTOS £TCpOV .
Apart from the particularity of Plato asking himself a
question on behalf of Cleinias (again an indication of the
exceptional difficulty involved in the issue under
discussion), this text provides a number of indicators which
help explain the discrepancies between the "unity of virtue"
thesis and the passages of the First Book mentioned above.
First of all, it has to be underlined that Plato indicates,
,
already in the First Book, that all forms of &vop£La are not
e qu i val ent. In 630a- b, jus t before comment ing on the f ac t
that even mercenaries can display courage, Plato declares
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that
,
"c5LxaLoauvT} XaL .aw<ppoauvT} XaL .<ppOVT}aLS ~ ~£LS 'tau'tov
£ABoDaaL J1£1:' &vc5p£~as" are vastly superior ,("TCaJ11l0AV
to "au 'tTl S J1~VT} S ) ,avc5p£Las"; and in 630c he says
,
that al though natural bravery IS "good" (xaAT}v), it comes
only fourth In the evaluation of the virtues. Now, at this
early stage of the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger does not
want to alienate his Dorian companions by directly
challenging their ancestral legislations which rated courage
highly; moreover, he has not yet developed his own
conception of virtue, which alone can make clear why natural
courage IS not properly a virtue. He therefore goes along at
this point with current Greek opinion and names this type of
courage a virtue. But it is only at the end of the dialogue
that he IS In a position to explain why the courage which is
. .
<pua£L and not AOYW is not a virtue proper. Plato In essence
\
revokes In the end his statement In the First Book that
unqualified courage is a virtue: a property which can be
displayed by beasts and young children cannot be a virtue In
the real sense of the word. The inference is that only when
it is coupled to the other virtues, when it is led by reason
and not merely given by nature, can andreia be considered a
virtue in the philosophical and not simply in the common use
of the term. For this reason the unity of virtue is not
cancelled out by the remark in 630aff.
The fact that courage arises from instinct and can appear
&A~YWS also explains why it IS rated last in the evaluation
of virtues. Phronesis t on the other hand, which can only
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exist in accordance with reason is duly placed In the top
position as the highest of the virtues. Moreover t In a
political f r amewo r k , wisdom IS obviously the most crucial
quality expected of those that are entrusted with authoritYt
and this helps us to understand why it can be considered the
highest virtue in the Laws. What this text does not reveal
is why justice IS rated below t ernpe r anc e , and why it is
specifically defined as the virtue which IS created by the
combination of the other three. Nowhere in the Laws does
Plato clarify or follow through this remark. S't a Ll ey , who
attempts to unravel the riddle of the ranking of the virtues
sees wisdom coming first because "rational judgement must be
In control" and temperance second because the "main danger"
144IS that the individual might "succumb to pleasure". But he
IS unable to explain justice's third place and he admits as
much. I think it is fair to say that Plato does not offer
any textual backing to the ranking of justice and therefore
the problem cannot be resolved in the framework of the Laws.
As for the fact that it is the combination of the other
virtues, perhaps this IS so because justice in the state
presupposes the correct relationship between the different
parts of the state t and t correspondinglYt in the individual
it presupposes a full harmony of the lower and the higher
parts of the soul; as we will now proceed to see, this
harmony is at the core of Plato's conception of virtue in
the Laws. If virtues interact with each other In the way
Forms (but not Forms of virtues) interact in the Sophist
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(254dff.), it is possible that justice IS the particular
virtue that comes into being when the relationship of the
other virtues is the right one: in this sense it would be a
combination of the other virtues. But this again IS not
sufficiently clarified by Plato and one has to remain at the
level of suggestion on this question as well.
Another important aspect of 963e is the way it associates
reason with the highest virtue~ phronesis~ and with virtue
in general. Reason was prominent already in the Republic
(e.g. 402a), where it was exactly the fact that the rational
element reigns In the souls of the philosopher-kings that
constituted their virtue and entitled them to rule. In the
,
Philebus the rational nous IS described as "(3a.OLA£VS
, ,
ovpavo-o 1:"£ xo t Yf1S" (28c). In the Timaeus human beings are
psychologically "healthy" if they do not follow the
arbitrary movements generated by the material world~ but the
regular form of movement which is associated with reason. In
other words human perfection depends on control of the
bodily desires and correct education (44a-c). The Timaeus
(69cff.) repeats the three-fold distinction of the soul
found In the Republic, but Plato indicates in the former
dialogue an increased awareness of the difficulty involved
in taming one's mortal part of the soul. This part is "cSELVa.
,
xo L eXva. )'xa. r a £. V £av1:"G.) naeTlJ1a1:"a
\
'1EXOV,
,
npG.)1:"ov J1EV r,cSOVTW,
J1~)'L01:"OV xaxo-o cS~AEap, £n£L1:"a A~nas, eX)'a.eG.)v ~V)'~S, £1:"L cS' aD
e~ppos xaL ~~(3ov, a~pov£ OVJ1(30~AW, eVJ1~v cs~ cSvonapaJ1~eTl1:"Ov
£An~cSa CS' £'unap~)'w)'ov" (69c-d) and therefore it is not
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easily controlled. This conception of reason as being
ident ical wi th the immortal part of each human being IS
repeated In the Laws (713e-714a).
There IS nothing new, then, in the thesis that conformity
with reason is a c~rdinal prerequisite for the virtue which
we find in the Laws. In this context virtue is the agreement
of one IS emot ions wi th one I s ra t ional judgement, a point
that Plato makes explicit in 653b. This agreement can be
fostered in early· life by education and when later one
obtains reason, the latter confirms the soundness of
p r e v i.ou s training. Plato had already stated in the First
Book that a conflict takes place within each man (626e)
between those forces that lead to virtue and those that lead
.
to vice and that "bad" (xexxov) is the individual who submits
to D8ova~ (633e). These passages suggest that the moral
psychology of the Laws is based on a conception of internal
conflict. But whereas in previous dialogues the emphasis was
on the submission of the lower parts of the .sou l to the
higher, in the Laws Plato appears keener to emphasize the
need for harmony between these parts than the outright
submission of the appetitive part of the soul. The
difference is indeed a subtle one. Either way, if virtue is
to come into existence, the lower part of the soul has to
give way. But it is very much an indication of Plato's new
spirit that he now meticulously explores the possibility of
a harmonization between the conflicting claims of reason and
. .
appetite and places this harmonization higher than the
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simple domination of the better party in either the
individual or the state. This approach is clearly
exemplified in 626eff. Plato uses there a parable in order
to explain what he means when saying that a city or an
individual can win a victory over itself ("VLXCXV :IaV'LOV
aVL~V") or be defeated by itself ("r,'L'LCXaBaL atHOV vet>'
~av'Lon"-626e). The philosopher imagines a family which
includes many brothers. Most of the brothers are a6LxoL but
.
a few are <5 LXa L0 L ( 62 7c ). Now t his f ami I y w0 u I d be w0 r s e
than itself if the unjust brothers ruled and better than
itself if the just ones did. This statement conforms fully
with the spirit of the Republic: the best community is the
one where the best rule over the worse. But in the, Laws
Plato is not content to let the matter stand at this. He
envisages a judge who reconciles all brothers and restores
peace In the family. Whereas In the first alternative the
unjust brothers are either killed or violently subdued, In
the second one they are accepted (presumably provided they
morally improve themselves) as part of this small community.
What IS remarkable in this passage IS the way Plato goes
beyond the conception of "the rule of the best" with which
he stayed content In the Republic. He now underlines that
the best end in an internal conflict is the reconciliation
of the fighting parties (628c-d).145 This emphasis on
moderation is a recurring theme in the Laws. It marks not a
denial of the Republic's emphasis on the importance of the
prevalence of the best parts in the city and the soul, but a
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higher, more articulate version of it.
In the light of this concept we can now understand better
why the aim of education is to instil in the souls of
children the values that conform with reason (653b). If the
emotions of these children are "canalized" in such a way as
not to conflict with logos' demands, the ideal of harmony
between emotion and reason is achieved. Plato clearly
suggests that this harmony, starting at a young age, is far
better than an outright subjection of emotions to reason.
Already in the Timaeus he had stressed the particular force
that emotions can have. By training them not to oppose
reason, Plato puts this force into morally useful effect. To
use a modern psychological conception, Plato wants to drive
the instinctive energy of the individual into morally and
socially acceptable tasks.
The idea that disharmony between emotion and reason is
ultimately disastrous and that moderation is absolutely
vital for good government is vindicated in the framework of
the historical content of the Third Book. The disharmony
between the feelings of pleasure and pain on the one hand
and of reason on the other is declared to be the greatest
.
ignorance (689a), while their accordance is the "x<XAA.La'tT}
" I
X<XL ~£lLa'tT} ••• aO$L<x" (689d). This disharmony explains for
Plato the downfall of Argos and Messene. Sparta, for its
part, survived due to the moderate provisions of its
constitution (691eff.).
History then proves the priceless value of moderation.
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The two greatest powers of Plato's own lifetime, Persia and
Athens, did well as long as they stuck to the principle of
moderation and held a middle course between absolutism and
freedom. But the abandonment of this principle meant their
decline (693dff.).
It IS on these grounds that Plato advocates a middle
course between monarchy and democracy as the best
constitution (756e). By the statement of this principle the
ethics of moderation IS coupled by the politics of
moderation and these two aspects of the Laws come to match
each other. Without any doubt, the need for moderation is
one of the pivotal exhortations of the Laws.
In his treatment of virtue in the Laws, Plato forcefully
reinstates some of the principles that shape his theory of
virtue in earlier dialogues. Virtue 1S the a1m of all
education and all legislation. It 1S par excellence the
146quality which legitimizes political power. It is
essentially one, though it takes the different forms of the
four particular virtues. One of the main intellectual tasks
of the theoreticians of Magnesia, the Nocturnal Council, is
to understand its fundamental unity and simultaneous
multiplicity (965c-d). Finally, virtue is brought about when
there is harmony between the higher and and the lower parts
in the agent's soul, this harmony presupposing that the
latter through training willingly submit to the former.
From a political point of view, however, there 1S a
distinct Platonic shift of emphasis in the ethical theory of
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the Laws towards a notion of virtue which is more compatible
with the moral abilities of the common citizen. Virtue
ceases in the Laws to be a quality that can only be obtained
by the very few. This IS not to say that the road to virtue
lies open to everybody. The strong force of the emotions
precludes this possibility. However, one of the features
which gave the Republic its particularly anti-democratic
character is absent from the Laws: there is no class barrier
to full virtue. Plato nowhere suggests that the members of
any specific class might be better qualified to achieve
virtue. Whereas in the Republic only citizens of one class,
and the class with the fewest members at that, could achieve
full virtue, in the Laws every citizen is, in principle,
able to do that, provided he can reach the psychic harmony
described by Plato. Virtue then shifts from being a class
question to being an individual's question. This IS
supported In the political sphere by the fact that all major
offices are open to all classes. From this point of view,
the theory of virtue of the Laws, unlike that of the
Republic, is not explicitly anti-democratic.
This aspect of Plato's ethico-political thought is
coupledW~~his increased interest in the practical character
of virtue and In moderation. The first is demonstrated by
the fact that the term for wisdom becomes, at least in the
lists of the virtues, epP~VTJOLS instead of ooe t.c . Although
the two words could be taken roughly as synonyms, cPpOVTJOLS
,
has a more practical character, OOcPLCX a more theoretical
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one. The fact that Plato gives more emphasis to the
practical side of wisdom means that the notion of wisdom put
forward in the Laws is more accessible to ordinary people
than the highly theoretical
,
and exclusive aO~La of the
Republic. As regards the obviously increased significance of
moderation in Plato's ethical thinking, again this points to
a shift in his position on democracy: the fact that the
emphasis is placed on the harmonization of the lower and the
higher parts of the soul, rather than on the outright
submission of the appetite, entails that the ideal in the
state will be government by consent and that force will be
unnecessary. The same ideal was expressed in the Republic,
but Plato's repeated use of fighting analogies in the Fourth
Book to describe the submission of the lowest parts of the
soul to the highest ones, indicates that he envisaged force
as an acceptable pol it ical means. In the Laws, where the
class stratification is looser, the stress on moderation
points towards a different attitude. The first aim r n a
situation of conflict, as Plato explicitly suggests in
627e-628a 1S not submission of the guilty party but
reconciliation. Furthermore, in the Laws individuals are
addressed as responsible citizens: this 1S the political
function of the preambles to the laws. Plato uses an analogy
,
between the npooLpLa to the Laws and the actions of the free
doctor who "paVe~V£L" and "oLo~ax£L" his patient before he
proceeds to treatment (720d). He distinguishes this method
d h d ot "{g i v e ]from the practice of the slave octors woo n
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any account"
.
(AOlOV . . .
,
OLOWOLV-720c) of their actions. As
the language here clearly demonstrates,148 the preambles are
directed to the rationality of the citizens and this is an
undeniable sign of Plato's increased trust in the rational
i t i f 149capaCl les 0 ordinary people. One has only to think how
much they would be out of place in the Republic to realize
that a major difference exists "1n the moral atmosphere of
the two works. Klosko justifiably remarks that "[t]he need
for consent to laws sets the Laws apart from Plato's other
150political works".. This need for consent is inseparable from
the need for moderation; and no matter how repulsive other
aspects of the dialogue might be, there can be no question
that the extreme anti-democratic authoritarianism of the
Republic is not reproduced in the moral content of the Laws.
'I'he r e r i s a tendency among scholars to treat the Laws as
h b l i 151 Th h i . dsome kind of aftermath to t e Repu Ie. at t 1S att1tu e
fails to do justice to this dialogue and to Plato's late
political philosophy as a whole, should, I hope, have been
made clear by now. It is absolutely true that Plato's
conviction of the superiority of the dogmas of the Republic
never faded. Magnesia is explicitly a "second best" state.
The theory of Forms, although to an extent irrelevant to a
purely human state, is reinstated. Knowledge is confirmed as
superior to opinion. Common possession of goods is the best
economic arrangement. But all these assertions, Plato
realizes, are by and large irrelevant to a human society in
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the absence of a philosopher-ruler. Already In the Timaeus
and the Politicus he distinguished sharply between what IS
divinely to be wished for and what is humanly achievable. In
the Laws he sets out to explore the second alternative.
But this change of course is not without far-reaching
philosophical consequences. In attempting to flesh out a
constitution created by humans and directed to humans, Plato
abandons the strategy of the Republic, which was based on
justifying political arrangements on metaphysical principles
(though he does not revoke these principles themselves) and
replaces the latter with a historical principle; and,
moreover, not with a historical principle in abstractio, but
with a concrete historical example of legislation. This
feature of the Laws has gone by and large unnoticed by
commentators, to a certain degree, I would think, because of
their tendency to look for the common grounds of the
dialogue with the Republic rather than for the ways in which
Plato departs in the Laws from his ideal of the middle
dialogues. So Saunders treats the Laws as the other side of
the coin of the Republic, and StaIley, who gives an
excellent account of particular issues involved in the Laws,
does not present an overall conclusion which captures the
essence of the dialogue. Friedlander finds the Socratic
principles in the work prevailing over the Solonian ones t a
position which relies on some tentative conclusions
extracted mainly from the last Book and ignores the vast
amount of specific historical argumentation which finds its
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way into the dialogue as a whole. Even Morrow, who In his
monumental Plato's Cretan City offers a met iculously
detailed analysis of the extent to which Plato incorporates
historical examples in the Laws, and who according to one
critic "has made the Laws readable for the first time", 152
does not spell out explicitly the fact that the main
legislative principle Plato follows in the work comes, both
in practice and in spirit, from Solon's Reformation. Having
said that, Morrow does recognize the force of historical
precedents which are at work In the Laws to a greater extent
than any other commentator; he also provides an excellent
account of the relationship between the Nocturnal Council
and the rest of Plato's legislation, thus removing the
suspicion that Plato at the end of the dialogue returns to
an ideal state, in essence repudiating almost everything he
had stated before the appearance of this Council In the
Laws. Both these aspects of his work constitute major
scholarly achievements.
The one point about the Laws which appears to be beyond
dispute is its practical character. Nevertheless, Plato's
orientation towards practice in his last dialogue is too
vague a notion to explain the richness and the detail of his
legislative proposals. The notion of the "mixed
constitution", for example, which decisively shapes Plato's
consti tutional project, is defended in the Laws by a long
historical narrative and is substantially Solonian in
spirit. And it is on the basis of the necessity for a mixed
302
,nOALT£LU that Plato distributes power In Magnesia. Thus the
Assembly IS given some power, but does not become the
sovereIgn organ of the state and a Council is created with
the equal participation of all classes. Judicial authority
is shared by popular courts and the magistrates, with the
balance tipped in favour of the latter. The lot is used, but
only for minor appointments. Whereas all these measures
might cautiously promote an aristocratic rule, the fact that
all officials are accountable for their actions (though not
to the Assembly) and that all positions of real authority
are open to all classes indicate a certain amount of
acceptance of democratic practices. The "mixed constitution"
is, consequently, the major conception on which Plato builds
his administrative system. And, crucially, it is a
concept~on derived from historical experience.
Moreover, the sheer number of Solonian measures that
Plato incorporates in his system shows the extent to which
history informs the Laws' political philosophy. Plato
undoubtedly admired Solon. He follows him in introducing to
,
his state four TL~D~UTU. The categorization serves political
purposes In Magnesia as it did in Athens, with different
prerogatives given to each class. Plato accepts an Assembly
open to all citizens as Solon did, though he takes measures
to secure greater participation by the higher classes. He
creates a Council, a state organ that was Solon's
innovation. He conforms almost completely to the spirit of
the Solonian judicial system and he institutionalizes, again
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in Solonian fashion t the officials' accountabilitYt even if
not directly to the people. FinallYt one can add that
Solon's is the typical example of a "mixed constitution" put
into practice.
None of these features of the Laws would make sense In
the framework of the Republic. Their existence In the Laws
proves that a principle quite distinct from the metaphysics
of the middle dialogues shapes the Laws. It is concrete
historical experience and adherence to a plainly historical
model which perform this task.
The same principles also explain the sovereignty of law
and the changes in Platonic epistemology that one notices in
the Laws. Although Plato links the law to transcendent
au t ho r i t y , i.e. the gods (645b)t there is little doubt that
the law is mainly a human creation. Plato's repeated
emphasis on the importance of an inspired human legislator
indica tes that, no rna t ter how important the r e l igious or
metaphysical vindication of public law, the latter is always
a human device. This IS also demonstrated by the fact that
in the Politicus the Ideal Ruler is placed beyond the law:
the latter, no matter how thorough, remains an expression of
human phronesis rather than of divine wisdom.
But the common citizen's ability is now ranked higher by
Plato. Although a certain degree of pessimism can be found
in his abandonment of the Ideal Ruler, Plato is in the Laws,
unlike In the Republic, ready to accept that common human
wisdom IS politically vital. True opinion is accepted as a
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legitimate alternative to knowledge; and although the
sovereignty of the latter is again asserted, in the absence
of a philosopher-king this becomes largely an academic
matter. Similarly, Plato's conception of virtue changes. He
is now interested in a more easily achievable form of
,
virtue. The more practically orientated ~povDaLs becomes the
word for wisdom instead of the more theoretical ao¢~a. Also,
abandoning his Socratic inheritance on this point, he
considers seriously the multiplicity of virtue, as a
conception that has to be examined rather than to be
rejected out of hand. On this point, fortified by the
opportunities provided by the theory of diairesis, Plato is
able to reach (though not fully to articulate) a notion of
virtue which combines the Socratic insistence on the unity
of virtue with a simultaneous acceptance of the differences
between particular virtues, differences that tended to be
obliterated by Socrates' reduction of all virtue to a common
denominator, knowledge.
As it has been argued, the theory of the Forms, plus some
pivotal pol it ical assert ions of the middle dialogues (I ike
the supremacy of XOLVOXLD~oavvD to individual property) are
reiterated in the Laws. But the absence of philosopher-kings
entails that they do not function as the regulating
principles of the work. They rather serve as indicators that
Magnesia is not a model city, that there is a divine policy
that vastly surpasses it. Nevertheless, the sheer amount of
legislative and philosophical labour that Plato puts into
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the Laws proves that, In his old age and wiser from his
Sicilian experiences, he considers the enterprise of
constructing a purely human state well worthwhile. 1 5 3
The historical principle operating in the Laws also marks
Plato's increased acceptance of democracy in this work. From
the moment he adopts a historical perspective, he IS
prepared to attribute at least some value to democratic
constitutional practices and to accept them, albeit
partially, in ·his own constitutional provisions.
Nevertheless, it.is true that Plato never abandoned some of
his aristocratic prejudices, like the contempt for traders
and manual workers (e. g. 831 e), or his low opinion of 01.
.
1C 0 AA0 I.. assuc h (e. g . 6 70 b ). Er am t his poi n t a f view, the r e
is a crucial difference between the actual Athenian
democracy of Plato's time and Magnesia. Whereas the former
to a large extent depended on traders, sailors and manual
workers, Magnesia IS a farmer's city. This is probably the
limit beyond which Plato is not prepared to go in his
acceptance of democracy. Although he affirms democracy as
one of the two constitutional poles of his mixed
constitution and although he makes some use of democratic
practices and ideological principles, Plato explicitly and
unapologetically debars "banausics" from his "second best"
city. This exclusion of the social strata which
substantially supported democracy from the citizen-body of
Magnesia ( e . g. 847d-e, 919d) is indeed one of the pivotal
reasons that makes the Laws more aristocratic than
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pro-democratic. Nevertheless, it would be wrong on the basis
of this one factor to deny the concessions to democracy
included In 154the work. If the Republic is Plato's greatest
cry against democracy, the Laws demonstrate a spirit of
moderation in this respect. From being a completely
inefficient and morally unsound form of government,
democracy is elevated to a position where it can contribute,
at least to some extent, towards the best humanly achievable
Greek city, the city that Magnesia purports to be.
Unlike the Republic which did not have any substantial
effect on Greek political theory, the Laws with its
moderation and its emphasis on the mixed constitution played
a significant role in subsequent political thought. Through
Polybius it reached Rome and Cicero and its influence can be
attested even in such works as More's Utopia and
" d' 155 0 t f . tItMontesqieu s L Esprit es L01s. n accoun 0 1 S a er
career, but even more for its considerable philosophical
meri t s , the Laws deserves a place in the pantheon of the
great works of political theory more than is generally
recognized.
307
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1 R.F. StaIley, An Introduction to Plato's Laws
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p.3.
2
Trevor J . Saunders, Introduction to Plato, The Laws
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p.28.
3 Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960).
4 See H. Rackham, Introduction to the Athenian
Constitution, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard University Press. London: Heinemann, 1981), p.5. The
latest event mentioned in the work occured in 329 B.C. and
as Rackham writes "the book a 1.so mentions triremes and
quandriremes, but not quinquiremes; and the earliest date at
which qUinquiremes in the Athenian navy are recorded is 325
B.C.
B.C."
The treatise can thus be dated between 328 and 325
308
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1
Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.49.
Vlastos proposes ten theses, each of them referring to one
aspect of the difference between the historical Socrates who
appears in the early dialogues and the Socrates who
expresses Platonic views in the middle ones. I agree with
eight of them but disagree with points VI and VII which
refer to the political positions of Socrates and where
Vlastos is referring to So cr a tes as favourably disposed to
democracy. It is very unfortunate that the theses are
expressed in aphoristic style and therefore there is not any
evidence offered by Vlastos at this point to be discussed.
2
Gregory Vlastos, "The Paradox of Socrates", in The
Philosophy of Socrates, ed. Gregory Vlastos (New York:
Anchor, 1971), p.3, makes this point for the Apology, but
it is obvious that it can be extended to cover the whole of
the early dialogues.
3 Vlastos, Socrates, pp.91-106.
4
Though not necessarily leaders of the democratic party
as well. Miltiades and Cimon, the son-in-law of Aristeides,
were leaders of the oligarchic party. But they all promoted
the interests of democratic Athens and in this sense they
all were leaders of the democracy.
5
Out of the six passages mentioned here, four (a,d,e and
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and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),
pp.196-197.
6
Not, however, if his attempt to be acquitted meant
compromising his principles. As Thomas C. Brickhouse and
Nicholas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Oxford: Clarendon
--------
- - - --
Press, 1989), p.viii, write "the real st.ory of the Apology
-------
is that, constrained and propelled by t.he moral principles
according to which he had lived and for which he would die,
Plat.o's
failed".
Socrat.es sincerely tried to win his release and
7
In 21a Socrates identifies his jury with the democrat.s
who fled the cit.y during t.he Thirt.y Tyrants' reign and
returned after their downfall (" [XOLpE:cpWV] ')'nv
c _
U fl LV
C
ETOLpOS TE: KO L ~UVE:CPUllE:V cpulln v TOUTnV KOL flE:8'
c _
U fl wv
KOTnA8E:") and in 32b with the democratic Assembly which
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Arginusai
~I
e:OO~E:V")
and regret.ted t.he decision afterwards ("nacrLv
c _
U fl LV
8 Kraut, Socrates and the State, p.196, n.7.
9
At this stage, and are innate capacit.ies
which have to be cult.ivated through education before they
capacities
~
are transformed to actual nOALTLKn opE:Tn
point is t.hat all men have those
therefore the potential to acquire this
But
two
~
opE:Tn
the
This
crucial
and
entails
that polit.ical virtue is a goal which can, in principle, be
achieved by everybody.
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Among the scholars who discuss Protagoras' political
position, W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge
--------
University Press, 1971) , p.268, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal
Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1978), P .129 and C.C.W. Taylor, Plato,
Protagoras (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) pp.83-84, accept
Protagoras as a democrat.
11
G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge:
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Plato, Popper and Politics, ed. Renford Bambrough
(Cambridge, Mass.: Heffer, 1961).
Some scholars, on the other hand, sided with Popper. One
example is Renford Bambrough, "Plato's Modern Friends and
Enemies", passim and »Plato's Political Analogies» passim,
both in Plato, Popper and Politics.
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Popper, The Open Society, 1:81.
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Versenyi, "Plato and his Liberal Opponents», p.231.
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Ibid., p.235.
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It is interesting that Versenyi here attributes to
Plato a repetition of the famous paradox of the Keno 80d.
153Versenyi, "Plato and his Liberal Opponents", p.234.
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Ibid., p.235.
157See also 412e.
158Guthrie, History, 4:451.
159Versenyi, "Plato and his Liberal Opponents", p.234.
160
Ibid., p.232.
161D.C.D. Reeve, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988) . Reeve for example questions the
explicit anti-humanitarianism of 406dff., where Plato
suggests that a craftsman unable to work should be let to
die on the basis that "Plato
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thinks that the craftsman
himself would refuse medical treatment" (p.214L But Plato's
assumption that a craftsman will prefer to die rather than
to submit to a lengthy treatment is too obviously and too
strongly counter-intuitive and his motives are clearly
revealed in 407d-e where he states that such an individual
would be "of no use to himself or societyn. The only
beneficiary of this inhuman prescription is a society
unwilling to undertake the support of its invalid members.
There is nothing "enlightened" (p.21S) about the
prescription, nor can the notion of a "life worth living"
(p.214) justify the extreme inhumanity of the measure.
Reeve also asserts that Plato only condoned slavery, but
that there is no evidence that he favoured it (p.216).
Strictly speaking, this is true. But Reeve cannot produce
anything better than an argument ex silentio for this
assertion; and the fact that Plato sanctioned a treatment of
slaves harsher than the usual practice of his time in the
Laws (see Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Law of Slavery in its
Relation to Greek Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1939), p.127), a more moderate work where social hierarchy
is not elevated to a major political principle as in the
Republic, is revealing. As for Reeve's assumption that if
slaves are subject to the principle of specialization they
"will be legally and constitutionally on a par with every
other member of the Kallipolis" (p.217), the statement
ignores two crucial facts: first, the majority of the
citizens of Callipolis have
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no legal or constitutional
protection themselves. There is absolutely no way that a
Producer who fee·l s himself wronged by a decision of a
Guardian can legally challenge the decision. Second, slaves
were definitely part of the division of labour in ancient
Greece, but they were nowhere given legal or constitutional
equality with citizens; it is therefore most improbable that
somebody as insistent on the importance of social
stratification as Plato would grant them such rights.
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Ibid. , pp.186-190. Reeve argues, in my opinion
conclusively, that Plato does not intend primary education
to cover the Producers. In this he follows George F.
Hourani ("The Education of the Third Class in Plato's
Republic", Philosophical Quarterly 43, 1949) . This is
also the position of Guthrie, History, 4:455 and n.2.
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Bambrough. Bambrough remarks that Plato's critics go deeper
than their opponents because they challe'1ge "not the
connection between the particular proposals and the premises
from which they are derived, but rather the premises
themselves" (Plato'S Modern Friends and Enemies", p.11). So
far I am in agreement with him. But the major Platonic
premiss with which Bambrough finds fault is that value
judgements can be based on factual judgements, whereas I
believe that it is another
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Platonic premiss, the
philosopher's unconditional acceptance of the natural
inequality of human beings, which his »friends" have
generally failed to consider.
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In the tradition of Greek conservative philosophy, to
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So, according to lamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, 200,
trans. Gillian Clark (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
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opinions of mortals are false and practically worlhless
(Cathleen Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A
Companion to Diels, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966),
p.141: Bl,v.30, B8,v.50 and B7,v.2). This is indeed the
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Allen, "The Argument from Opposites in Republic Review
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Ackrill l "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259" in Plato I
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 1978) ,
pp.211ff. Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Theory of
Knowledge (1960; reprint ed. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paull 1979)1 p.296 and believes that Plato separated
the existential sense of einai
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connection with the Republic
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is by the fact that
it effectively begins with a recapitulation of the
conclusions of the Republic.
198Guthrie, History, 4:S28 and n.2 and Barker, Political
Thought, p.10S and p.176 and The Politics of Aristotle,
p.2S0, n.3. In the last case Barker goes to absurd lengths
in his defence of Plato. He writes that "Plato's treatment
of constitutional change was meant to give an account of its
inner logic rather than of its historical chronology.
Aristotle's criticism is therefore hardly relevant". But to
state that the "inner logic" of constitutional change i 9
irrelevant to history is to suggest that history is
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199Williams, "The Analogy of City and Soul", p.200.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1
Stanley Rosen, »Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos·,
Review of Metaphysics 33, 1979, p.79, comments on this point
that the "Stranger seems to agree with Hegel and Marx that
properly human existence depends upon human labour". I think
this is wrong as regards both Plato's overall conception of
human labour and the myth in particular. The Republic proves
beyond dispute how lowly Plato rated manual labour (which is
fundamental in both Hegel's and Marx's conception of
labour): only the Producers do such labour and lhey are lhe
lowest class, practically deprived of any social or
political rights. As for the myth, Plato recognizes in il
human labour as a fact of life; bul lhis does nol enlail
that he attributes lo it a cardinal imporlance, in
parlicular since labour is necessary only in lhe presenl
"age of Zeus".
2 According to Rosen, "Plalo's Myth", p.73, lhere are al
leasl lhree distinct mylhological sources lhal Plato
utilizes in his myth: the fable of the »quarrel of Alreus
and Thyestes», "the mylh of lhe golden age of Cronus" and
the nmyth of the race of autochthonous morlals».
3
The other two tales lhal Plato uses in his
myth are
structurally subordinaled to the »age of Cronus
n myth. Il is
explain lhe »fall» from this age lo his own
lhal Plalo
to
utilizes the story of the reversal of lhe
universe (included
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in the Atreus and Thyestes myth) and the tale of the
earthborn appears only in the fram k f th'ewor 0 1S reversal.
4
Vidal-Naquet, "Plato's Myth of the Statesman, the
Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History", Journal of
Hellenic Studies 98,
-------- -------
5
I bid., p . 133.
1978, p.134.
6
J • B. Skemp, Introduction to Plato, The Statesman
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p.52.
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Ibid., p.57.
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See Ibid., p.58.
9
See Ibid. , pp.58ff. and v. Tejera, "Plato's Politicus:
an Eleatic Stranger in Politics", Philosophy
------~---
and Social
Criticism 5, 1978, pp.93-94.
10
Xenophon, Cyropaideia, 8.2.14, summarized by Skemp,
Introduction to Plato, The Statesman, p.60.
11
Xenophon, Cyropaideia, 8.2.42, summarized by Skemp,
Introduction to Plato, The Statesman, p.60.
12
The position that Plato's myth is primarily targeted to
a political conception justifying personal absolutism on the
basis of natural superiority is developed in detail by
Skemp, Introduction to Plato, The Statesman, pp.54ff.
13
Vidal-Naquet, "Plato's Myth", p.137, argues correctly
that the myth goes back in time far beyond the nQTpl-OS
lTOAl-Te:l-Q of the Crito, to a state of affairs where politics
as we know it did not exist.
14
Here I am in agreement with Skemp, Introduction to
Plato, The Statesman, p.54, Paul Friedlander, Plato, trans.
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Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970) , 3:289, and Christopher Gill, "Plato and Politics: the
Critias and the Phronesis 1979, p.151.
G.E.L. Owen. "The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's
Dialogues", in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics. ed. R.E.
Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) , p.332 and
George Klosko. The Development of Plato's Political Theory
(New York: Methuen. 1986) , p.190. suggest that the
philosopher-king of the Republic is repudiated by lhe mylh.
Bul, despile their divine wisdom. the philosopher-kings are
no gods. They belong to the same species as ordinary humans,
and since there is compelling evidence in lhe Polilicus for
lhe praclical idenlification of lhe Scienlific Ruler and the
philosopher-king.
sustained.
Owen's and Klosko's posilion cannol be
15Gill. "Plato and Po l Lt Lc s?", p.152.
16
Ibid. Gill writes lhal "the Slatesman contains "second
thoughts" about goverment, at least in the sense of
different (if not necessarily contradictory) thoughts to
those of the Republic" (my emphasis).
17
Mitchell H.Jr. Miller, The Philosopher in Plato's
Statesman (The Hague: Marlinus Nijhoff, 1980), p.66.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21 Gi l l, "Plato and Politics", p.152.
22
There is an analogy between
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this line of thought and
the passages in the Phaedrus asserting the superiority of
oral discourse to the written work: 274eff. and the famous
passage in 275d: "liELVOV ~ap nou ~ pacpn , I<a L
C·
ws
:s _
a>-nBws
CI
0\-l0LOV {w~pacpLa.
\
~ap Ta
:s
EKELVns
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23
Lewis Cambell, Introduction to the Politicus of Plato
(New York: Arno Press, 1973), p.16.
24
W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 5:185.
25
Ibid.
26
Miller, The Philosopher, p.90.
27
This has been demonstrated in Christopher Bobonich's
unpublished article "What's wrong with Ordinary People in
Plato's Politicus?".
28
These
People",
passages
p.23.
are suggested by Bobonich, "Ordinary
29
These reasons for accepting the rationality of doxa are
proposed by Bo b o n I c h , "Ordinary People", pp.23-24.
30
See chapter 3, section 6.
31
Guthrie, History, 5:184, writes that "the distinction
between [lIthe ideal statesman, god rather than man,
whose enlightened wiil is his only law") and [lIthe best
sort of human statesman or political reformer (who himself
has not yet appeared), whose qualifications and policies
form the main subject of enquiry in the Politicus") is not
always clear". Guthrie points out that Plato uses the same
name for both, as he admits
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in 301a-b, and assumes that
"[t]his leads him into at least apparent contradiction on
the use of a written code of laws and the desirability of
government by consent of the governed". There are a number
of points worth commenting on in this interpretation. First
of all, Guthrie's description of the Scientific Ruler and
the constitutional monarch is unfortunate. The former is not
divine in the strong sense the gods of the myth were, but
only to the extent that he has knowledge of the transcendent
Forms, and he definitely belongs to the same species as his
subjects. Therefore he is hardly "god rather than man".
Secondly, the activities of the law-abiding monarch relying
for his rule on opinion do not form "the main subject of
enquiry in the Politicus". This position is consistently
held by the and to suggest otherwise is a
misreading of the dialogue. Furthermore, when Plato says in
301d-e that no such king appears, he means the Scientific
Ruler, not the non-philosophical monarch. There is no
contradiction, apparent or real, on the question of the use
of a written code of laws, because Plato's thesis is clear:
among the constitutions which are not based on episteme,
written law is always and unconditionally preferable to
disrespect for law (301aff.). Finally, the question of
government by violence or consent depends primarily on the
ambiguity of Plato's stance on the issue of the ordinary
citizens' rational ability, not on his alleged confusion
between the Scientific Ruler and the constitutional monarch.
32Campbell, The Sophistes and
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reprint ed. New York: Arno Press, 1973) , comment ad loc. ,
Plato, The statesman,
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p.161, n.1, 1.M.E. Moravcsik,
"The Anatomy of Plato's Divisions" in Exegesis and Argument,
eds E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, R.M. Rorty (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1973), p.331 and Rosen, "Plato's Myth", p.64.
33
Moravcsik, "Plato's Divisions", p.331.
34Skemp, Plato, The statesman, p.161, n.1.
35
Here I am in agreement with Guthrie, History, 5:177,
n.1, who argues that Skemp's point is not proven beyond
dispute by the text in question.
36 Skemp translates
:H
e:d5wAOV somewhat inaccurately as
"visible resemblance".
37G.E.L. Owen, "Plato on the Undepictable" in Exegesis
and Argument, eds E. N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, R.M. Rorty
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), p.351.
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40Guthrie, History, 5:178-179.
41 Owen, "Plato on the Undepictable", p.354.
42
Ibid.
43 Ibid., p.355.
44 Ibid., p.358.
45 These texts are suggested by Guthrie, History,
5:179-180, as implying Forms.
46
A clear majority of eminent scholars accept Forms as
present in the Sophist. They include Campbe 11,
The
Sophistes,
---------
253a, 254d and 254e
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(ad lac. ) , Friedlander,
Plato, 3:275, Guthrie, 5:147ff. and especially
5:149, n.2, IOosko, Plato's Political p.184 and
Moravcsik, »Plato's Divisions», pp.330ff. It is also
significant that commentators presenting works .s pee i a liz t'1 )
in Plato's late ontology take the existence of Forms in the
Sophist for granted and do not feel the need to argue for
it: see Edith Watson Schipper, Forms in Plato's Later
Dialogues (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp.34ff. and
Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983), p.183.
47
Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.197. See also
Friedlander, Plato, 3:299.
48The reference is of course to the Apology 38a: c"0
, 2:a •
aVE~ETaaTOS PLOS au ~LWTOS av8pwnw».
\
49
Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and
Ancient Political Theory (Oxford:
------- --------- ------
p.181.
50Gill, »Plato and Politics",
Basil Blackwell, 1978),
p.162. Gill's statement
refers to the impossibility of an absolute ruler remaining
incorruptible which is a cardinal position of the Laws (it
has to be added that even if Plato does not accept the
strong form of this position already in the Politicus, at
least he clearly moves towards it). Gi 11 also assumes that
»[tlhe starting-point of this realistic appraisal of human
nature is Statesman 300-303 rather than 291-300"
(Ibid. ). On this point I am in agreement with him. Although
293-300 provides the first
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evidence of Plato's "second
thoughts on government» (Ibid.), the real locus of Plato's
change of attitude is indeed 300bff.
51
Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.191.
52 a s _
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[apETns] (306b).
53
See Eve Browning Cole, »Weaving and Practical Politics
in Statesman», The Southern Journal of Philosophy
29, 1991, p.203, who refers to Thucydides 1.31-1.44,
3.37-3.49 and 5.85-5.113 (p.207, n.19) and Melissa Lane's
unpublished New Angle of Utopia: the Polit.ical Theory of
the Politicus», pp.7-8, which refers t.o the first and third
of these examples.
54
Lane, "A New Angle", p.7.
55
Ibid., p.2.
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Ibid., p.5.
57See 306e-308a and 308e-309a.
58Lane, »A New Angle", p.ll.
59Skemp, Plato, The Statesman, p.223.
60
It is my view that the Politicus' interest in history
has not received its due attention by commentators. The one
considerable exception is Lane, »A New Angle", passim.
61 Skemp, Plato, The Statesman, pp.222-223.
62 Guthrie History, 5:191-192; Klosko, Plato'sSee
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Political Theory, p.194j Miller, The Philosopher,
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pp.107,;.108.
63Skemp, Plato, The Statesman, p.222.
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Ibid., p.223.
65
Klosko Plato's Political
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Theory, p.194. For a similar
argument emphasizing the importance of the Scientific
Ruler's enterprise see Miller, The Philosopher,
-----------
p.108.
66
Guthrie, History, 5:191 and n.2.
67
Ibid., 5: 192.
68
I do not agree with Skemp, Introduction to Plato,
- ----
Statesman, p.65, who writes that this "takes us a long
---------
The
way
from Republic, VIII, with its unfriendly picture of the
democratic man and is really the greatest practical
acknowledgment of the merits of democracy to be found in
Plato, since the Laws, though technically approving
democracy to an even larger extent, does not mean by it
anything 1 ike the Athenian democracy but only Plato's own
small citizen body of landholders all having votes". But the
Politicus includes in seed a number of concepts which lead
to a more pro-democratic predi~vJrOY( and which are fully
developed only in the Laws. So in the Laws the absolute rule
of the scientist is abandoned as an impossibility and human
law is elevated to the position of the major criterion of
good government. Some practices of the Athenian democracy
are partially approved and, even on the constitutional
plane, democracy is not mainly characterized by its
impotence but becomes one of the two principles of the
state's constitution (the other being monarchy).
69Bobonich, "Ordinary People", p.2S.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1
There are a number of passages, scattered throughout the
dialogue, which demonstrate that Plato's ideological
commitment remains essentially aristocratic. So, in 630b he
attac}<s mercenaries for being in their vast majority
"Spacre:i:s Kal. ~OI.KOI. Kal. cU~pl.crTal. Kal. )acppove:crTaTOI. crx e () 0 v
c •
aTTaVTWV". Mercenaries came predominantly from the lower
social strata and did for money what in the traditional
Greek moral code one should do only for one's i . e.
fight in war. This explains why "[wlriters of oligarchic
sympathies sometimes abuse the mercenaries bitterly" (G.E.M.
De Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek world
(London: Duckworth, 1981), p , 295). Plato's absolute contempt
for them is therefore indicative of his political ideology.
Of similar vein is also his praise of the Egyptian adherence
to a strict prohibition of any innovation in art (656d-e)
which is sharply contrasted to the "8e:aTpOKpaTLa TLS TTOVnpa"
that according to Plato prevailed in his own days and which
he explicitly connects with (701a). Both the
praise ancient rules and the abuse on the democratic
public exercizing its prerogative to judge in artistic
contests (the :»oX AOS" is "II e Xo Eo s " if they think they
can judge on matters concerning art-670b) are typical
instances of aristocratic ideology. The same is true of
Plato's fierce attack on trade
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(705a) and on tradesmen
(831e-832b) who are depicted as individuals corrupt and
sinister beyond help. Tradesmen of course were the specific
class in Athens who bound their fortunes with the expansion
of the Empire, vital for their prosperity, and in general
supported the democracy faithfully.
Plato also reveals his ideological preferences in
attacking naval power. He disapproves of naval battles
because for victory in them honours are attributed to
"rraVToOanous l<a L :JOU navu C"noUOaLOUS :Jov8pwnous" (707a-b) . He
even goes as far as to claim that the victories on land, at
Marathon and Plat.eai saved the Greeks from the Persians and
made them (morally) better, whereas the naval victory at
Salamis only made them worse (707b-c). This is a surprising
statement and as Plato knows all too well it goes against
common Greek opinion
c
( "0 L nOAAOL cEAAnVwV
TOUTO" -707b-c) . Plato's position becomes understandable when
one realizes first that the navy was manned by the poorest
citizens and second that the battle at Salamis was a crucial
event in the political history of Athens because it gave to
the lower classes who participated in it an opportunity to
increase their political power. As Aristotle puts it
(Politics 1274a 12-15) vauopX LOS llap
:J
e:v TOLS
c
o
:JI
aLTLOS lle:vO~e:vos
.
:Je:CPPOVL~oTLC"8n l<OL
CPOUAOUS
:J
OVTLTTOALTe:UO~e:vwv TWV ~nLe:Ll<WV" In view of his
aristocratic inclinations, there is little doubt why Plato
felt distaste for this development.
The recurrence of such
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attacks on aspects of democratic
ideology discloses that Plato remained an aristocrat at
heart until the end. The question then is. how this attitude
can be reconciled with the slightly more sympathetic
a pp ro a c h to democracy that Plato adopts in the Laws. This
issue is addressed in the text.
2 As Glenn R. Plato's Cretan City (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1960). p.113. remarks »although
there will be exactly 5040 lots. it does not follow that
there will be only 5040 citizens. as it is sometimes hastily
assumed. For we must not forget the sons and heirs of lot
holders; these wi 11 be liable to military service upon the
age of twenty (785b) and thereafter qualified to take
part in the elections; and at the age of thirty they can
hold office (785b). But none of these will count as the
owner of an allotment until his father dies and he has
succeeded him to the property».
3
Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood. Class Ideology and
Ancient Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) ,
p.183. The economic analysis of the Laws is the bedrock of
the authors' interpretation of the dialogue. The fact that
this analysis can be proved to be deficient makes their
whole interpretation more than questionable.
4 .I bid., p , 187.
Slbid. Wood and Wood's argument entails that there is no
real economic or political distinction among the four
classes. They are classes at because
essentially
they are the same class divided in four parts.
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6
Plato's interest in the right proportion is demonstrated
by the use of the notion of the "essential measure'" in the
Politicus, which was discussed in the previous chapter, and
by his insistence on the importance of proportionate (or
geometrical) equality in the Laws 757b-758a.
7
I t is more than obvious from the context that the law8
laid on this point are adressed to citizens. Trevor 1.
Saunders, Notes on the Laws of Plato (London: The Institute
- ---- - - ---
of Classical Studies, 1972) , pp.76-77, argues correctly that
in two close passages (841d and 845c) Plato uses the word
I,
EAEU8EpOS as a synonym for citizen rather than for free man.
It seems that Plato is dolng this in the whole section.
including. 842d.
8
This is how both R.F. StaIley, An Introduction to
Plato's Laws (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1983) , p.102, and
Trevor J . Saunders Later Political Thought ... in The
Cambridge Companion to Plato. ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1992). p.476, interpret Plato's
prescription for the abstinence of the lower classes from
some stages of the voting procedure. It appears that an
overwhelming majority of scholars are in favour of the
»working citizens'" view:
E. David, Spartan syssitia and Plato's Laws ....
American Journal ·of Philology 99. 1978, p.489. writes that
»[o]ne passage in the ·Laws £806d-e] gives a schematic
picture of the state which presents many similarities
to
such a Spartan-fashioned ruling
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minority based on serf
labour, but it should be remembered that this isolated
passage is in contradiction to the general picture of the
society Plato imagines in his last dialogue. The citizens of
the Laws' state are not similar to the Spartan "peers·
(homoioi); they are not meant to concentrate exclusively on
military and political activities, but are to be allowed
certain economic activities, especially in agriculture.
Those who insist on the difference between the Spartan
society and that of the Laws are certainly justified. The
passage mentioned above is, indeed, the exception rather
than the rule."
Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Law of Slavery in its Relation
to Greek Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1939) ,
p.22, writes that "Plato clearly recognized that his
citizens would be compelled, in greater or less degree, to
give personal attention to their lots, if not to engage in
actual manual labour .... Later, in his Plato's Cretan City
Morrow seems clearly inclined to accept the "actual manual
labour" interpretation (pp.531-532); although sensitive to
the fact that "[t]here is no glorification of physical labor
in Plato; it seems to be regarded as a disagreeable
necessity", he adds: " i t seems not to be intention
that his citizens shall be exempt from the care of their
property and from personal labor on their land."
Leo Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.BS, and
George Klosko, The Development
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of Plato's Political Theory
(New York: Methuen, 1986), appear also to accept the
same view. Thus Strauss writes that Plato "gives the poorer
citizens greater freedom to mind their own business" and
Klosko suggests that "[plerhaps the poorer citizens, who
have the fewest slaves, will engage in heavy physical
labour".
Finally StaIley, Introduction, who discusses the
subject at some length, finds four reasons for supporting
the view that citizens are expected to engage in
agricultural labour: the fact that there is no "prohibition
of agriculture" for citizens; the agricultural laws and the
Council election discussed in the text and Aristotles'
remark (Politics 1265a15) that an e n or mo u s territory would
be necessary to support five thousand and forty unproductive
families.
9
StaIley, Introduction, p. criticizes Wood and Wood
to whom he objects that "[mluch of the evidence suggests
that the citizens will be small farmers rather than
aristocrats". This is true of the third and fourth class,
but doubtful of the other two which have both wealth and
leisure. As a criticism of Wood and Wood it is correct,
however, because they assume that all citizens are to be
maintained by metics and slaves and they completely
disregard the differences, economic and political, between
the four classes themselves.
Less fortunate is StaIley's second criticism of Wood and
Wood. He says that
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"[nleither the metics nor the
slaves are intended to form permanent classes within the
state". But this is simply irrelevant to Wood and Wood's
interpretation, because their point is that these classes
are needed to sustain the citizenry, and whether they are
constituted permanently of the same individuals or there is
a constant flow of new metics and slaves in the city does
not influence their role in production.
10
Moses I. Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece,
ed. Brent D. Shaw and Richard p • Sa 11 er (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1981), p.. 114, writes: "the more advanced the Greek
city-state, the more it will be found to have had true
slavery rather than the »hybrid" types like helotage. More
bluntly put, the cities in which individual freedom reached
its highest expression-most obviously Athens-were cities in
which chattel slavery flourished".
This phenomenon looks paradoxical if examined in terms of
the degree of "liberty" existing in each Greek city, as
Finley seems to do. (In his statement advancement is
measured by the degree of freedom enjoyed by the citizens).
An excellent economic analysis of this problem, which also
has the advantage of clarifying how misleading modern
liberal notions can be when uncritically transferred to the
ancient world is given by De Ste Croix, Class Struggle,
- -- -- --------
p.141, who explains how increased political power for the
lower citizen classes could mean harder repression for
non-citizen classes and especially slaves: a city like
Athens just because it was
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a democracy and the poorer
citizens were to some extent protected against the powerful,
the very most had to be made out of the classes below the
citizens We need not be surprised l then l if we find a
more intense development of slavery at Athens than at most
other places in the Greek world: if the humbler cilizens
could not be exploited l and it was inexpedient to lry to pul
too much pressure on the metics, then it was necessary to
rely to an exceptional degree on exploiting the labour of
slaves l ' .
11
Aristotle makes a vague remark in Politics 1253b20-21
to some people supporting the notion that slavery is "TTapa
«puaLV" But from other sources we have precious lillIe
information suggesting that the institution was actually
seriously debated in the fifth and fourth centuries. For lhe
fifth century there is Antiphon's assertion that nature»
Greeks and barbarians are the same (Antiphon the Sophisl l
frag. 5), but . it is far from certain that Antiphon actually
questioned slavery: in Kerferd's formulation »[ilt may be
an implication of the opposition developed by Antiphon
between nomos and physis that all slavery is conlrary lo
nature l bul we have no record that he drew out lhe
implication l and it is nol sufficienl to argue thal he did
so condemn it because »he musl have done (G.B. Kerferd,
The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989) I p.156). Alcidamas in lhe fourth century
definitely condemned slavery, but only in the framework of
urging Athenian help for the
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Messenians against the Spartans
(Kerferd~ The Sophistic Movement~
--------
p.156). Therefore it is
not very likely that he was expressing a wider current of
thought on this point. There must have been some kind of
intellectual challenge to the institution of slavery for
Aristotle to make his remark~ but the lack of specific
evidence suggests that it could well have been a kind of
left-extreme mi nor ity view. Aristotle's vagueness at this
point is most unhelpful. At the end of the day, however, one
can only agree with Finley who writes: "How completely
always the Greeks took slavery for granted as one of the
facts of human existence is abundantly evident to anyone who
has read their lit~rature" (Economy and Society~ p. 97) .
Identical is also the position of De Ste Croix~ Class
Struggle~ p.284.
12
An excellent illustration of this fact is provided by
Thucydides in Nicias' speech to his troops during the
Sicilian Expedition: "[ilt is men who make the city, and not
walls or ships with no men inside them" (7.77).
13Finley~ Economy and Society~ p.81.
14 De Ste Croix~ Class Struggle~ p.288.
15
As M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press~ 1983)~ p.9~ puts it
""[rlule by the few" or "rule by the many" was a meaningful
choice~ the freedom and the rights that the factions claimed
for themselves were worth fighting for~ despite the fact
that even "the many" were a minority of the whole
population".
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16
Aristotle's definition ignores two factors which were
crucial for citizen status: ownership of land, which at
least in Athens and probably throughout the Greek world was
a prerequisite for one to be accepted as citizen (though
non-landowners could sometimes also qualify-see Philip Brook
Manville, The Origins of in Ancient Athens
(Princeton: Princeton University Prees, 1990> , p.95; and
autochthony, one's ability to trace one's ancestry from free
members of the community as far back as possible. In 451/450
B.C. Pericles institutionalized autochthony as a
prerequisite for citizenship in the strict form that both
one's parents should be Athenians. For an interesting
discussion of the relationship between citizenship and the
myth of autochthony see Nicole Loraux, The Children of
Athena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993>,
pp.6-21.
17
1 am referring to the distinction between the two
higher classes and the Producers. Plato only drew from the
social reality of his time in creating such a scheme. Nor
true that he attributed his third citizen class with a
productive role because he did not allow slaves in the
Republic. Gregory Vlastos, VDoes Slavery exist in Plato's
Republic?» in Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1973>, pp.140-146, argues
conclusively that slavery does exist in the dialogue. The
reason why no attention is paid to it is, in his opinion,
that »Plato [admits] slaves in
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his society without thinking
of them as a proper part of the polis" ( 141)p. .
18
Despite Plato's explicit assertion that the political
system of the Laws is halfway between monarchy and democracy
(756e), Aristotle is definitely right when he asserts that
the nOAI.TEl.a of the Laws has nothing monarchic about it but
is composed of democratic and oligarchic elements:
:t ,
"ou6
:tIEx o u a a <paI.VETal. ~ovapXLKov :tOU6EV. :taA).' KaL
6n~OKpaTLKa» (Pol itics, 1266a5-6).
19
Trevor 1. Saunders, "The Structure of the Soul and the
State in Plato's Laws", Eranos 60, 1962, p.43, n.1, writes:
" scorn for TO l3avauaov in Greece was generally reserved
for artisans and traders; farming was an eminently
respectful oc c u p a t i on not included in the general
contemnation (See e.g. Xenophon Oeconomicus IV 3, V 11)".
The remark is correct, apart from the fact that one should
be cautious not to identify what is an essentially
aristocratic point of view (Xenophon's political sympathies
are well-known) with the view of the Greeks in general. The
attitude that Saunders describes here is not the »Greek"
attitude but the »aristocratic Greek" one.
20
There is a problem here. Klosko, Plato's Political
Theory, p.212, is undoubtedly right when he remarks that
»[tlhere are numerous gaps and other difficulties in Plato's
account of the constitution of the state. To some extent
these can be attributed to the fact that Plato probably died
before completing the Laws"'. Al so Morrow, Plato's Cretan
City, writes that »Plato's account
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of the offices in his
state is at many points incomplete» (p.229) and that
"Plato's qualities as a systematic legal thinker are, in
part at least, responsible for [the] gaps in his account of
the offices" (p. 233). Nevertheless, there are a substantial
number of points in this account that are well established.
In our
those.
discussion in the text we will try to concentrate on
21
Whether women would be accepted in the Assembly is
unclear. Since women are to participate in military training
(B04d-B05c) and ~€I.S [ TQS) :tapx a s (7B5b) one could suppose
that they would. But as Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.157,
remarks "there is no hint that Plato has this point in mind"
in the discussion of the Assembly.
22 On this point see Strauss, Argument and Action, p.B5
and Morrow, Plato's Cr~tanCity) p.157.
23 Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.164.
24 StaIley, Introduction, p.113.
25 Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.177.
26 K'l o s k o , Plato's Political Theory, pp.213-214.
27
Ibid., p.212.
2B
By election or by lot, the Assembly is in both cases
the body responsible for this appointment.
29
It is however a step in a democratic direction that any
citizen can question the morality of one of the examiners
and bring him to trial (947e-94Bb).
is, in my opinion, a deficiency of both Klosko and
Morrow that in their discussion
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of the Assembly (Plato's
Political Theory, pp.212-215 and Plato's Cretan City,
--------- ------
-------
------
pp.157-165 respectively), they fail to point out that the
fact that state officials are not accountable to the
Assembly is the single most vital factor which deprives the
Assembly of becoming the ultimate authority in the polis.
31
Twice in the Politics Aristotle defines this procedure
of participation in the Assembly as oligarchic: in
1266a10-12 where the Laws is explicitly referred to (1266a1)
and in 1297a17-19.
32
M0 r row, PIa to'. s Cret a n Cit Y, P P . 158 - 159 .
33
This is exactly the measure ferociously criticized by
Socrates in the Gorgias 515e.
34
The first case is not p·er fee t 1 Y clear: PIa to refers to
"TTaVTEs" that bear or have borne arms (753b) . However, the
Greek strongly suggests that all will participate, not that
simply all will be allowed to participate. The second
passage (772d) is free from any ambiguity: "TTaVTa TOV On~ov"
means explicitly a full Assembly.
35
This is how Aristotle interprets the whole procedure
(Politics 1266a15-30). Morrow, Plato's Cretan City,
underplays the political intention of Plato's scheme:
"Plato's reason for excusing the third class from one day's
proceedings, and the fourth class from two, is probably
-despite Aristotle's suggestion of oligarchical intent- that
some of the poorer citizens could not neglect their affairs
for the whole period" But the socio-economic rationale to
which Morrow refers does not entail that there is not an
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evident political intention on Plato's part. The political
direction in which the p r o c e du r e points is fairly clear and,
whatever excuses one can find for it, Aristotle's
interpretation
valid.
of it as oligarchic remains essentially
36 The point is established by Morrow, Cretan
City, p.170 and followed by Klosko, Political
Theory, p.214.
37
Plato does not assign specifically this task in the
Laws, but since he follows an Athenian model it is most
likely that it would go to the Counci 1. The point is made by
Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, pp.175-176 and Klosko, Plato's
------- ------ -------
Political Theory, p.214.
--------- ------
38
For a full list of such assignments see Morrow, Plato's
-------
Cretan City, pp.173-174.
39
In Athens the Council was manned by equal
representatives of each tribe.
40
As Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.176, remarks: "the
elaborate procedure of selection Plato devises for the
council shows that he thinks it will be an important organ
of deliberation. It is indeed seldom mentioned after the
sixth book of the Laws; but this feature of Plato's text
like the rarity of references to the assembly may be taken
as evidence that the assembly and council are everywhere
presupposed as functioning in the familiar Greek manner".
4 1 Plato talks about a "tribal" court (956c), but as
Morrow has shown Cretan
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City, pp.257-261) in fact
he refers to the "familiar heliastic courts of Athens·.
There is little doubt that Morrow is correct on this point.
The interpretation that these courts are composed of members
of one tribe is unlikely for quite a few reasons. Morrow's
argument is that if Plato was referring to one-tribe courts
a) he would violate his principle of adhering to existing
Athenian constitutions, b) he would ascribe importance to
the tribes which are otherwise completely insignificant in
the Laws, c) he would have left undiscussed the case of
members of different tribes having a dispute and d) he would
not refer to these courts as "common".
42
Here Plato accepts an essentially democratic practice,
but he takes measures to avoid what he regards as the worst
manifestations
43
Morrow,
of
Plato's
s
OX>"OKpaTl.a.
Cretan City, pp.267-268, suggests that
this court actually usurps cases that, according to
767e-768a should be tried by the Assembly, and therefore
this provision is straightforwardly oligarchic. He also
compares this court with the Areopagus of Athens. Now, it is
beyond doubt that this "select" court is of aristocratic
inspiration. But does it rea 11 Y undertake cases that should
belong to the jurisdiction of the Assembly? This depends, in
my opinion, on how widely one interprets the term "crimes
against the state» (767e). Treason fall s
definitely under this description and Morrow is right on
this point. The other crimes referred to this court,
however, are primarily of a
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religious rather than of a
political character: temple robbing (854d-e), homicide
(87ld) or attempted murder (877b) and impiety (9l0c-d). But
given Plato's increasing concern about religious offenses
after the Seventh Book and the fact that he expects his
senior magistrates to be the upholders of religious
orthodoxy, there are good reasons for him to refer religious
crimes (homicide is also a strongly religious matter for the
Greeks) to a select court rather than to the Assembly. The
only case where the contradiction between the Sixth and the
Ninth Book is obvious is treason. But this only partially
justifies Morrow's point.
44 Ibid., p.289.
45 Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.2l4.
46 important since ·Aristotle, TheThis is all the more
Athenian Constitution, 9.1, asserts that democracy came
-------- ------------
about as a result of the judicial powers entrusted to the
people.
47
The reason for this seems to be that ~)..npos is
(690c) and therefore in a sense the god chooses his priests
on his own through the lot.
disagree with Klosko, Plato's Political Theory,
p.224, who believes that means [election and lot are]
employed fairly". There is little doubt that election is the
predominant means of appointment of state officials, whi Ie
the lot's role is minimal.
49 On the democratic connotations of arithmetical equality
see chapter 1, section 4.
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50
For a discussion of the lot in the context of Plato's
political intentions see Trevor J . Saunders, "Plato's Later
Political Thought» in the Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed.
--------- --------- - -- --
Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
p.474.
51
Politics 1294b8-10.
52
See StaIley, Introduction, p.119; Morrow, Plato's
Cretan City, p.162; Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.223.
53
For the procedure of their election see: Nomophylakes
753b-e; Examiners 945e-946c; Official for Education 766a-b;
Select Judges 767c-d.
54
In his Plato's Cretan City Morrow has demonstrated in
meticulous detail that Plato's Magnesia is by and large
modelled after the Athenian constitution of an earlier time,
roughly what in Plato's time was known as the naTpLOS
noALTELa. But Morrow, although including in his work some
specific comparisons between Platonic proposals and Solonian
measures, does not insist particularly on the relationship,
which, as it is argued in the text, is crucial for the
shaping of the Laws.
55 See Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 5.3.
56
The extreme oligarchs preferred to look as far back as
Drako. On the subject see Morrow, Plato's Cretan City,
pp.78-79.
57 See Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 12.1 and 12.5
where he cites, obviously with approval, Solon's poems
asserting that he conceived himself
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as a mediator. In a
cryptic _ remark in the Politics 1296a38-40 the philosopher
refers to »[o)nly one of a long succession of statesmen
[who) succeeded in introducing a social order of this kind
[a »middle constitution»)>>. He might well mean Solon who is
mentioned a few linea earlier (-1296a19) along with Lycurgus
and Charondas. Of the three Solon fits the description
better, although other possible politicians not mentioned in
the chapter could also be meant (Pittacus of Chius for
instance). T.A. Sinclair, Aristotle, The Politics
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p.171, thinks it is Solon
that is referred to here and in my opinion this is the most
plausible suggestion, especially as in 1273b39 Aristotle
describes Solon as "~£I..~aVTa t<aAws TnV lTOAI..TEl..av".
58
Aristotle's sympathies lay, to a considerable extent,
with the moderate oligarchs (see the Athenian Constitution
26-28 and his glorification of Theramenes in 28.5) and this
might have played a role in the way he understood Solon's
Reformation.
59 See
20d-21c and
e.g.
27b;
Protagoras 343a; Charmides 155a; Timaeus
---------- ---------
-------
Republic 59ge; Phaedrus 258c and 278c;
-------- --------
Symposium 209d.
60
Although Morrow does not press very far the
relationship of Plato's constitution to that of Solon, he
plainly agrees on this point (Plato's Cretan City, p.135).
three classes defined
Methuen, 1968), p.63,
61
Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates (London:
-----
--------
suggests that before Solon there were
in terms of military function: hippeis
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serving in the cavalrYI zeugitai constituting the infantry
and thetes with no military duty. Solon then established a
new higher class from the richer of the knights: this was
"the cream of the hippeis n and the highest Tl.~n~a in the
state.
62
See Ibid., p.67.
63
Ibid' l p.63.
64
If women are accepted in the Assembly (which is likely
though not certain) . Plato goes far beyond Solon. But at the
same time he goes far beyond his time as well. The measure
would indeed be unthinkable for the common male citizen of
the Classical era.
65 See Ar i s tot 1 e I The At hen ian Co n s tit uti 0 n , 8 . 1
66
Ibid' l 8.4.
67
Ibid. Aristotle states that despite this f a c t , the
Areopagus retained significant authority.
68
I bI d. I 9. 1.
69
Ibid. Aristotle might be referring exactly to this
first-level system of distributing justice when he uses the
word (appeal), since an appeal normally presupposes
a prior decision. This would mean that this system was
embodied by Solon in his judicial legislation. The passage
is not clear, however, and appeal might mean simply
resorting to a popular court.
70
Laws: On homicide 871dj on attempted homicide 877bj on
treason 856e. As regards Solon, see Aristotle l The Athenian
Constitution 8.4 and Ehrenberg,
366
From Solon to Socrates,
Socrates, p.66.
--------
71 At least it is taken as such by Aristotle, The Athenian
Constitution 9.1.
72
See Aristotle, Politics, 1274a19.
73 See Solon's poems cited by Aristotle, The Athenian
Constitution, 12.1 and 12.5.
74
Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.82.
75
In fact, Plato never uses the term lTOAI.TEI.O"
(mixed constitution).
76
Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.521, argues that "[t]his
passage, occuring· at the end of the third book and
concluding the preliminary discussion of principles, may
properly be taken as supplying the clue to the legislation
for Cleinias' Cretan colony which begins with the following
book".
77 Mixed Constitution inKurt Von Fritz, The Theory of the
------
--- -- ------------
Antiquity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p.80
Political
StaIley,
and Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, pp.525-526
------- ------
Aristotle is at least literally correct.
Introduction, pp.117ff., and Klosko, Plato's
------------
-------
Theory, p.222, simply attack his interpretation.
admit that
78 Von Fritz, The Mixed Constitution in Antiquity, p.80.
79Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, pp.52-527.
80StaIley, Introduction, p.120.
81 Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.223.
82Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.524.
Brochard, "'Les "Lois'"
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de Plato et la theorie des
idees", in Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie
-----------
moderne (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J . Vrin, 1926),
p.154, suggests that the "exclusively political" character
of . the Laws does not give Plato the opportunity to expound
the theory of the Forms, but this does not entail that he
has abandoned it. W.K.C. Guthrie, A History
-------
of Greek
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) ,
5:380, has criticized this expression as a "considerable
exaggeration", but even so Brochard has a good point:
Plato's orientation towards a practical conception of
politics in the Laws makes the dialogue a work inappropriate
for the expression an elaborate metaphysical theory, in
the sense that Plato's main interest throughout almost the
whole of the Laws lies in actual political institutions and
the way they could be adopted in a "second best" state,
rather than in a transcendent theory that would justify this
sta te. Brochard also supports his claim with a successful
analogy: "If Spinoza, in the Tractatus Politicus, does not
speak of the distinction between adequate and inadequate
ideas, it is clear that nobody can legitimately conclude for
that reason either that he does not hold this theory any
more or that he has abandoned it» (p.154; all Brochard's
quotations are in my translation).
84
The theology of Book Ten supplements the theory of
Forms rather than repudiates it. The issue is discussed
below in the text.
85 Brochard, "La theorie
368
des idees", p.154, strongly
supports the case of Forms in the Laws but he nevertheless
writes: »Let us recognize then from the beginning that one
can go through all the twelve books of the Laws without
encountering, even once, a formal and explicit mention of
the theory of the Forms».
86
Saunders, "Plato's Later Political Thought", pp.467-468.
87
See 818e and 886b.
88 Quite surprisingly, Karl Popper, The Open Society and
its Enemies (London: Routledge and Kegan Pau I, 4th ed. rev. ,
1962) , p.215, n.5, takes the passage in 739d-e to prove the
existence of Forms in the Laws. But here there is nothing
more than an assertion of the point about common property
that is made in the Republic. Nothing in the language of the
text indicates a reference to Forms. If one wanted to
connect this passage with Forms one would have to show why
it is necessary that common property in the Republic entails
Forms. Popper does not give any arguments for his position
and is therefore unjustified to read Forms in this passage.
89
A similar point is made in the Politicus 274c-d.
90
Brochard, theorie des idees", passim, provides the
most detailed defence of this view. Popper, The Open Society
1:215, n.5, finds seven passages in the Laws suggesting
Forms, but provides no argumentation for this position
whatever. Guthrie, History, 5:378-381, takes a somewhat
-------
paradoxical stance by denying that there is a clear
reference to the Forms in any of the passages referred to by
either Brochard or Popper, but
369
in the end agreeing with
their conclusion. Harold Cherniss. Selected Papers. ed.
Leonardo Taran (Leiden: E. J • Brill. 1977) • pp.3B5-3B7. gives
some good reasons for accepting Forms in the Laws. 1. A.
Stewart. Plato's Doctrine of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon.
1909). p.106. believes that 965c-966a proves the case beyond
dispute, but he does not offer detailed argumentation.
Joseph P. Maguire, "Plato's Theory of Natural Law», Yale
Classical Studies 10, 1947, pp.169-171, argues that we can
assert the existence of Forms in the Laws both in the Tenth
and the Twelfth Books. Leo Strauss. Argument and Action,
pp.1B3-1B4. claims that lithe ideas retain in the Laws. if in
a properly subdued or muted manne r • the status which they
occupy. say, in the Republic.»
Saunders. »Plato's Later Political Thought"', pp.465-469
and Klosko, Plato's Political Theory. p.235 are inclined to
accept the same conclusion, though neither expresses
certainty on the subject.·
91 Br o c h a r d , liLa theorie des idees"', p.15B.
92
Ibid.
93Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.553.
94
Another of Brochard's arguments ("La theorie des
idees·. p.160), is that Forms are implied at B17e-B1Ba.
where Plato writes that all citizens should know the basics
in calculat.ion, geometry, stereometry and astronomy, but
only few, t.o be identified at. the end of the work, ought to
have deeper knowledge of them. But not. only, as Guthriea
has remarked, is dialectic not mentioned here (History,
-------
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5:381), but also this better knowledge to be acquired by the
few is left completely unexplained and the language of the
passage has nothing whatever to do with language associated
with Forms. Brochard wants to link this passage with the
crucial passages in the Twelfth Book. But the passage in
817e-818a in itself is too vague to allow for this link; we
can assert that the to obtain deeper knowledge are the
members of the Nocturnal Council, but this does not prove
anything in itself. Therefore it is questionable whether
this passage provides the slightest clue in the search for
Forms in the Laws.
95 See Cherniss, Selected Papers, p.385, n.3.
96
This point is underlined by Saunders, "Soul and State",
p.45. Saunders concludes that the Nocturnal Council
corresponds exactly to the Rulers of the Republic. This
question is addressed in the next section.
97 Guthrie, History, 5:381.
strongly disagree with Guthrie, History, 5:379, that
the word in this context could mean simply "sort" or "kind".
This, I believe, is highly unlikely in the context of a
discussion of virtues.
99 Cherniss, Selected-Papers, p.385, n.3.
100
Plato's strict attitude on this point appears even
more uncompromising if we consider that this practice was
not in fact part of the Greek political or religious
culture. See James K. Feibleman, Religious Platonism
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971>, p.39.
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101
Brochard, "La theorie des idees", pp.164-165.
102
Strauss, Argument and p.185, presents the
superiority of the metaphysical inquiry to the theological
one as the reason that proves the existence of Forms in the
Laws. I agree with his comment on the hierarchy of the two,
bul lhis would definitely nol be sufficient proof of lhe
presence of Forms in the dialogue wilhout lhe lextual
evidence and lhe linguistic analogies presenled in the text.
103
The first to· suggest this interpretation was Arislolle
(Pol itics 1265a3-4) ..
104-
Klosko, Plalo's Political Theory, p.235.
105 Guthrie, History, 5:369.
106 Saunders, "Soul and Stale", p.43.
107
Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory,
1918; reprint ed. (London: Methuen, 1960), p.406.
108 In lhe second Parl of his Plato's Cretan City Morrow
proves by detailed argumentation that almost every little
piece of Plato's legislation is based on existing Greek
institutions.
109
According to Morrow (Plato's Cretan City, p.500 and
n. 2) , this obvious contradiction has made some commentators
suppose that the Nocturnal Council is not Plato's invention,
bul was introduced by Philippus of Opus, or at least that it
was a kind of afterthought, hardly integrating with the rest
of the Laws. But there is no reason to accept this extreme
interpretation since there are good philosophical grounds
for taking the Council as an integral part of Plato's
372
initial plan. At this point I am in agreement with Morrow
(pp.500ff.), who provides an adequate defence of the
position that the Council does not contradict in any
insoluble way the rest of the dialogue. The issue is
discussed at length in the text below.
110
See 301c-d.
111 Gregory Vlastos, »Socratic Knowledge and Platonic
HPessimism"» in Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.215, n.25.
112
Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p.512.
------- ------
113Saunders, »Soul and State», p.45.
114
There is some ambiguity in the texl regarding whelher
this procedure applies lo all changes in the law or only to
amendments lo the laws concerning choruses. Morrow, Plato's
Cretan City, p.571, n.54, remarks that "the context shows
that it is the laws regarding the canons of dancing and
choruses that Plato has in mind here .... He admits lhough that
... (tlhe language of 772cd could be interpreted as actually
prescribing this procedure for all changes in the laws». In
my opinion the latter interpretation is preferable for two
reasons: first, the critical passage referring to revision
of the law (from 't'WV TTE:pl. onwards) is stated in
general terms, i . e . there is no indication that Plato here
has in mind merely the particular laws about choruses.
Secondly, this is the only case in the Laws where such a
procedure is described and therefore it is very likely lhat
it is intended to cover all similar instances.
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115
StaIley. Introduction. p.112.
116
See e.g. Repu~lic 496a-b;
--------
Politicus 293a; Laws 875c-d.
117
Kf o e k o , Plato's Political Theory.
118 See the metaphor in 961d.
119 See 666b and 818e.
p.236.
120Strauss. Argument and Action. p.180.
121
The scrutineers are of course members of the Nocturnal
Council. but they are not the only ones. What is more
important. however. is t.hat they are not honoured as members
of t.he Counc i 1. but in the i r capac i ty as SCTut i neer a ,
122 This idea is hinted at by Strauss in his final comment
on t.he Laws (Argument and Action, p.186).
123See StaIley, Introduction, p.3.
124
Morrow's (Plat.o·s Cretan C i t.y, p.512) first objection
to the thesis that this passage "proves" Plato's intention
to give full power t.o the Nocturnal Council is that it is a
»peroration». This is formally correct, but s t I 11 nothing
would preclude the possibility of a peroration containing
import.ant philosophical points. Morrow has a better argument
when he shows that the Council is not designed to be
permitted to override the law and that such an
interpretation would invalidate all the principles that
Plato employed in the Laws until t.he closing page: "Is it
possible that on the very last page Plato completely
reverses himself and repudiates not only what he just said.
but also the fundamental principles he has insisted upon in
three hundred and forty-five
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previous pages of text? To
assume this is to violate all sound criteria of
interpretation» (p.513).
Klosko, Plato's Political Theory,
------
p.241, has suggested
that »Morrow somewhat weakly attempts to undermine the force
of this line». But even if there is a degree of weakness in
the "peroration» p,~Z}umen t , Morrow has definitely a tenable
position overall, since he has demonstrated two things:
first, that Plato employs on a large scale historical
precedents in the construction of the Magnesian
institutions, the point of which i 8 to ensure that the city
will be reasonably successful even though it is based on
common experience instead of philosophical wisdom; and
second, that the Nocturnal Council is supposed to operate
within the law rather than against or beyond it.
125
One could of course suggest that the hypothesis in
this passage is used in a trivial manner, i . e . that it is a
facon de parler. If 969b is taken in this way the
interpretation we suggested in the text would be
invalidated. However, this is obviously a critical point of
the Laws, indeed Plato's final remark in this lengthy
dialogue, and both the possibility of the Nocturnal
Council's
issues of
emergence
the
and
Twelth
its
Book
political
and
role
actually
(i . e.
of
two
the
major
whole
dialogue) are discussed here. I find it therefore unlikely
that Plato would not pay particular attention to the
syntactical form in this passage, or that this form would
not have any philosophical significance.
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Moreover, one can
understand why the author would be cautious with regard to
his commitment to the appearance of a body with the exalted
knowledge of the Nocturnal Council in an actual Greek city
inhabited predominantly by Dorians.
126
My translation.
127
Saunders# »Soul and State"'# misses this point
when he argues that the inability to "6ouval.. AO/SOV" which is
described in 966b as :t»av6paTTo6ou is a characteristic
of
:t
opBn There is abundance of evidence in the Laws
that Plato operates with a conception of such a doxa which
is full Y appropriate for citizens; on Saunders'
interpretation# every citizen except for the members of the
Nocturnal Council would then be an
:t
avopaTTo6ov; but this is
incompatible with the trust that Plato displays towards the
,
:t
open of the average Magnesian citizen by allowing all
the formal offices of the state to be filled by men who
operate on the basis of right opinion.
128
Blair Campbell, "'Deity and Human Agency in Plato's
History of Political Thought p.441, defends
on different grounds the npriority of #'opinion" over
metaphysical insight» in the Laws and cites as examples the
passage in 951c referred to in the text and 665d where the
chorus of the elders is characterized as the of
the city because of their age and their phronesis (Campbell
obviously infers from these texts that Plato has in mind
their experience here and this is quite probable). There is
little doubt that Plato
376
in many ways envisages a
gerontocracy in the Laws, but I do not think this can be
taken as full proof of his emphasis on experience, although
it could be an indication. In the Republic,
--------
for example,
where experience is dismissed as a gUide for political
action, the philosopher-kings have to be above a certain age
and to have experience, but it is not this experience in
itself which entitles them to power.
129
Klosko, Plato's Political Theory, p.204.
130
I bid., p. 205 .
131
StaIley, Introduction, p.180.
132
StaIley, Introduction, pp.181-182, isolates two
passages from Popper, on which the latter »relies heavily"
for his charges of collectivism against Plato: the first is
739c-d where Plato supports KOLVOKTn~oauVn of all goods.
StaIley accepts that Popper "is justified in citing this
passage as evidence of Plato's collectivism", but remarks
that "Popper is wrong to suppose that Plato ever considered
the community of family and property an attainable ideal».
However, I think it is wrong to discuss this passage in the
context of the Laws at a I I . Here Plato simply reinstates the
position of the Republic and indicates that there is a
socio-economic arrangement which is substantially superior
to that of the Laws. The fact however that he abandons this
ideal and works painstakingly to establish a very different
social structure in the Laws shows that this passage refers
to the ideal world of the Republic and not to the »second
--------
best» city of the Laws. It appears to me that not only
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Popper but also staIley misses this point. As for 942c-d,
where Plato emphasizes the importance of a leader in
military life, StaIley correctly remarks that Popper takes
the passage out of its context and that the charge of
»totalitarian militaris£m]» (Popper, The Open Society,
-------
p.103) should be weighed against rejection of Dorian
militarism in the early Books of the Laws.
133
However, as Morrow, Cretan City, p.375,
remarks »[dlespite this appearance of drastic censorship,
the procedure Plato proposes is-formally, at least-quite
similar to that followed at Athens.»
134
Kl o a k o , Political Theory, p.204, makes on this
point the caustic but justifiable remark that "[alt this
stage in his life Plato wishes to put an end to the age-old
battle between philosophy and poetry by declaring his
philosophy to be the only permissible poetry».
135
For a list of leading Platonists accepting this
position see Campbell, "Deity and Human Agency», p.417.
136 Campbell, »Deity and Human Agency", p.435, n.70.
137
The »puppet metaphor" is the one passage in the Laws
on which the assumption that Plato denies free human agency
for theological reasons can most forcefully be based. As I
have argued, this position is untenable. Campbell, "Deity
and Human Agancy", passim, examines the issue on the basis
of the theology of Book Ten and reaches the same conclusion.
Also Richard Mohr, Final Thoughts on Evil: Laws
x, 899-905», Mind 87, 1978,
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proposes a theological
justification of what could be called »free in Plato.
He writes that "[gliven that the Demiurge of the Laws x is
perfectly good (SOOd) and is not ignorant of evil goings-on
(S01d) and is also ready, willing, and able to eradicate
evil (S02e7-S03a1) and yet does not eliminate evil from
"small things" or "parts of the whole" (SOtb8, c1), we must
assume that the Demiurge's action or rather inaction with
regard to small evils is actually a choice for the best»
(p.S73). From this point of view .. the Demiurge supposes the
whole which he constructs of parts that are both good and
bad is better than a whole of only good parts. The specific
advantage to the whole of permitting ev i 1 souls to exist
seems to be the preservation of something like the free-will
of moral agents c ~aUTns l3 o u }.. n a Lv , 904dS)" (p.S74).
138
The state's response to this fact is then violently to
suppress atheism. Here Plato really goes over the top: even
atheists who do not attempt to "proselytize" anybody and
live an otherwise blameless life are to be jailed (S08b-e).
13S
There is a slight ambiguity in 688aff. Plato suggests
first that the lawgiver should aim at one of the four
virtues, but he immediately corrects himself by explaining
that the lawgiver "l)e:OL rrpos rra aa v ~ e v 13}..e:rre: LV"
(688b); and then he emphasizes that the highest virtue,
phronesis, ought to be uppermost in the lawgiver's mind. The
way to understand this swift succession of lawgiving aims
is, in my opinion, the following: the lawgiver has to start
by aiming at one of the particular
379
virtues; because of the
essential unity of virtue. however, this means he will be
aiming at virtue 'as a whole. while the particular virtue he
first targets will be merely a starting po i n t. The good
lawgiver must. of course, be aware of this fact~ and not
lose sight of the whole when he aims at a part. The best way
for this to be achieved is by starting with the highest of
virtues. wisdom. Read in this way the passage proves Plato's
belief in a single virtue.
140
S't.a Ll e y , Introduction, p.45.
------------
141
StaIley. Introduction. p.44. finds 632d-e as posing
problems for the "unity of virtue n doctrine as well. In this
text Plato suggests that different institutions should aim
at different virtues. But this does not necessarily deny the
unity of virtue. because these institutions could still be
aiming at the whole of virtue. For practical reasons it
might be better for the lawgiver to start with a specific
virtue in mind. But if virtue is one. then the final aim of
the institutions wi 11 still be virtue as a whole. So, there
is no reason to take this passage as a downright rejection
of the essential unity of virtue.
142
Guthrie. History. 5:330.
143
S't a Ll e y , Introduction, p.57.
144
Ibid .• pp.57-58.
145
Although this can only be an educated guess, it is
likely that the disastrous outcome of expedition in
Sicily might have finally convinced Plato that in the
context of a civil conflict
380
reconciliation is better even
than the rule of the philosophically minded.
146
Plato insists almost unfai lingly in his provisions for
the appointment of Magnesian officials that the first
prerequisite for holding office is virtue.
147
StaIley, Introduction,
------------
p.48, makes this point
referring to Aristotle's use of phronesis in the Sixth Book
of the Nicomachean Ethics.
----------- ------
148
R.F.
Political
assumption
StaIley, "Persuasion in Plato's Laws·, History of
-------
Thought 15, 1994, p. 169, n.60, questions this
-------
the grounds that con Plato uses »T)IJEPOUIJEVOV" in
this passage (720d), the word being used in the Republic to
designate the taming of the irrational part of the soul.
Nevertheless, StaIley himself admits that the description of
the patient as
c
nlJe:poulJe:vov is "controversial" and even if
his linguistic point is accepted, the implication that the
patient is treated as a rational being is not cancelled out,
because in this case the doctor appeals both to his emotions
and to his rational capabilities.
149This has been forcefully argued by Christopher
Bobonich, "Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's
Laws", Classical Quarterly 1991. Glenn R. Morrow,
Conception of Persuasion", Philosophical Review 62,
1953, and StaIley, "Persuasion in Plato's Laws", cast doubt
on whether Plato intends the preambles to address the
rational part of his citizens, arguing that they are
directed to their emotional side as well. But the critical
issue here is that Plato's
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appeal to emotions does not
invalidate the fact that the preambles are also directed to
the rationality of the citizens. Plato would have denied
this rationality in his use of the preambles if he appealed
only to their emotional side. The fact that, as a good
psychologist, Plato directs his exhortation to both parts of
the citizens' personality demonstrates that he takes the
Magnesians to have reason as well as emotions. In the end,
both StaIley and Morrow accept that the use of the preambles
indicates an increa,sed Platonic acknOWledgement of ordinary
people's rational abilities. StaIley admits that »[tlhe
citizens of the Laws will certainly have a much truer
conception of the principles on which their state is based
than would those of the Republic n (npersuasion in Plato's
Laws n, p.175) and Morrow writes that the preambles are
npersuasion at the high level of rational insight suffused
with emotion» Conception of Persuasionn, p.242;
Morrow uses exactly -th e same expression in Plato's Cretan
City, p.558).
150
K'l c a k o , Plato's Political Theory, p.227.
151 One obvious example is Saunders, ·Soul and State»,
passim, who argues that the political and psychological
schemes of the two dialogues are identical. Friedlander,
Plato. The Dialogues: Second and Third Periods, trans. Hans
Meyerhoff. Bollingen Series, no 59, Vol. 3 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970) , 3:444, sees the spirit of
the early and middle dialogues prevailing in the end over
late turn to historical
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models (Socrates winning out
over Solon>. Wood and Wood, Class pp.183-202, find
in the Laws only the reinstatement of the political
doctrines of the Republic. Popper, The Open Society, passim,
uses the Laws to support conclusions formulated on the basis
of the Republic without arguing for any kind of connection
between the two. Barker, Greek Political Theory, p.406ff.
claims that Plato returns to the rule of the
philosopher-king at the end of the work. Finally, Zdravko
Planinc, Plato's Political Philosophy (London: Duckworth,
1991), explicitly follows Strauss in acknowledging the
philosophical significance of the Laws (p.156), but
otherwise treats its political message as similar to that of
the Republic.
152 Charles Kahn, "[Review of] Plato's Cretan City" by
Glenn R. Morrow, in the Journal of the History of Ideas 22,
1961, p.424.
153
One passage in the Laws which typifies Plato's
attitude towards human beings is 803b:
:H
" EO"T l. TOl.VUV TO
;)
OV8pWTTWV TTpollfJ a T a fJEV O"TTou6ns
;)
OUK
;) -OVOllKOl.OV fJn V O"TTou6aCEl.V " This statement is sometimes
interpreted as a purely negative evaluation of the
importance of human matters (see e.g. Klosko, Plato's
Political Theory, p.203). But although Plato clearly rates
importance
divinity,human
sti 11
issues
asserts
far
the
lower than
of
those
their
concerning
study: ;) -OVallKOl.OV is
he
a
powerful term indicating an inescapable necessity.
Therefore, man's significance might be nowhere near the
383
divine o n e , but still it is given a positive rating.
is on this point that I fundamentally disagree with
Wood and Wood (Class Ideology#
--------
pp.183ff.). Whereas they are
absolutely right to emphasize that in the socio-political
context of Classical Greece the exclusion of manual workers
from the citizen-body is an oligarchic device# they are
wrong to assume that all Magnesian citizens will be
labour-free aristocrats (see section 1) and to ignore the
considerable extent" to which democratic practices are
accepted in the Laws as part of the constitutional apparatus
of Plato#s city.
155 See Cretan pp.539-540,
Friedlander# Plato# 3:414, Walter Nicgorski# "'Cicero's
Focus"'# Political Theory 1991# p.249, n.33, and Thomas
Constitution,
White# Public Good: Thomas More#s Use of
of the History of Philosophy 20,
------- ----------
to Von Fritz, The Theory of the
------
"[t]he theory of the mixed
The
Journal
and
According
##pride
Utopia",in
pp.239-254.
I .
Mixed
Plato
constitution# in the narrower sense in which "'mixed
constitution'» means above all a system of checks and
balances# appears for the first time in Plato's political
writings'». Von Fritz refers to the Politicus when he makes
this but he argues for it mainly on the basis of the
Laws.
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